There are statements whose breadth is surprising, compelling us to reflect on their implications and the motives behind them. Statements that, when considered in full, expose the distance between the outlook of a leading European political figure and the reality as it can be observed on the ground. The figure is French politician Jean-Luc Melenchon, and the error he has made relates to the dynamics between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.
“Taiwan belongs to China. There is a problem, and it is for the Chinese to solve it. We must intervene with courtesy and respect, so that it unfolds calmly.”
With these words, Melenchon stepped beyond political, moral and strategic boundaries, with inevitable implications for how his potential governing approach would be interpreted should he win the next French presidential election.
To claim that “if China takes Taiwan and I am elected president, we will not intervene” is, in substance, to absolve Beijing for what would constitute the invasion of another state’s territory, while adopting a stance of neutrality — a neutrality that, in this case, still amounts to taking a side, as the issue at stake is the defense of a state’s sovereignty.
Choosing not to intervene would in itself be a deliberate act, as it would mean declining to defend — even at the level of communication — a country subjected to an invasion.
Melenchon is undoubtedly aware of this dynamic, yet his ideological sympathy toward China appears strong enough to subordinate any political, moral or strategic consideration. A Chinese move against Taiwan would, after all, amount to the invasion of another sovereign state, with all the implications that follow.
Melenchon’s stance is grounded in a long-standing affinity with China, a country he has repeatedly portrayed as a more credible partner than the US. This closeness is substantial enough to have taken the form of a concrete promise: If elected, he intends to deepen the relationship between France and the Asian power.
Melenchon made this point last year, offering an additional clarification of his intentions on the front of relations with Beijing: “I firmly believe that one day we will have a La France Insoumise (LFI) government capable of asserting sovereignty over our domestic production and foreign policy: one that understands that China is not a systemic threat to us. This is the vision I am campaigning for.”
If we look back to 2021, another significant divergence emerges between Melenchon’s position and that of European leaders on China policy.
When then-US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan despite Beijing’s strong objections — which it portrayed as a violation of its sovereignty — Melenchon sided entirely with China’s view, going so far as to describe Pelosi’s trip as “a provocative gesture,” echoing Beijing’s own language.
By accusing the US of seeking to “open a new front,” Melenchon showed yet another area of convergence with China, which has for years advanced the narrative that it is Washington’s “hostile actions” that are laying the groundwork for a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing welcomed his comments with clear satisfaction, publicly thanking him for his steady support of the “One China” policy, which China reads as acknowledgment of its sovereignty over Taiwan.
Considered in their entirety, Melenchon’s statements and actions paint a picture that clashes with the notion of a progressive leader attentive to international law and to the protection of those whose dignity, rights and freedoms are violated.
Despite the evident nature of China’s political reality, the LFI leader continues to advance a political agenda unfavorable to Taiwan, not only by denying any intention to support the Taiwanese — should China launch an attack — but also by validating Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over Taiwan.
That amounts to a political, moral and strategic error rooted in the stance Melenchon has taken toward China. Rather than defending the sovereignty of a nation threatened by an authoritarian neighbor, the French leader promotes a model that legitimizes a neutrality which, in practice, overlooks the democratic struggle of a nation fighting to preserve its autonomy, freedoms and democratic institutions.
In doing so, Melenchon once again fails to shift course on a matter of great significance — the China-Taiwan question — where he continues to uphold positions that render him ill-equipped to assume the symbolic mantle of a “defender of the free and democratic world.”
Michele Maresca is an analyst at Il Caffe Geopolitico, an online international law journal, and the think tank Geopol21.
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