From the Iran war and nuclear weapons to tariffs and artificial intelligence, the agenda for this week’s Beijing summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is packed. Xi would almost certainly bring up Taiwan, if only to demonstrate his inflexibility on the matter.
However, no one needs to meet with Xi face-to-face to understand his stance. A visit to the National Museum of China in Beijing — in particular, the “Road to Rejuvenation” exhibition, which chronicles the rise and rule of the Chinese Communist Party — might be even more revealing.
Xi took the members of the Chinese Politburo Standing Committee to the exhibition in 2012, just weeks after taking power, using it as the backdrop for his declaration that the biggest “Chinese dream” is the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” He expanded the exhibition in 2018 with a glitzy annex devoted to his own achievements: an entire floor of military dioramas, scale models of warships and missile launchers, and displays of China’s technological mastery, from deep-sea submersibles to semiconductor fabrication.
The annex provides a glimpse into how China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong (毛澤東) sees his place in history. However, to understand its message, one must first consider what is not there. Although Xi considers “reunification” with Taiwan to be a keystone of his vision for national rejuvenation — putting it at the “core of China’s core interests,” as a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson said — the nation is not mentioned in the exhibition.
What Xi’s annex does include is a series of photographs depicting how another illustrious Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), compelled the British to hand over Hong Kong in 1997. There was no invasion; no shots were fired. Instead, Deng ensured British capitulation by accumulating overwhelming leverage and maintaining a firm stance.
Xi intends to apply a similar strategy to Taiwan. The most likely crisis scenario is not a bolt-from-the-blue invasion, but a slow-motion coercion campaign to strangle Taiwan.
For example, China could declare a “customs enforcement zone” around the nation, requiring commercial vessels to register at Chinese ports before entering Taiwanese harbors. It could expand its military exercises around Taiwan, thereby normalizing the presence of warships in the area and creating a rolling quasi-blockade.
China could also pressure multinationals to reclassify Taiwan as a Chinese market, severing its economic identity one contract at a time.
None of these steps would constitute the kind of dramatic act that would force the US to respond militarily. However, together they would gradually erode Taiwan’s autonomy, choke its economy and open the way for a “peaceful” Chinese takeover.
Economic and military coercion is only half the strategy; the other half is psychological. China would flood Taiwan with propaganda and disinformation to convince Taiwanese that US support is a mirage, and resistance against China is futile. Creating a sense of despair and inevitability would make a Chinese takeover far easier.
As one senior Taiwanese national security official said: “China’s war on minds may be even more important than the war on our bodies.”
The Trump administration could inadvertently bolster this campaign. Every careless statement positioning Taiwan as a bargaining chip or casting doubt on the US’ willingness to fulfill its security commitments would be highlighted. This is why Xi wanted to meet with Trump in the first place. Regardless of what is said in private, China would try to spin the meeting as evidence that the US is prepared to abandon Taiwan. If Trump is not careful, that would be the story.
Xi has instructed the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to be ready for a fight. He has donned fatigues and inspected scale models of the Presidential Office Building on the plains of Inner Mongolia, where troops rehearse decapitation strikes. A successful move against Taiwan would cement Xi’s status as one of China’s greatest leaders, but a failed invasion would destroy the legacy he has already built and chronicled in that National Museum annex.
Xi understands this well. As ambitious as he is, his self-imposed deadline for “rejuvenation” is 2049, at which point he would be 96. This is not the timeline of a man who would pursue a rash invasion. Xi evidently believes that if China keeps getting stronger and thinking strategically, the problem would eventually solve itself. As the US dithers and the Taiwanese lose hope, China would be able to coerce Taiwan into submission.
Denying Xi this theory of victory would require the US to work with its allies to establish a joint playbook for “gray zone” scenarios — quarantines, economic coercion and military intimidation that fall short of armed attack. However, such an effort depends on allied unity. The US must therefore bolster its coalition with Australia, Japan and other partners.
At the same time, Washington must avoid rhetoric that convinces Xi that his window is closing, while reassuring Taipei that its commitment remains credible, including by pursuing agreements with Taiwan on energy, technology and trade. If Taiwan’s leaders and citizens become convinced that they are on their own, China’s psychological strategy would have succeeded, and its hand would be much stronger.
At this week’s summit, Trump would be facing a patient, perceptive and ambitious leader. The best way to safeguard Taiwan’s autonomy is to ensure Xi never receives the signal that patience is no longer required — and that Taiwan never doubts who its friends are.
Eyck Freymann is a fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the author of Defending Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War with China.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
The White House’s decision to take a 9.9 percent stake in Intel Corp is looking like very shrewd business indeed. Since the government bought in at US$20.47 a share last August, the US chipmaker’s surging stock price has delivered the US a US$43 billion return. One of the reasons the investment has so far proved so sound is that the White House has made sure of it. According to The Wall Street Journal, Howard personally pushed deals on Intel’s behalf with some of the most lucrative clients imaginable. They include Nvidia Corp, the company at the heart of the AI
A single photograph can cut through a lot of noise, but it can also be used to misrepresent the truth. At the very least, it can concentrate the mind on something that requires further investigation. On Monday last week, Ma Ying-jeou Foundation CEO Tai Hsia-ling (戴遐齡) and former National Security Council secretary-general King Pu-tsung (金溥聰) held a news conference in which they showed a photograph of former foundation CEO Hsiao Hsu-tsen (蕭旭岑), now Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) deputy chairman. In the image Hsiao is seated next to Xiamen Taiwan Businessmen Association chairman Han Ying-huan (韓螢煥). The two men were holding
I first met Professor Ray Jiing (井迎瑞) as a film and documentary student at Shih Hsin University’s (SHU) Department of Radio Television and Film in 1988. The following year, he went on to become the director of the Chinese Taipei Film Archive — forerunner of the Taiwan Film and Audiovisual Institute (TFAI). Over his eight-year tenure, Jiing rescued and restored over 200 classic Taiwanese films. In 1997, he established the Graduate Institute of Studies in Documentary and Film Archiving at Tainan National University of the Arts (TNNUA), and I joined the program in his third cohort of students. Beyond a
President William Lai Ching-te’s (賴清德) May 20 second-anniversary address was not just a routine policy review; it was damage control. US President Donald Trump’s remarks — that he did not want to see anyone move toward independence and that the delivery of a major Taiwan arms package could depend on the progress of US-China relations — unsettled Taiwan’s public and created an opening for opposition parties to question whether Taiwan was being treated as a bargaining chip in Washington’s dealings with Beijing. Lai’s speech was designed to close that opening. The address covered the expected ground: sovereignty, cross-strait relations, defense spending,