Mon, May 18, 2026 page8

• Balikatan: Friends and enemies

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  I wrote this before US President Donald Trump embarked on his uneventful state visit to China on Thursday. So, I shall confine my observations to the joint US-Philippine military exercise of April 20 through May 8, known collectively as “Balikatan 2026.”

  This year’s Balikatan was notable for its “firsts.” First, it was conducted primarily with Taiwan in mind, not the Philippines or even the South China Sea. It also showed that in the Pacific, America’s alliance network is still robust. Allies are enthusiastic about America’s renewed leadership in the region. Nine decades ago, in 1936, America had neither military strength nor real allies in the Pacific and all Asia paid a price for unpreparedness. Our question at the end is, where Taiwan’s leaders, primarily its legislative leaders, believe Taiwan’s future lies. But for the time being, let’s look at Balikatan.

  Certainly, flying a 22,000 kilometers round-trip from Washington to Beijing and back last week for what was barely a two-day “state visit” signaled that Mr. Trump understands better than most the global security threat from State Chairman Xi Jinping’s (習近平) China. Everything Mr. Trump does (as opposed to what he says) reflects that rebuilding America’s “comprehensive strength” before it’s too late is his top priority. In a perverse way, the millions of pounds of high explosives detonated over Iran in the past two months have concentrated Washington’s collective mind wonderfully on the urgency of rebuilding America’s munitions infrastructure (not to mention its energy, information, aerospace, and manufacturing infrastructure). A mere glance at Mr. Trump’s bandolier best explains his hesitation to expand hostilities in the Strait of Hormuz. But at the other end of Asia, missiles were front-and-center at Balikatan; refurbished Japanese Type-88s sank a target vessel in six minutes, and new US Tomahawks were launched by the US Army’s new Typhon systems. HIMARS systems were also tested, as well as the US Navy-Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), all new for the Western Pacific.

  

  Not to be outdone, China’s navy deployed its own aircraft carrier task force south through the Taiwan Strait on April 20, followed by a second fleet of guided missile destroyers into the Philippine Sea on April 24.

  Here, let me interject a thought about diplomacy. The late Richard L. Armitage, a former deputy secretary of state, was fond of explaining that “diplomacy is the art of saying ‘nice doggie, nice doggie’ until you can find a big stick.”

  Armitage’s conflicted sentiments of sweetness and stick-grabbing describe President Donald Trump’s “National Security Strategy” (NSS) released this past December 4, his US$11.1 billion arms sales approval for Taiwan of December 18, the Pentagon’s Chinese Military Power Report (published on Christmas Eve), and the Department of War’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) released January 23, 2026. These illuminate how Mr. Trump approaches the Taiwan issue. As I read it, the new Trump NSS reflects a new urgency about the fragility of neglected sectors of America’s military and strategic power and therefore eschewed angry fulminations against adversaries like China. Language in the January NDS was even more subdued regarding China. That’s the “nice doggie” part.

  Mr. Armitage was channeling Theodore Roosevelt, America’s revered 26th president (1901-1909), who counselled: “Speak softly, but carry a big stick.” TR probably would not have considered many Trumpian outbursts as “speaking softly,” but Mr. Trump is all warm and fuzzy when it comes to China. “Speaking softly” also includes the barely noticed Pentagon “China Military Power Report” which was issued during a long Christmas vacation and then immediately eclipsed by a series of events on the day after New Year which sucked the oxygen from the news cycle. But the “Pentagon Report” also catalogued China’s super-sized military and naval might. That report, unobtrusive as it was, persuaded all US policy-makers of the urgency for a “big stick.”

  This year’s “Balikatan” was a big stick. Its 2026 iteration of combat maneuvers in the Philippines and along the South China Sea involved over 17,000 troops from at least five nations (depending upon how one counts), who participated in 18 days of tactical missile launches, live-fire, drone warfare, cyber warfare, island defense training, communications and headquarters/combat unit coordination. About 10,000 troops were American, around 5000 were Filipino, and the third-largest force at Balikatan was the 1,500-person Japanese contingent. About 400 Australian ground troops joined American allies for maritime air assault and counter-landing live-fire rehearsals.

  For the first time, in place of its normal delegation of embassy military attaches, Canada dispatched an RCN anti-submarine frigate, a light infantry battalion, special operations, cyber, military police and combat medics. Likewise, for the first time, New Zealand sent 70 military personnel, including a light infantry platoon — instead of observers. Australia has always been a robust participant in Balikatan with some 400 ground troops. For the first time, France’s “Pacific Theater Command” (Commandement pour le Pacifique — CPP) assigned 20 general staff officers to the Balikatan headquarters “to strengthen interoperability with allies and partners in the region.”

  And, also for the first time in post-war history, Japan’s combat Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) joined in combat maneuvers overseas. Japan’s 1,400-strong contingent was the third largest after the Americans and the Filipinos. The JSDF presence leant weight to Prime Minister Takaichi’s assertions on November 7, six months ago, when she first assumed the premiership, that China’s use of military force against Taiwan would likely constitute “a survival threatening situation” to Japan. She was specific. “If battleships are used and a naval blockade involves the use of force, I believe that would, by any measure, constitute a situation that could be deemed a threat to Japan.”

  This remark prompted China’s Consul General in Osaka, the incontinent Mr. Xue Jian (薛劍), to demand her “filthy neck” must “be cut off” (or words to that effect — I don’t read Japanese, but I think “勝手?突??????????首?一瞬?躊躇???斬????????。?悟?出??????” was the way he put it). Alas, Mr. Xue’s choice of words — particularly his cutthroat use of the character “斬” — did not have the intimidating effect he intended. Xue’s overly negative endorsement of the Japanese leader, coupled with President Trump’s enthusiastic approval a few months later, helped propel Mme. Takaichi to a landslide parliamentary victory on February 8, giving her Liberal Democratic Party an unprecedented post-war super-majority. Japan’s voters approved.

  One hesitates, after 81 years, to remind anyone that this is the first time Japanese military units have engaged in live-fire artillery, small arms, and anti-ship missiles in the Philippines since World War II. But when leaders of the Philippines welcome troops from Japan onto Philippine soil in an effort to help deter China’s might, one can say the world has truly changed. Communist China in 2026 is emulating Imperial Japan of 1936, with all of old Japan’s arrogance but none of its hastiness.

  Most Taiwan citizens should be heartened by Balikatan 2026. Balikatan’s success demonstrated that Taiwan has strong and committed friends in the region willing to intervene against China’s threats. Despite Balikatan, however, Taiwan’s political opposition, which now controls the disposition of the nation’s defense budget, has curtailed Taiwan’s defense acquisitions from the US and cut the cabinet’s defense request by a third — a move the US state department last week termed “unhelpful stalling.”

  The State Department sourly added that “further delays in funding the remaining proposed capabilities are a concession to the Chinese Communist Party.” Concession to the Communists, indeed! By alluding to Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) days of “Patriots shall never concede to brigands” (漢賊不兩立), the state department is signaling that the opposition’s pro-China leaders do not seem to be on democracy’s side. Some of Taiwan’s opposition insist that both sides of the Taiwan Strait share Chairman Xi Jinping’s (習近平) vision of a “great rejuvenation of the Chinese race”; some protest that “Taiwan does not want to be the next Ukraine.” If so, one must ask who in Taiwan benefits from the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese race”? Who benefits if Taiwan is the next Hong Kong?

  I’ll discuss future US defense sales, grants and assistance to Taiwan in my next column.

  John J. Tkacik, Jr. is a retired US foreign service officer who has served in Taipei and Beijing and is now director of the Future Asia Project at the International Assessment and Strategy Center. He is also on the Advisory Board of the Global Taiwan Institute.
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