The Control Yuan on Monday urged the judiciary to impose stricter punishments on military personnel convicted of spying for China and called on the armed forces to strengthen the management of classified information.
The government watchdog investigated two cases involving military personnel. One involved a member who was approached by Chinese agents after searching online for loan information, while the other involved a temple manager who recruited 10 active-duty members to help him obtain classified information for Beijing.
These cases demonstrated a “failure to thoroughly enforce the cybersecurity protection policy and subpar security awareness among military personnel,” Control Yuan members Lai Chen-chang (賴振昌) and Lai Ting-ming (賴鼎銘) said in a statement.
The cases were the latest in a trend of lenient sentences for those convicted of espionage, they said, citing Ministry of Justice data showing that the average prison sentence for national security breaches is 31.4 months.
This is close to 12 times shorter than the average sentence for similar offenses in other democratic nations and is lighter than penalties handed down to officials convicted of bribery or people found guilty of trafficking drugs, they said.
A case illustrates the contrast. A federal judge in San Diego in January sentenced former US Navy sailor Jinchao Wei, known as Patrick Wei, to 16-and-a-half years in prison for selling technical and operating manuals for ships and operating systems to an intelligence officer working for China. By comparison, a Taiwanese court on March 26 last year sentenced four soldiers, including three who worked in the president’s security team, to prison terms of up to seven years for selling “internal military information that should be kept confidential to Chinese intelligence agents for several months.”
The men took photographs of the information with their mobile phones and passed them to Chinese agents in exchange for money, a Guardian report said.
While money is not the only motivator in such cases in Taiwan — ideological factors sometimes play a role — financial incentives are often a key factor.
Shen Ming-shih (沈明室), a research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, said some recruited spies were lured by financial or sexual incentives, while others were motivated by resentment over their treatment or lack of advancement.
Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute and a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, said the financial incentive could be a major factor. While older cases often involved a mix of ideology reinforced by financial gain, “the motivation of these recent cases appears to be primarily financial,” he was cited as saying by the Business Standard on Aug. 24, 2024.
These assessments show that espionage could be mitigated through a combination of legitimate financial incentives and stronger deterrents. The military could offer debt-relief services to personnel experiencing financial hardship, while providing more opportunities for career advancement and wage increases for those with exemplary performance records.
At the same time, the judiciary could make espionage convictions so financially ruinous that the rewards of assisting China would be far outweighed by the consequences of being caught. For example, in addition to prison sentences, those convicted could face fines of up to 10 times the amount they received from China. These fines could be taken in installments from whatever income they earn after leaving prison.
As China might attempt to circumvent such penalties by depositing funds in Chinese bank accounts for Taiwanese collaborators, the government could impose international travel bans on those convicted of espionage after completing their sentences, depending on the severity of the offense.
However, punishments and incentives are unlikely to affect those who are ideologically motivated, which is why comprehensive vetting of personnel with access to sensitive information is essential. This process should include psychological evaluations as well as thorough reviews of candidates’ past political and social media activity.
While it is not illegal for Taiwanese to hold pro-China or pro-unification views, individuals with such leanings should not be eligible for positions that could allow them to compromise the sovereignty of the nation.
Longer prison sentences might help deter espionage, but addressing the issue effectively requires a multifaceted approach. In practice, this means combining tougher penalties with stronger incentives for loyalty, more rigorous screening of candidates for sensitive positions and improved management of information security.
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