China’s supreme objective in a war across the Taiwan Strait is to incorporate Taiwan as a province of the People’s Republic. It follows, therefore, that international recognition of Taiwan’s de jure independence is a consummation that China’s leaders devoutly wish to avoid. By the same token, an American strategy to deny China that objective would complicate Beijing’s calculus and deter large-scale hostilities. For decades, China has cautioned “independence means war.” The opposite is also true: “war means independence.” A comprehensive strategy of denial would guarantee an outcome of de jure independence for Taiwan in the event of Chinese invasion or occupation, even if it is only diplomatic recognition of a captive nation.
One might object that, goodness gracious, once the People’s Liberation Army invades and subdues Taiwan, a fat lot of good “de jure independence” is going to do. To be sure, should the People’s Liberation Army occupy Taiwan, its first order of business will be to dismantle the ROC Taiwan civil government and establish a puppet regime subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party. But at the very least, American diplomatic recognition of an independent Taiwan state immediately upon the commencement of hostilities would bolster Taiwan’s morale and deepen a sense of national identity, factors that have proven to be dramatic force multipliers in Ukraine and Israel.
Mr. Elbridge Colby, now the Pentagon’s top policy secretary, posited in his 2021 book of the same name that a “strategy of denial” is key to deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Five years ago, he believed “denial” was achievable with “rock-solid” defenses on Taiwan combined with credible external military assistance to defend Taiwan. Mr. Colby’s vision, however, addressed only the military dimensions of “denial.” The political dimension is equally important. Any strategy to deter Chinese military aggression must include a capacity to prevent China from thwarting Taiwan independence after hostilities erupt.
This requires three things:
First, that the ROC Taiwan government have a “continuity of government” evacuation blueprint in place. Beyond the morale factor of maintaining coherent government in a nation under siege, an “independent Taiwan” can continue to exist as a legally recognized entity beyond China’s reach. Either the existing “Republic of China” 1) will itself partially relocate to safety abroad, say, in Japan or the United States or some safe haven, to carry on international relations, or 2) will have designated some successor governing authority already in situ overseas, like the Taiwan Representative office in Washington, D.C. The necessity for the ROC Taiwan to have “continuity of government” is clear in the US’ “Taiwan Relations Act.” Trillions of dollars are in jeopardy otherwise. “Taiwan” maintains “ownership of, and other rights to, and interests in,” hundreds of billions if not trillions of US dollars in “properties, tangible and intangible, and other things of value” overseas. That is, bank accounts, foreign exchange reserves, government, military and naval properties, real estate, financial assets and the like. These are all reserved to the ROC (Taiwan) government regardless of China’s invasion or occupation.
If it hasn’t already, Taiwan should incorporate into its own “Multi-domain Denial, Resilient Defense” strategic plan something akin to Singapore’s “Total Defense” concept of ensuring continuity of government in exile should the homeland be invaded and occupied. It is of existential urgency that the ROC Taiwan government prepare to relocate to safety. Likewise, Taiwan’s keystone commercial, industrial, technology, insurance and financial institutions should have similar contingency plans, especially those international legal persons whose licensing and charters are established under Taiwanese law.
This may be the most difficult to achieve. The ROC is a constitutional democracy with a robust opposition. Alas, reaching consensus on “continuity of government” prior to actual hostilities is problematic. Ukraine’s people were divided between Ukrainian and Russian speakers even after the 2013 “Maidan Demonstrations” ousted a corrupt pro-Putin government. While Taiwan’s population is not so deeply divided, the March-April 2014 “Sunflower Movement” exposed similar cleavages in sentiment toward China. In 2026, Taiwan still cannot reach a consensus on the nation’s defenses. The goal of a multi-party government-in-exile that could function overseas in the absence of democratic elections, as its legitimating instrument may be elusive.
Second, there must be coordination with safe-haven countries to recognize and secure the ROC authorities’ continued operation in exile. This seems already under way. Taiwan has reached significant trade and investment agreements with the United States and several other countries, and I suspect that these have facilitated mutual understandings on serving as a safe haven.
Third, safe-haven states must commit to formal recognition of Taiwan’s independence once hostilities begin. The United States, at least, has a solid statutory foundation for immediate recognition of Taiwan’s independence. Under US law, Taiwan’s legal status as a “foreign country, nation, state, government, or similar entity” is already established. Indeed, ever since 1979, US law has defined “Taiwan” as “the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities.” So, whatever occupation authority the People’s Republic inflicts on Taiwan, that regime cannot, under US law, be recognized as a “successor” to “the authorities recognized by the US as the ‘Republic of China’ prior to January 1, 1979.”
In any event, with a continuity-of-government structure abroad, Taiwan independence will live on after any cross-Strait conflict, and international sentiment is likely to be very sympathetic.
Some will fret that US President Donald Trump is a deal-maker, not a diplomat, and he is temperamentally unsuited to confronting Chinese Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan Strait security in his summit with Xi next week. But in the spirit of “hear his words, observe his actions” (聽其言觀其行), Mr. Trump’s conspicuous reticence on Taiwan Strait security has been matched by his quiet display of genuine support for Taiwan’s security. His December 17th approvals of US$11.1 billion in new defense systems for Taiwan were the largest package of Taiwan arms sales approvals ever. And we hear that a bigger package is in the pipeline. This is unsurprising, given that the United States has more to lose than China has to gain from hostilities across the Strait.
There are obvious reasons for the Trump Administration’s fondness of Taiwan. Taiwan is now America’s fourth-largest trading partner (after Mexico, Canada and China). In its National Security Strategy issued four months ago (December 4, 2025), the White House acknowledged that “there is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan” in America’s strategic posture “because of Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production” — an understatement, to say the least. The White House’s “Strategy” explained that Taiwan is also crucial to American security, “mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters.” “Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan” is an American “priority.”
Presumably, all this National Security Strategy talk of “island chains” and “distinct theaters” assumes that China is the preeminent adversary. Hence, preserving Taiwan’s de facto independence from China is the real “priority” described by the White House NSS paper.
As Mr. Colby wisely counsels, denial is the most effective strategy “to deter and prevent large-scale military conflict.” If China is convinced that the likeliest outcome of Taiwan hostilities would be American recognition of Taiwan’s de jure independence — the outcome it most wants to avoid — it would be a real strategy of denial.
John J. Tkacik, Jr. is a retired US foreign service officer who has served in Taipei and Beijing and is now director of the Future Asia Project at the International Assessment and Strategy Center. He is also on the Advisory Board of the Global Taiwan Institute.
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