The world is experiencing a series of political, ecological, social and economic ruptures. Astonishing levels of wealth concentration and inequality have eroded development gains, accelerated social fragmentation and fueled civil unrest. According to the Indicators of Global Climate Change report, we are only three years from breaching the 1.5°C global warming limit set in the 2015 Paris climate agreement, increasing the risk of irreversible changes in planetary conditions.
These cascading crises are converging in the world economy. Insufficient climate finance from wealthy countries has led some developing countries to double down on fossil fuels. Moreover, an unfair debt system traps low-income countries in a cycle: Servicing short-term dollar-denominated loans with high interest rates prevents them from meeting development targets. Rich countries are unwilling to cooperate on stopping illicit financial flows and taxing billionaires and multinational firms, further undermining low-income countries’ ability to raise revenue.
This economic instability is inextricably linked to global democratic decline. When wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few, political discontent is sure to follow, as evidenced by the surge of far-right parties in Western democracies.
Strengthening democracy is essential to tackling these crises. At the national level, citizens must be at the center of decisionmaking regarding development policies and outcomes. At the international level, multilateral institutions and processes — including the G20, the UN Climate Change Conferences, and the Bretton Woods institutions — must be democratized to regain credibility and legitimacy. They have been too slow in addressing their shortcomings, and too focused on the developed world’s interests.
Examples abound of how multilateralism has reproduced inequalities. Developed countries offer climate finance in the form of guarantees for commercial loans, which increase debt burdens rather than build resilience. Time and again in Africa, ratings agencies and the IMF’s lending requirements prevent governments from investing in inclusive growth and development. The global consensus is to pursue a private-sector-led green transition, but this approach intensifies precarity for those who contributed the least to global warming but are most vulnerable to its effects.
The decisions and actions taken in the interest of global capital have expanded the ranks of so-called “surplus people.” These populations on the margins include workers made redundant by multiple and convergent socio-technical shifts, communities displaced by mine closures and climate shocks, and households pushed into poverty by soaring food and energy prices.
So, what can be done? To answer this question, civil-society groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from across the global southare tomeet with our global north allies at the People’s Summit for Global Economic Justice on the sidelines of the upcoming G20 Leaders’ Summit in Johannesburg. In keeping with the meeting’s theme — “We, the 99%” — the attendees must work together to map structural alternatives to the “societies of enmity” produced by capitalism. The goal is to develop a locally rooted but globally connected program of action for achieving economic justice.
Chief among the proposed solutions to be deliberated at the People’s Summit is a wealth tax on ultra-rich individuals and companies under the auspices of the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation. Such a tax is technically feasible and politically necessary to address the interconnected financial, sovereign-debt, and sociopolitical crises destabilizing advanced and developing economies alike.
Another important solution is scaling the availability, accessibility and affordability of public climate finance, as provided for under the Paris agreement. Given that advanced economies rely on developing countries for the commodities that fuel their industrial growth, financial and technological support must flow in the opposite direction to ensure development gains and to compensate for the extensive loss and damage caused by the escalating climate crisis.
Given that South Africa’s G20 presidency is focused on solidarity, equality and sustainability, we are approaching these structural alternatives as an ethical project of repair that reflects our shared vulnerability and views the Earth as our common home. To mitigate economic injustice and the risks it poses to our democracies, we must coordinate our voices, resources and networks to create a coherent political program that respects the planet’s boundaries and builds power from below.
However, neither this political program nor the movements that carry it forward can emerge on their own. They must be cultivated, coordinated and provided with resources. Civil and social movements must go beyond the outdated architecture of the “NGO era” and start building scaffolding for resilience. That means investing in projects that advance people’s aspirations for just and inclusive growth and development.
Sekoetlane Phamodi is director of the African Climate Foundation’s New Economy Hub in South Africa.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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