The US Senate’s passage of the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which urges Taiwan’s inclusion in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise and allocates US$1 billion in military aid, marks yet another milestone in Washington’s growing support for Taipei. On paper, it reflects the steadiness of US commitment, but beneath this show of solidarity lies contradiction.
While the US Congress builds a stable, bipartisan architecture of deterrence, US President Donald Trump repeatedly undercuts it through erratic decisions and transactional diplomacy. This dissonance not only weakens the US’ credibility abroad — it also fractures public trust within Taiwan.
For decades, the foundation of US policy toward Taiwan has rested on institutional continuity. Through successive administrations, the US Congress has steadily embedded support for Taipei, from reaffirming the “six assurances” to authorizing multibillion dollar security assistance packages.
The recent NDAAs have gone even further, suggesting elevating Taiwan to the status of a “major non-NATO ally,” approving joint training programs and encouraging pre-positioning munitions in the region. The trajectory is unmistakable: Washington is shifting from declaratory policy to operational partnership.
Such measures are meant to help Taiwan deter invasion by making any Chinese assault prohibitively costly. Integrating Taiwan into RIMPAC would be a historic step toward embedding it in a wider regional defense network — one that includes Japan, Australia and other Indo-Pacific democracies increasingly wary of Beijing’s expansionism.
Yet the solidity of this congressional commitment contrasts sharply with the volatility of presidential decisionmaking. Trump has repeatedly treated Taiwan as a chip on the negotiating table with China. A vivid example came when a US$400 million military aid package was quietly shelved while the White House sought to ease tensions with China over trade.
From Trump’s blunt suggestion that “Taiwan should pay us for defense” to more recent moves pressuring Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) to shift production to US soil, Taiwanese leaders have watched Washington’s rhetoric of partnership collide with acts of self-interest. Each episode reinforces the uneasy perception that US support is conditional, reversible and transactional.
That perception carries serious consequences inside Taiwan. The nation’s democracy is increasingly polarized over what US military aid represents. To some, it is a vital lifeline that keeps authoritarian aggression at bay. To others, it risks turning Taiwan into a pawn in a superpower chess game.
Public opinion shows a sharp rise in what local analysts call a “US-skeptic” sentiment. Polling released by Academia Sinica’s American Portrait Survey showed that the share of Taiwanese who do not view the US as a trustworthy ally rose from 50 percent last year to 59.6 percent this year. Many Taiwanese wonder whether Washington’s ultimate goal is to defend Taiwan or to use it as leverage in its rivalry with China.
If Taiwanese lose confidence that Washington’s promises can hold under pressure, then the credibility of deterrence begins to crumble. No amount of congressional aid can offset the psychological effect of inconsistency at the top.
In the intensifying “gray zone” confrontation across the Taiwan Strait — daily air incursions, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns — morale and perception are as vital as missiles and ships. A Taiwan that doubts its partner is a Taiwan less capable of enduring coercion.
For the US, resolving this paradox is a strategic imperative. Congress can continue to legislate billions in support, but without coherent executive leadership to align policy with principle, the US’ deterrence rings hollow. Stability in the Indo-Pacific region does not hinge on the next weapons sale or exercise invitation, but on whether Washington can convince Beijing and Taipei that its commitments are consistent, credible and enduring.
The US’ greatest challenge might not be China’s aggression, but its own ambivalence. A defense partnership built on laws and values deserves steadier stewardship than a series of transactional gestures. For Taiwan — and for the democratic order that depends on its resilience — credibility, not capability, determines the balance of peace.
Meng Chih-cheng is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at National Cheng Kung University.
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