This month is the first anniversary of Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s presidency — he officially assumed office on Oct. 20 last year. As his first year draws to a close, a key question is how Jakarta plans to manage its posture toward Taiwan, an issue at the intersection of geopolitics, economics and diplomacy.
From the outset, Prabowo emphasized a foreign policy of being “a good neighbor” under a “free and active” diplomatic framework. In his inaugural address he pledged to steer Indonesia with independence of judgement and to avoid automatic alignment with any great power.
Indonesia under Prabowo has signaled adherence to a “one China” policy. However, Jakarta and Taipei continue significant informal ties. Taiwan hosts about 300,000 Indonesian workers, and the number of Indonesian students in Taiwan is also significant. The presence of these workers and students means the bilateral relationship is not just abstract diplomacy, but involves real people and livelihoods.
In October last year, a statement from Prabowo’s campaign office said that “good relations between Indonesia and Taiwan will continue” under his presidency. The same month, the head of the Taipei Economic and Trade Office (TETO) in Jakarta said Taiwan hoped for “more open” ties with Indonesia under the incoming administration.
Last year, Prabowo held a call with Nvidia Corp chief executive officer Jensen Huang (黃仁勳) to discuss artificial intelligence (AI) cooperation in Indonesia, reiterating Indonesia’s interest in technology partnerships.
These developments suggest that during his first year, Prabowo’s handling of Taiwan relations has been one of cautious continuity: avoiding sudden shifts, while maintaining practical engagement. Such an approach reflects Indonesia’s need to preserve stable relations with China, protect Indonesian citizens in Taiwan and maintain diplomatic room to maneuver.
From Taiwan’s perspective, Indonesia remains a partner of growing strategic importance: large in population and economic weight within Southeast Asia, with an established workforce and student presence in Taiwan, and an increasingly active role in technology dialogues.
For Jakarta, the challenge is how to convert this posture into meaningful action that advances Indonesia’s interests while preserving its independent voice.
First, Jakarta might more explicitly reaffirm that, while adhering to its “one China” policy, it values a peaceful “status quo” across the Taiwan Strait and takes seriously the welfare of Indonesians working and studying in Taiwan.
Second, economic engagement with Taiwan — especially in technologies, education and workforce issues — offers Indonesia a path to diversify its partnerships beyond China.
Third, Indonesia must continue protecting the large community of Indonesians in Taiwan, ensuring that consular support, labor-protection standards and educational pathways reflect the realities of migration and study abroad.
Finally, diplomatic messaging matters: Jakarta must manage its signals to reassure Beijing while still demonstrating that Indonesia remains independent and capable of shaping its regional future.
One year into his presidency, Prabowo’s handling of relations with Taiwan is best described as cautious continuity. However, continuity alone may not fully leverage the opportunities at hand — particularly when so many Indonesian lives and regional interests are intertwined with Taiwan. If Indonesia under Prabowo can articulate a clearer Taiwan policy framework, deepen practical ties with Taiwan, and safeguard its significant community of workers and students abroad — all while maintaining diplomacy that neither provokes Beijing nor undermines Indonesia’s standing — then the coming years could see Jakarta move from accommodation to constructive leadership.
The measure of Prabowo’s foreign policy mettle is not simply whether he maintains nuetrality on Taiwan, but whether he enables Indonesia to play a constructive role in the region’s future. That begins with moving from posture into policy — and while doing so, bearing in mind Indonesians in Taiwan, in classrooms and workplaces, as well as recognizing how emerging technology partnerships such as the one with Nvidia link, Indonesia, Taiwan and the region in a new era of geopolitics.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is director of the Indonesia-China desk at the Center of Economic and Law Studies in Jakarta.
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