Buddhist Master Hsing Yun (星雲法師), founder of the Buddhist organization Fo Guang Shan, passed away on Sunday last week. In his 95 years, Hsing Yun built an extraordinary legacy of charity, education and compassion reaching far beyond his organization’s humble Kaohsiung roots. Yet the “political monk” was no stranger to criticism, regularly coming under fire for his support for peaceful unification with China.
Even his memorial service yesterday morning was dogged by political controversy. A planned 38-member official Chinese delegation to the service — which would have included former Chinese State Administration for Religious Affairs director Ye Xiaowen (葉小文) and Taiwan Affairs Office Deputy Director Long Mingbiao (龍明彪) — was barred from entry to Taiwan after they failed to apply via established protocols, and due to concern that their presence would disrupt the funeral. Beijing of course portrayed it as political machination, claiming that the Democratic Progressive Party “disregarded basic humanitarian principles” by “rudely” rejecting the delegation.
While he used to reject the “political monk” label, Hsing Yun came to accept it with the view that politics is “part of life.” For better or worse, the religious leader would come to represent the politics he sought to avoid.
Born as Lee Kuo-shen (李國深) in 1927 to a poor family in China’s Jiangsu Province, Hsing Yun came to Taiwan as part of the mass exodus at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. As with many of his generation, he considered both sides of the Taiwan Strait as “belonging to one family.” He controversially told the World Buddhist Forum in 2009 that “there are no Taiwanese in Taiwan, and Taiwanese are all Chinese,” raising ire among independence advocates and native Taiwanese who have a far different understanding of their own heritage.
Yet despite his beliefs, Hsing Yun arguably did more than most to build the very Taiwanese identity that he denied. He founded Fo Guang Shan in 1967 in a forgotten area of Kaoshiung, which over the years opened more than 300 temples in 50 countries, as well as Buddhist seminaries, schools, libraries and publishing companies. Fo Guang Shan now has more than 1 million followers, and is recognized around the world as a steward of Chinese Buddhism and a charitable force, along with the other three members of the “Four Great Mountains” that developed Taiwan’s distinguishing version of humanistic Buddhism.
Hsing Yun spent the last few decades of his life promoting humanitarian work in China, donating funds to build temples and libraries, running cultural programs and promoting cross-strait exchanges. Fo Guang Shan also opened a branch there in the early 2010s, focusing on charity and cultural revival to avoid conflict with Beijing, although under Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) it has been given more leeway to spread Buddhist teachings. While these actions can undoubtedly be criticized, they have made significant waves and could change Chinese society for the better by promoting the humanitarian ideals championed by liberal democracies.
Hsing Yun’s beliefs also courted conflict on the other side of the Strait, earning him a place on Beijing’s blacklist for allegedly helping former Xinhua director Xu Jiatun (許家屯) flee to the US in 1990. Years later, he would encourage Beijing to reconcile with the Dalai Lama.
Passing away along with the polarizing master is the salience of his “one China” vision of politics. While many of his contemporaries might have identified with the claim that “Taiwanese are all Chinese,” few today would accept it. Fo Guang Shan — and the rest of Taiwan — can now choose which of Hsing Yun’s legacies it wishes to continue, and with it usher in a new era.
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