Nine Truku Aborigines of Mqmgi Village in Hualien County recently were charged by the police with violating the Controlling Guns, Ammunition and Knives Act (槍砲彈藥刀械管制條例) and with threatening people.
About a year ago, to safeguard their land, the nine attempted to stop a large group of tourists from flooding into the Mqmgi Scenic Area (慕谷慕魚風景區) by blocking the road and shooting a firearm into the air to claim their land rights. However, their attempt to protect their tribal land in this way resulted in police charges.
Whether the Mukumugi Scenic Area should be open to the public has been a matter of debate for many years. Beginning this year, Hualien-based tourism companies have repeatedly pressured the county government to reopen the Mqmgi Ecological Corridor, which was closed due to road damage last year. The companies say the closure of the area has caused them considerable financial difficulties.
However, the decision to reopen the area does not only involve the roads. Due to the high numbers of tourists flooding into Mqmgi Village, the area’s ecology has come under great pressure, and in addition, non-indigenous guides working for tourism companies have taken on the role of experts on Truku culture, giving arbitrary introductions to the the culture and ecology to tourists.
Although locals set up a tourist center and equipped it with local guides, most travel companies were reluctant to increase their expenses by hiring local guides. Apart from operating a few businesses that sell food and drink, most of the local people have to silently tolerate the crowds, the garbage and the environmental damage brought about by all the tourism.
However, the problems that Mqmgi faces epitomize the problems of many other indigenous villages. It is not only about conflicts between the local people’s determination to safeguard their land and tourism companies’ desire to make money, the heart of the issue is at the political level and concerns indigenous autonomy rights.
In 2002, then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) signed A New Partnership between the Indigenous Peoples and the Government of Taiwan (新夥伴關係) promising to grant indigenous people autonomy, inherent sovereignty and the right to use traditional natural resources.
However, things changed when President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) pro-China administration took office in 2008. As the indigenous people and their rights magnify the differences between Taiwan and China, Ma’s administration pays little attention to them. As a consequence, many bills that concern indigenous rights fail to make it through the legislature or lack real content. This is also the main reason why there are no laws for effectively controlling and managing traditional Aboriginal territory.
In contrast, other colonized societies, such as New Zealand, Australia, the US and Canada, have given many of their indigenous groups autonomy, with which they can proactively and effectively control their traditional territory. One thing that Ma is likely to be remembered for is suffocating the rights of the indigenous peoples.
Chi Chun-chieh is a professor in the Department of Ethnic Relations and Cultures at National Dong Hwa University.
Translated by Ethan Zhan
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
Taiwan no longer wants to merely manufacture the chips that power artificial intelligence (AI). It aims to build the software, platforms and services that run on them. Ten major AI infrastructure projects, a national cloud computing center in Tainan, the sovereign language model Trustworthy AI Dialogue Engine, five targeted industry verticals — from precision medicine to smart agriculture — and the goal of ranking among the world’s top five in computing power by 2040: The roadmap from “Silicon Island” to “Smart Island” is drawn. The question is whether the western plains, where population, industry and farmland are concentrated, have the water and
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
RSS