President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) did his own bit of distorting history on Thursday with his assertion that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) defeated the Japanese in the Chinese war of resistance against Japanese invasion from 1937 to 1945. Even though Ma and the KMT’s claims are stronger than those made by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), they are only slightly so.
The fact of the matter is that neither the CCP nor the KMT, either individually or collectively, either did or could defeat the Japanese without US intervention in the Pacific during World War II. US material and logistical aid, not to mention direct US military involvement after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, effectively defeated Japan. A reading of former president Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) diaries clearly illustrate the importance of US aid to China during China’s war of resistance, which later became the Chinese Theater of World War II.
Soong Mayling’s (宋美齡) visits to the US during this period also underscore the importance of US efforts to help sustain China’s war effort. Her visits were meant to drum up US popular and congressional support for China and her presence, arguments and personality also had a strong effect on then-US president Franklin and first lady Eleanor Roosevelt.
What these facts, so twisted by the Ma administration and the KMT, reveal is that China did not defeat Japan. Indeed, Japan had a strong and growing foothold in China before US military intervention. Moreover, the rapid defeat of KMT forces during Japan’s Operation Ichigo, which consisted of a series of battles in China from April to December of 1944, further demonstrates the Japanese ability to muster enough troops and firepower to effectively neutralize Chiang’s forces even after the US had been fighting in the Pacific for more than two years.
Claims from either the KMT or the CCP that China played a role in the defeat of Japan are certainly well founded. Japan became bogged down in China, unable to assemble enough troops and firepower to effectively garrison the areas it conquered — a situation that led to the growing power of the CCP, which strengthened itself mostly behind Japanese lines during this time. Japan’s supply lines also became increasingly stretched and more men and materiel were needed to press Japan’s advantage in China and defend the territorial gains the Japanese made.
In comparison, Germany suffered the same problem in the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa. Hitler’s forces became bogged down attempting to cross vast expanses of western Russia before the Russian winter set in. The Soviet Red Army was able to destroy the German army at Stalingrad. The Soviets had the upper hand against the Germans thereafter, almost single-handedly rolling back prior territorial losses and, at the end of the war, taking Berlin. Most impressively, the Russians had already defeated the Germans and were rolling them back on the Eastern Front before the Allied invasion of France was able to open the Western Front on the European continent.
Chiang and the KMT never had a Stalingrad. Chiang hunkered down in Chongqing and decided to fight a long and costly protracted war. In retrospect, this was probably Chiang’s only viable option. He knew his military was outclassed and outgunned by the Japanese, yet making a smart strategic decision does not make one a victor.
Indeed, China’s role in the Pacific War most closely resembles the role of France in Western Europe. The French state was quickly defeated by the German invasion in 1940. Although many French soldiers were able to retreat to Britain, the French role in the war was limited. (Chiang was never defeated by the Japanese, but his forces were effectively neutralized by the Japanese.) The French were included in the partition and occupation of Berlin following the war, but no one can viably claim that the French defeated the Nazis. And no one can viably claim the French won the war in Europe.
The war in the Pacific, though it had Chinese involvement, was won almost entirely by US forces. The US plan to invade Japan, conceived before the use of the atom bomb was thought possible, did not involve Chinese forces invading the Japanese islands. The Chinese could have attempted, in the event of a US invasion of Japan, to make advances against Japanese forces in China, but any advancements would most likely have been due to the withdrawal of huge numbers of Japanese forces from China to defend the Japanese homeland against US invasion. This possibility is essentially moot though, as history took another track. Although Japanese forces in China at the end of the war surrendered to Chiang’s, and not Chinese Communist forces, they were ordered to do so by US General Douglas MacArthur. They most certainly were not defeated there by either Chinese party.
One can appreciate the Chinese struggle from 1937 to 1945. One can appreciate the Chinese nation-building struggle from 1911 to 1945. One can praise the patient persistence of the Chinese government and people during China’s war of resistance. One can easily say that China played a role in the Pacific War. However, one cannot claim that China defeated Japan. Even the decision to “return” Taiwan to China was the decision of a US president. Moreover, that decision was then, has been, and still remains under scrutiny.
Nathan Novak studies China and the Asia-Pacific region with particular focus on cross-strait relations at National Sun Yat-sen University.
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