During the past few weeks, China has significantly increased tension in East Asia by claiming “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea. While claims and counterclaims by China and other nations in the region — in particular Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and Taiwan — have existed for several decades, China’s recent aggressiveness and belligerence have put other countries on edge.
The most significant pushback came during the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi from July 22 to July 24, when 11 Asian nations plus the US expressed concern about China’s moves. In her statement, US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton called freedom of navigation on the sea a US “national interest,” and urged “a collaborative diplomatic process” by all claimants to resolve “the various territorial disputes without coercion.”
The emphasis on a multilateral mechanism is essential here: In a multilateral forum, China faces a group of like-minded countries, while in bilateral negotiations, China can play off countries against each other.
This development has significant implications for Taiwan. During the past two years, the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has followed a policy of accommodation toward China to reduce tension and — through signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) — enhance economic relations and broaden ties with East and Southeast Asian countries. China’s belligerence on the South China Sea — as well as its refusal to rein in North Korea — raises doubts about its long-term intentions. Is it really for peace and stability in the region, or is it intent on domination? If it is the latter, what does that say about its intentions toward Taiwan?
As I have said earlier (“Taiwan needs to stand by its Allies,” Taipei Times, June 1, page 8), there are no indications that Beijing has changed its intentions in any fundamental way. Chinese rulers are still intent on absorbing Taiwan. Their tactics have only changed slightly — in addition to military threats and intimidation, they are now using economic means to entice Taiwan.
What would be the best approach from Taiwan’s side? Is it going to follow the approach of accommodation, or does it clearly take the side of its democratic allies — the US, Japan and South Korea — and others in the region whose key interests are threatened by China’s expansion.
Simply reiterating its claims to the Pratas (Tungsha) islets and Taiping Island in the Spratlys is not enough. Taiwan needs to take a more principled stance on freedom of navigation. The discussions at the ASEAN Regional Forum show that there is growing solidarity among the nations of East and Southeast Asia to counter Chinese moves.
Is Taiwan joining this newfound solidarity, or is it going to be the odd-man-out? For China, “recovering” Taiwan is not only a symbolic conclusion of the civil war between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party of many decades ago, it is also perceived by the People’s Liberation Army as a strategic asset in dominating the East Asia region. Without control of Taiwan, it will be difficult for China to move toward a full-fledged “blue water” navy and exert its influence as a Pacific sea power.
Taiwan, on the other hand, can only maintain its freedom and democracy if it remains in the democratic camp and is able to build fair and equitable relations with other like-minded states. That would be the best long-term guarantee for peace and stability in the region.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
In the US’ National Security Strategy (NSS) report released last month, US President Donald Trump offered his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The “Trump Corollary,” presented on page 15, is a distinctly aggressive rebranding of the more than 200-year-old foreign policy position. Beyond reasserting the sovereignty of the western hemisphere against foreign intervention, the document centers on energy and strategic assets, and attempts to redraw the map of the geopolitical landscape more broadly. It is clear that Trump no longer sees the western hemisphere as a peaceful backyard, but rather as the frontier of a new Cold War. In particular,
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) races toward its 2027 modernization goals, most analysts fixate on ship counts, missile ranges and artificial intelligence. Those metrics matter — but they obscure a deeper vulnerability. The true future of the PLA, and by extension Taiwan’s security, might hinge less on hardware than on whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can preserve ideological loyalty inside its own armed forces. Iran’s 1979 revolution demonstrated how even a technologically advanced military can collapse when the social environment surrounding it shifts. That lesson has renewed relevance as fresh unrest shakes Iran today — and it should
When it became clear that the world was entering a new era with a radical change in the US’ global stance in US President Donald Trump’s second term, many in Taiwan were concerned about what this meant for the nation’s defense against China. Instability and disruption are dangerous. Chaos introduces unknowns. There was a sense that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) might have a point with its tendency not to trust the US. The world order is certainly changing, but concerns about the implications for Taiwan of this disruption left many blind to how the same forces might also weaken
On today’s page, Masahiro Matsumura, a professor of international politics and national security at St Andrew’s University in Osaka, questions the viability and advisability of the government’s proposed “T-Dome” missile defense system. Matsumura writes that Taiwan’s military budget would be better allocated elsewhere, and cautions against the temptation to allow politics to trump strategic sense. What he does not do is question whether Taiwan needs to increase its defense capabilities. “Given the accelerating pace of Beijing’s military buildup and political coercion ... [Taiwan] cannot afford inaction,” he writes. A rational, robust debate over the specifics, not the scale or the necessity,
RSS