The symbolism of China’s growing power was dramatized in French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s recent China visit as an exercise in smoothing relations with that country. Relations between France and China reached a crisis point in 2008 over a series of events such as protests in Paris over the Beijing Olympic torch relays, criticism of China’s human rights in Tibet and, above all, Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama.
Beijing reacted strongly by downgrading economic and political relations with Paris. Beijing was apparently telling France and the world that any country officially hosting the Dalai Lama would have to be prepared to stand up to China or else face political and economic sanctions.
Taiwan last year managed to squeeze in a visit by the Dalai Lama when it was hit by a typhoon, without repercussions. He was invited to offer spiritual solace sought by the affected people and their political leaders who, incidentally, largely belonged to the opposition Democratic Progressive Party.
Understandably, China didn’t want to give President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) opponents more political fuel to damage the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Ma is Beijing’s best political bet in Taiwan’s competitive political landscape.
Sarkozy’s China visit is undoubtedly an important symbol of China’s “Middle Kingdom” syndrome and an effective exercise of Beijing’s coercive diplomacy.
However, It doesn’t square with the reality of Chinese power and prosperity. In terms of raw military power, the US still remains the most powerful country in the world.
As for economic prosperity, in per capita terms, China is way behind the West and Japan, and is likely to take a long time to reach a similar level of prosperity, if ever. Yet, its spectacular economic growth and its geographical size have created the perception of a new superpower likely to overtake the US in the next two to three decades.
Increasingly, policymakers are arriving at this view, which has led them to favor accommodating and integrating China into the framework of existing international institutions that have been largely shaped by the West. It is believed that in this way, the transition to a new world order with China as a crucial component might be achieved peacefully.
According to China scholar Marc Lanteigne, “What separates China from other states and indeed previous global powers [like Germany and Japan], is that not only is it ‘growing up’ within the milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country’s development of global power status.”
It is true China has made best use of the existing international institutions to exponentially increase exports (though the global economic crisis has limited that prospect), amass trade surpluses of US$2.4 trillion (and rising) and significantly increase its international profile.
At the same time, however, it is also true that when constrained in its role as an emerging global power, it doesn’t feel the need to abide by some accepted international norms — which is frustrating for the international community.
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd best expressed this frustration in a recent speech at the Australian National University: “It doesn’t help, for example, that China associates with regimes around the world that others seek to isolate because of their assault on the integrity of the international system — from Sudan to Burma.”
Beijing is prepared to operate within the multilateral framework of international institutions as long as it suits China. At the same time, it likes the operational flexibility to promote its interests as a competitive center of power.
Indeed, in recent history, no country with global aspirations has been satisfied with a role within an existing global system. Germany and Japan are examples.
As US scholar of realpolitik John Mearsheimer has written: “If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.”
While China’s story of spectacular economic growth could eventually make it a center of power, there is an important caveat here that is generally ignored in this big picture: Can a one-party state of China’s size continue to maintain its monopoly of power?
There are already signs of widespread social unrest in various forms and in different places in the country, along with their suppression with brute state power.
Bao Tong (鮑彤), a famous Chinese dissident, has said: “Every four minutes there is a protest of more than 100 people.” In other words, Bao says, many “little Tiananmens” are happening everyday.
These demonstrations lack organization, however. The Chinese Communist Party’s greatest fear is that human rights activists and intellectuals might fill the organizational gap at some point when social discontent reaches a critical point, hence the systematic suppression of such elements.
The question, though, is for how long this can succeed.
There are many issues agitating the people, from corruption and nepotism to land grabs, gangsterism, particularly by local authorities, and police brutality to silence its critics.
One example is China’s World Expo showcase in Shanghai, which reportedly involved clearing 2.6km² along the Huangpu River. This meant moving 18,000 families and 270 factories, including the Jiangnan Shipyard, which employs 10,000 workers.
Only an authoritarian regime of China’s ilk can spend US$45 billion for such an event, and cause so much distress and suffering to its own people by removing them and disrupting their livelihood.
There are many Chinese examples, big and small, of such scant regard for people by a government bent on having its way.
Anyone forecasting China’s future and its international status, therefore, must take into account the fragility of the country’s internal situation.
It is a one-party state with no proper channels for people to express their frustration and anger and to seek justice. In such a situation, with anger and frustration constantly building up and with no safety valve to release people’s discontent, there is every danger of a blow-up at some point.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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