US President Barack Obama has broken with a tradition of almost 20 years by overturning a decision by national security officials to let the US president “meet by chance” with the spiritual leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, who is currently visiting Washington. There are reasons for this decision, which may affect US-Taiwan relations.
In late July, the Obama administration met leaders from Beijing at the first ever US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington, where a preliminary consensus was reached on issues such as the global financial crisis, climate change, North Korea and anti-terrorism.
This was followed by Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) meeting twice last month — at the UN and at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh. Hu visited North Korea early this month and tried to persuade North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to make concessions, while Obama is set to make his first visit to China in the middle of next month. These arrangements are aimed at strengthening US-China ties and substantial collaborative achievements at the second US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue next summer.
Democrats and Republicans agree that engaging China is necessary. Republicans believe caution and engagement should be given equal weight, while the Obama administration has gone to great lengths to promote dialogue and interaction at the senior level. Although Obama almost set off a trade war between the US and China after demanding tariffs be imposed on tires imported from China — a debate the White House then tried to soothe via senior channels — at the UN General Assembly last month, he sent clear messages about multilateralism, encouraging US allies to engage China and encouraging Beijing to become a responsible stakeholder.
With China’s human rights abuses, suppression of Tibet and marginalization of Taiwan, it is not surprising that Obama has decided not to meet the Dalai Lama. Under President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration, cross-strait relations are relatively stable, which means the government is not causing any worries for Obama, who is currently focused on US domestic healthcare and economic issues. Although the Ma administration has expressed — through the legislature and the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) participation in the US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference — its strong wish to procure F-16C/D fighter jets, the Obama administration remains quiet on the issue.
US policymakers are also worried about causing uncertainty in US-China relations. They are worried that any new decisions about arms sales to Taiwan could hurt cross-strait relations in the same way they are worried about the effects a meeting with the Dalai Lama could have. The guarantees the Ma administration has given the US have not eased these doubts. After all is said and done, the biggest point of contention between Washington and Beijing is the sale of US arms to Taiwan.
The Obama administration has also been confused by Ma’s statements on Taiwan’s national defense strategies. At a press conference after Typhoon Morakot struck, Ma said Taiwan’s biggest threat is Mother Nature, not China, and that the government would only buy 45 of the 60 Black Hawk helicopters Taiwan had agreed to purchase from the US. Ma said the remainder of the budget would be used to purchase disaster relief helicopters and that the armed forces would have to adjust their strategy, staff number and budget accordingly.
This was an absurd decision that was not appropriately assessed beforehand. The MND immediately came out to clarify that the budget for the US arms purchase remained unchanged and that it would apply for a new budget to procure choppers used for disaster relief. Former minister of national defense Chen Chao-min (陳肇敏) also said that disaster relief was only one of the responsibilities of the armed forces and not their most important task. These comments were intended as a slap in the face for Ma and to show that his wavering stance on Taiwan’s defense capabilities has sent mixed messages to Washington.
Ma has come under pressure from the military and has had no choice but to change his plans to cut national defense. His status as commander-in-chief and the relationship between the government and the military are fragile. Apart from causing the armed forces to lower their guard toward China, Ma’s actions have led the international community to question how serious Taiwan is about increasing its defense capabilities.
For these reasons, it is unlikely that the Obama administration will announce the sale of F-16C/D fighter planes to Taiwan next summer. The US is more likely to offer less sensitive military items to pacify the Ma administration.
Liu Shih-chung is a visiting fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON
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