Thu, Apr 23, 2026 page8

• Japan’s response to Cheng-Xi meeting

  • By Wang Hui-sheng 王輝生
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  Following the meeting between Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on April 10, political and media commentary in Taiwan has largely focused on its political implications and what it means for cross-strait relations. By contrast, Japanese media and government responses were relatively subdued and mostly reported basic facts rather than extended commentary.

  During the Liberal Democratic Party convention on April 12, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said that revising the constitution was a “matter of national survival” and pushed for related proposals to enter parliamentary review. The stark contrast between Taiwanese and Japanese reactions to the Cheng-Xi meeting reflects a difference of strategic perspectives on Taiwan-related issues.

  First, changes in the geopolitical security environment make it difficult to continue seeing the Taiwan Strait as a side issue. Over the past few years, China’s military activities around Taiwan and in Japan’s southwestern region have ramped up and become increasingly normalized. Security in the Taiwan Strait has direct implications for Japan’s southwestern defenses and the stability of its sea lines of communication.

  As such, Japan has already begun to incorporate cross-strait stability into its core security considerations: Once an ambiguous and peripheral affair, the more explicit possibility of a Taiwan contingency must now be faced directly. Takaichi has even told the Japanese Diet that a Taiwan contingency “could constitute a survival-threatening situation” for Japan, indicating that Taiwan-related security concerns have already reached an institutional level.

  Second, strategic adjustments within the US-Japan alliance have also shed more light on Japan’s stance on Taiwan. In recent years, bilateral summits have repeatedly emphasized the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and reiterated opposition to any unilateral change to the “status quo” by force or coercion. That underscores how the Taiwan issue has already been embedded within the broader Indo-Pacific security framework and is no longer confined to cross-strait dynamics alone.

  Major European countries have also begun to express positions on Indo-Pacific affairs. A recent joint statement from a summit between Japan and France included references to the Taiwan Strait, linking it to issues in the East and South China seas and freedom of navigation. That shows the gradual internationalization of the Taiwan issue and its connection to the global order.

  It is against this backdrop that, from Japan’s perspective, the political significance of Cheng’s meeting with Xi is comparatively limited. Rather than short-term political signals, Japan is focused on the long-term strategic trends and shifts in the broader security environment. Advancing constitutional revision to bolster its national defense framework is the priority, which explains its understated treatment of the event.

  Overall, Japan’s restrained response does not indicate indifference to Taiwan, but rather a shift in its analytical framework. As the Taiwan Strait issue becomes integrated into Japan’s and the broader international community’s security architectures, the impact of any single political event naturally diminishes. Japan is increasingly viewing Taiwan through a macro, long-term security lens, rather than one of short-term political interactions — a shift which mirrors broader developments in the Indo-Pacific region.

  Wang Hui-sheng is a founding member of the East Asian Research Institute.

  Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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