As US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepare to meet on the sidelines of an economic summit in South Korea — an encounter that might not actually happen — some foreign-policy strategists in Washington are not just worried, but aghast. The two mightiest nations on Earth seem hell-bent on waging economic war up to and including “mutual assured destruction,” and at least one of the pair seems to have no plan, no expertise and no clue.
“The first thing to understand is that there is no China policy” in the current US administration, Rebecca Lissner told me. She was a top adviser to former US vice president Kamala Harris and would now be in the National Security Council if Harris had won last year’s presidential election.
The Trump administration has no coherent strategy toward China, and the “trade stuff is worse than the markets believe,” I heard from Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. That must be bad indeed, because the stock markets have been see-sawing since April. One of his colleagues despairs over “nine months of policy whiplash” and a chronic case of “strategic schizophrenia.”
Attempting to summarize the chaos so far runs into the same limits of encapsulating, say, the story twists in Game of Thrones in one sentence. In short, earlier this year, Trump declared economic war on most of the world. Almost all countries sued for peace, but the most powerful, China, stared him down, matching tariffs on the way up (peaking at 145 percent at one point) and on the way down (hovering at about 30 percent for a while). A few reversals, pauses and feints later, a new round of spikes is threatened for next month.
However, tariffs were just the overture, as Washington and Beijing, tit-for-tat, started going after each other in every other way. They are slapping port fees on one another. They are harassing each other’s tech companies — the US is squeezing Chinese firms that use US semiconductors; China has targeted the US’ Nvidia, Qualcomm and others. Everything, it seems, is now a bargaining chip, as the Trump administration keeps reversing itself. One minute it bans the sale of microchips to China, the next it partially lifts the ban again. Adding to the confusion, Trump has also thrown unrelated (and relatively trivial) matters into the mix, such as the fate of TikTok, a Chinese-owned video app.
However, one move has risen above the noise. Off and on, China has throttled, or threatened to stop, exports of rare earths, in which it has a global quasi-monopoly. This was entirely foreseeable — and yet seemed to take the Trump administration by surprise. Some of these 17 elements (which are not that rare, just very difficult to mine) are essential to make, say, the magnets that go into modern electronics, including those inside US cars and fighter jets.
Harvard University professor of government Graham Allison, a doyen among international-relations academics, said that “in the game of supply chain poker, China holds the high cards” and Trump has come to realize that he does not. (The metaphor is cheeky, since Trump likes to bully others for not holding “the cards.”)
Cooper disagrees. “I don’t think the Chinese have all the cards,” he told me. “We have cards, we just haven’t been willing to play them.” For example, the US could cut Chinese banks out of dollar transactions in global financial markets, which is, in its context, as asymmetric as blocking exports of rare earths. (Most US banks don’t care about losing access to renminbi transactions, but Chinese banks “would fold,” Cooper said.)
One problem is that the White House has recently fired a lot of the China experts who have the deep technical knowledge to find and use such levers. One example is former US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs David Feith, who was pushed out for political reasons — or “Loomered,” in the argot, a reference to far-right activist Laura Loomer’s habit of publicly targeting and harassing officials deemed ideologically impure — just as the confrontation with China heated up.
Another problem is that Trump’s remaining advisers are at one another’s throats over what the US even wants out of China. Ryan Fedasiuk, an adjunct assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, describes three main camps: The economic nationalists love tariffs for their own sake. The hard-power realists care more about keeping China inferior to the US technologically and militarily. The transactional restrainers view tariffs and other measures merely as tools to extract concessions, such as a Chinese clamp-down on the chemicals used to make fentanyl. Meanwhile, Trump seems to be all over the map.
That is what it means to have no strategy. The Trump administration has not answered, or seemingly even asked, fundamental questions, small or large, specific or general: Does the US want to attract Chinese investment, or to decouple the two economies? Does it want to sell its best semiconductors and software, or to hog them?
More broadly, does the US want to keep China down, or share with it the burden of restoring order and peace in the world, from Ukraine to the Middle East? Is Taiwan (or the South China Sea, for that matter) a vital US interest to be defended, or a mere bargaining chip? Is China an adversary the US will have to fight and defeat one day, or a difficult but unavoidable partner?
By the time the top guys take a seat at the same table, Lissner told me, “you don’t have the luxury of saying, we’re going to do trade, but not Taiwan, or we’re going to do fentanyl. but not the Philippines. That’s just not how it works.” The result is what she calls “ADD” diplomacy — negotiating with attention deficit disorder, in pursuit of no clear goal and guided by no compass.
“I just don’t think that the Trump folks believe you need a strategy to do things,” Cooper told me. Their narrative is that Trump is a “master negotiator, walks into the room, decides where he has leverage, uses it and walks out,” Cooper said.
The problem is that the Chinese have prepared for this showdown for a long time, and their rare earths are just the start. They believe that they are “running circles around the Trump team. They feel really confident,” Cooper added.
If the meeting in South Korea does not happen, the Chinese would blame it on logistics. (Getting both leaders to overlap is, in fact, tricky — Trump is also due to visit other Asian countries.) If it does happen, it is unlikely that anything big would be resolved. There might be a tariff reprieve here, or a corporate deal there, but as to the most important relationship in and for the world, that between the US and China, nobody would be any wiser.
Andreas Kluth is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering US diplomacy, national security and geopolitics. Previously, he was editor-in-chief of Handelsblatt Global and a writer for The Economist. This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
President William Lai (賴清德) attended a dinner held by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) when representatives from the group visited Taiwan in October. In a speech at the event, Lai highlighted similarities in the geopolitical challenges faced by Israel and Taiwan, saying that the two countries “stand on the front line against authoritarianism.” Lai noted how Taiwan had “immediately condemned” the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas and had provided humanitarian aid. Lai was heavily criticized from some quarters for standing with AIPAC and Israel. On Nov. 4, the Taipei Times published an opinion article (“Speak out on the
Eighty-seven percent of Taiwan’s energy supply this year came from burning fossil fuels, with more than 47 percent of that from gas-fired power generation. The figures attracted international attention since they were in October published in a Reuters report, which highlighted the fragility and structural challenges of Taiwan’s energy sector, accumulated through long-standing policy choices. The nation’s overreliance on natural gas is proving unstable and inadequate. The rising use of natural gas does not project an image of a Taiwan committed to a green energy transition; rather, it seems that Taiwan is attempting to patch up structural gaps in lieu of
News about expanding security cooperation between Israel and Taiwan, including the visits of Deputy Minister of National Defense Po Horng-huei (柏鴻輝) in September and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Francois Wu (吳志中) this month, as well as growing ties in areas such as missile defense and cybersecurity, should not be viewed as isolated events. The emphasis on missile defense, including Taiwan’s newly introduced T-Dome project, is simply the most visible sign of a deeper trend that has been taking shape quietly over the past two to three years. Taipei is seeking to expand security and defense cooperation with Israel, something officials
“Can you tell me where the time and motivation will come from to get students to improve their English proficiency in four years of university?” The teacher’s question — not accusatory, just slightly exasperated — was directed at the panelists at the end of a recent conference on English language learning at Taiwanese universities. Perhaps thankfully for the professors on stage, her question was too big for the five minutes remaining. However, it hung over the venue like an ominous cloud on an otherwise sunny-skies day of research into English as a medium of instruction and the government’s Bilingual Nation 2030
RSS