Eighty-seven percent of Taiwan’s energy supply this year came from burning fossil fuels, with more than 47 percent of that from gas-fired power generation.
The figures attracted international attention since they were in October published in a Reuters report, which highlighted the fragility and structural challenges of Taiwan’s energy sector, accumulated through long-standing policy choices. The nation’s overreliance on natural gas is proving unstable and inadequate.
The rising use of natural gas does not project an image of a Taiwan committed to a green energy transition; rather, it seems that Taiwan is attempting to patch up structural gaps in lieu of a more complete fossil-fuel exit strategy following the closure of the Ma-anshan Nuclear Power Plant in May.
The central principles of Taiwan’s energy policy in the past 10 years — to pursue a non-nuclear platform and cut back on coal — are respectable in principle, but have created an awkward situation, with a slow transition to renewables and unstable support for baseload grid requirements. Paradoxically, policy intended to support a clean energy transition has instead increased the nation’s reliance on natural gas and delayed decarbonization.
The development of Taiwan’s renewable energy might appear rapid, but it is experiencing serious bottlenecks. Offshore wind farms have attracted billions in investment, but their roll out has been slow, while their onshore counterparts face resistance from residents. Solar power is limited, as it has to compete with agriculture for limited land and, increasingly, public skepticism.
Although renewable energy capacity continues to grow, issues with grid integration mean that power provision is struggling to keep up. As a result, Taiwan’s demand for liquefied natural gas has been rising faster than anywhere else in Asia, driving up energy costs and creating geopolitical risks that undermine its energy security.
Domestic backlash to reports such as the Reuters article has clearly framed the public’s position: Criticism from abroad is an attempt to humiliate Taiwan.
The reality is that the energy challenges Taiwan is facing threaten its survival. If the government continues to avoid an open conversation about them, policy solutions would struggle to get off the ground and Taiwan would be unable to extricate itself from its current bind.
To eliminate fossil-fuel dependency, Taiwan must leave old frameworks behind and comprehensively upgrade its energy strategy. There are several ways it could go about this.
First, people must be able to rationally discuss nuclear power and re-examine the role it could play in meeting the nation’s energy requirements. Internationally, nuclear power is recognized as an important source of stable, clean energy. France, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and the US are continuing or expanding their nuclear energy programs.
The government needs to explore introducing small modular reactors, and meeting the conditions for restarting and extending the service life of the Ma-anshan and Guosheng nuclear power plants. A nuclear power strategy should not be governed by ideology; there is a real need for a new model of public engagement on the issue.
Energy storage must also be considered as part of basic infrastructure requirements, rather than just a backup policy. Artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and electric vehicles are set to drive peak energy demand to new levels. Without sufficient storage to handle fluctuations, the government’s renewable energy policy would become all but meaningless.
Energy storage regulations, buyback systems and the capacity market participatory model should be updated to support the transition. The government must also expand the use of pumped-storage hydropower plants, aquifer thermal energy storage systems and solid-state batteries to make Taiwan’s energy system more resilient.
Grid resilience needs to be viewed and understood as a national security matter. Pressures from fluctuating renewables and insufficient long-term investment from Taiwan Power Co mean that output from renewable energy sources is often not translated into usable power. Grid regionalization, dual-circuit power line backups and smart scheduling platforms are all necessary for viability in engineering and national security.
Taiwan must diversify its energy portfolio to prevent overreliance on a single source. There is significant potential for geothermal energy as a baseload power source, although policy in this space has long been neglected.
While nations around the world are seeking to implement hydrogen and ammonia cofiring, Taiwan has yet to set out a complete road map for its development. Marine and bioenergy could have applications in the region, but have not been systematically integrated into the energy framework. Energy diversification would help Taiwan maintain a steady footing amid fluctuations in global fuel prices.
Taiwan needs to build a social consensus on energy transformation, so that policy is not weaponized for political infighting. The issue is intergenerational, requiring interparty negotiations, special deliberations and independent bodies to build a governance model rooted in science and democratic principles. The platform for discussing energy transition must be redesigned so that policies are no longer distorted by populism.
The nation’s energy troubles are a product not of bad luck, but of choices. Policies for a clean energy transition must rise above ideology, work across ministries, integrate technologies and consider all possible eventualities. As the world enters a new era of AI and green energy, Taiwan must maintain its resilience and international competitiveness. To that end, it does not need slogans, but a real strategy to see the nation through the next decade.
Edwin Yang is an associate professor at National Taiwan Normal University and chairman of the Central Taiwan Association of University Professors.
Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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