China has been spoofing the automatic identification system signals of its vessels in the Taiwan Strait as a form of cognitive warfare, according to a report released last week by the US-based think tank Institute for the Study of War.
Several Chinese fishing vessels transmitted false transponder signals in Taiwan’s waters last month, with one mimicking a Russian warship and another impersonating a Chinese law enforcement vessel, the report said. That multiple vessels with similar names broadcast fake signals in the same area and timeframe suggests a coordinated effort — a form of “gray zone” coercion, harassment and surveillance.
China frequently employs such tactics to probe Taiwan’s response capabilities and to wear down its defenses. Its constant rotation of these methods shows that Beijing remains uncertain about what works and still lacks the capability to launch an amphibious assault on Taiwan. Yet in doing so, it also gives Taiwan and the US valuable chances to study potential contingencies and develop countermeasures.
Many of these scenarios have long been considered by defense planners, but China’s provocations have pushed them higher on the policy agenda. One example is a possible blockade of Taiwan — an idea first raised in the 1950s during the Taiwan Strait crises, and which resurfaced in the 1970s in studies by the RAND Corp and the US Naval War College.
After then-US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August 2022, China launched large-scale military drills around Taiwan, effectively enacting a partial blockade. That incident refocused attention on the blockade scenario, in Taiwan and abroad.
In response, Taiwan developed multi-layered plans for such a contingency, combining military, logistical and civil defense measures. These include nationwide drills, legislative amendments, energy and resource stockpiling, and the creation of the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency to coordinate reserve and civil defense efforts.
Likewise, when Kinmen and Lienchiang counties began facing regular intrusions by Chinese drones, the Ministry of National Defense allocated NT$988 million (US$32.3 million) for an anti-drone network, which includes defensive drones, jammers and other countermeasures.
Another example came after a Chinese cruise ship sailed within 2 nautical miles (3.7km) of Pingtung County’s Hengchun Peninsula (恆春半島), prompting the creation of a vessel intelligence and tracking database. Taiwan also amended seven laws to protect undersea cables and other critical infrastructure after Chinese ships damaged communications lines connecting Taiwan to global networks.
In July, US senators John Curtis and Jacky Rosen introduced legislation to help protect Taiwan’s undersea cables from Chinese interference, saying that the US “cannot stand idle as China ramps up its tactics to isolate Taiwan.”
Far from isolating Taiwan or sowing panic, China’s “gray zone” operations have instead made Taiwan — and its partners — more vigilant and better prepared. Each new provocation leads to new strategies, technologies and laws that bolster Taiwan’s resilience and deterrence.
A Chinese idiom first recorded in the Book of the Later Han (後漢書) advises to “conceal one’s abilities and await the right moment” (韜光養晦). Former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) famously invoked it when he urged China to “hide our capabilities and bide our time.”
That wisdom appears lost on Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), who has shown his hand early and often when it comes to Taiwan. His relentless gray zone tactics might aim to intimidate, but in practice, they are doing the opposite: giving Taiwan valuable insights and time to prepare.
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