The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats.
It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia.
With Modi in China for the SCO summit just as Beijing prepared for its military parade last week, many assumed he would join Xi, Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the event, which was staged to commemorate “the 80th anniversary of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.”
Such a move would have sent a powerful and troubling message to the coalition of partners seeking to project freedom in the Indo-Pacific region. It would have been a disaster for the democratic bloc and a blow to Taiwan.
Yet Modi chose not to attend. Unlike Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, who risked domestic criticism to make the trip to Beijing despite ongoing unrest at home, Modi declined the invitation, even though he was already in China. It would have been logistically easy to do so. Logistically, not politically.
India plays its own game, guided by its calculations of interest. Since independence in 1947, its approach has been to reject alignments that might constrain its freedom of action in international affairs. New Delhi has preferred to keep its diplomatic powder dry, its external obligations light and its decisionmaking firmly in its own hands to demonstrate its status as a power to be reckoned with in its own right.
Washington might be unhappy with India’s purchases of Russian oil, but heavy tariffs are unlikely to mean the US has “lost India.” New Delhi’s ties with Moscow are long-standing. At the same time, India’s relationship with Beijing is complicated: Border disputes remain unresolved, and domestic opinion has soured since the deadly Galwan Valley clashes in 2020. However, India also recognizes that it cannot benefit from a complete breakdown in dialogue with its neighbor.
However, Japan, is a crucial partner beyond its role in the Quad. The nature of Beijing’s parade would have made Modi’s endorsement politically awkward for Tokyo, highlighting why New Delhi sometimes chooses restraint. New Delhi is not afraid to stand up to China, or to carve its own way when it believes certain actions might jeopardize its relations with friendly nations.
This is why India is a natural partner for Taiwan. As Uma Chinnannan, a doctoral candidate in the Asia-Pacific Studies program at National Chengchi University, writes on today’s page in “Taiwan, India and aerospace ties,” the two nations have considerable room for collaboration beyond high-profile sectors such as semiconductor manufacturing.
She writes that on a technical level, combining India’s scale, cost advantages and engineering capability with Taiwan’s manufacturing precision and certification expertise offers a compelling case for cooperation in the aerospace sector. Such collaboration would not only be practical, but also symbolically significant for the future of the Indo-Pacific region and for the role that like-minded democracies can play in securing critical supply chains.
India would continue to adhere to its “one China” policy, but it would not allow Beijing to dictate the terms. New Delhi would also maintain relations with Taipei until it, and only it, decides that something needs to change.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
Media said that several pan-blue figures — among them former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱), former KMT legislator Lee De-wei (李德維), former KMT Central Committee member Vincent Hsu (徐正文), New Party Chairman Wu Cheng-tien (吳成典), former New Party legislator Chou chuan (周荃) and New Party Deputy Secretary-General You Chih-pin (游智彬) — yesterday attended the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. China’s Xinhua news agency reported that foreign leaders were present alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), such as Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korean leader Kim
Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Chairman Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌) is expected to be summoned by the Taipei City Police Department after a rally in Taipei on Saturday last week resulted in injuries to eight police officers. The Ministry of the Interior on Sunday said that police had collected evidence of obstruction of public officials and coercion by an estimated 1,000 “disorderly” demonstrators. The rally — led by Huang to mark one year since a raid by Taipei prosecutors on then-TPP chairman and former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) — might have contravened the Assembly and Parade Act (集會遊行法), as the organizers had
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) last week made a rare visit to the Philippines, which not only deepened bilateral economic ties, but also signaled a diplomatic breakthrough in the face of growing tensions with China. Lin’s trip marks the second-known visit by a Taiwanese foreign minister since Manila and Beijing established diplomatic ties in 1975; then-minister Chang Hsiao-yen (章孝嚴) took a “vacation” in the Philippines in 1997. As Taiwan is one of the Philippines’ top 10 economic partners, Lin visited Manila and other cities to promote the Taiwan-Philippines Economic Corridor, with an eye to connecting it with the Luzon