Earlier this year, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) said Taiwan “would welcome Honduras if they want to restore diplomatic ties with Taiwan after their elections.” His remarks came after Honduran Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Reina suggested the country might seek to re-enter the Taiwanese market for shrimp exports.
The shrimp industry, once one of Honduras’ most prolific, has been hit hard since the diplomatic switch to the People’s Republic of China. According to the National Association of Aquaculture Producers of Honduras, shrimp exports fell 67 percent in just two years, from 9,389 tonnes in 2022 to only 2,994 tonnes last year. Before the switch, Taiwan was Honduras’ main market, buying nearly 40 percent of its product in 2022.
The collapse has had a severe impact on southern Honduras, where most production is based. Business closures, job losses and falling household incomes have fueled frustration among communities that once relied on stable exports to Taiwan.
While Reina’s comments hinted at possible trade with Taiwan, no concrete steps have been taken, and Beijing’s strict conditions on its diplomatic partners make such a move unlikely under the current government.
The shrimp crisis has become part of a wider disappointment with the China relationship. In 2023, Honduras began talks for a free-trade agreement with China, raising hopes among business owners eager for access to its vast market, but two years later, progress has stalled. Negotiations have been bogged down by disagreements over rules of origin, agricultural access and strategic sectors. The initial enthusiasm has been replaced by disillusionment.
China’s purchases from Honduras have been modest, just US$11 million in exports last year compared with US$121 million in exports to Taiwan two years earlier, while imports from China exceeded US$200 million. Many business owners now speak openly about the “unfavorable trade balance” and lost opportunities since the switch.
For producers who believed that the new relationship would open doors to one of the largest consumer markets in the world, the reality has been sobering. The lack of significant Chinese investment and the limited access for Honduran agricultural goods have diminished expectations, and frustration is building in rural areas, where the economy depends on export markets.
These concerns are now spilling into the political arena and reshaping the conversation ahead of the presidential election. The growing view among these sectors is that Taiwan’s previous cooperation model, which included direct aid, training programs and targeted investment in local industries, provided more tangible benefits than the still unfulfilled promises from Beijing. This sentiment is now becoming a political force and an economic reality that is influencing the November presidential race in ways that could directly affect Taiwan.
Honduran presidential frontrunner Salvador Nasralla seems to share the disappointment in China, and might use Taiwan’s direct military, educational and social cooperation projects to argue for a diplomatic reversal were he to emerge victorious in the Nov. 30 presidential elections.
The Liberal Party candidate is leading several independent polls, including Le Vote Honduras, which give him a 12-point lead over National Party candidate Nasry Asfura and a 17-point lead over the Libre Party’s Rixi Moncada. His platform includes a clear promise: restore diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Nasralla has long criticized China’s record in Central America, pointing to Costa Rica, Panama and El Salvador as examples of countries that saw big promises turn into modest trade gains and increased imports from China. He argues that the diplomatic shift cost Honduras 8,000 direct jobs and 50,000 indirect jobs in the shrimp industry alone.
In a March presidential debate, Nasralla linked the China trade imbalance directly to the destruction of small and medium-sized businesses through dumping of cheap goods, and framed restoring ties with Taiwan as a way to rebuild trust with the US and strengthen Honduras’ global standing.
For Taiwan, the potential return of Honduras as an ally would reverse a major diplomatic loss and send a message to the region that Beijing’s promises do not always translate into tangible benefits.
For Honduras, the decision is ultimately about which partnership offers the most reliable and beneficial outcomes. The collapse of the shrimp industry has become a powerful symbol of what is at stake, illustrating how a single policy shift can reverberate through the economy, undermine livelihoods and change the country’s political direction. The outcome in November could determine whether Honduras doubles down on its relationship with China or reopens the door to Taiwan.
For now, the combination of economic disappointment and political momentum makes the possibility of a diplomatic reversal more than just speculation, and one that could have consequences well beyond the borders of Honduras.
Fernando Ramos is a Honduran journalist based in Taiwan focusing on regional politics and international affairs.
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