Behind the gloating, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) must be letting out a big sigh of relief. Its powerful party machine saved the day, but it took that much effort just to survive a challenge mounted by a humble group of active citizens, and in areas where the KMT is historically strong.
On the other hand, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) must now realize how toxic a brand it has become to many voters. The campaigners’ amateurism is what made them feel valid and authentic, but when the DPP belatedly inserted itself into the campaign, it did more harm than good.
The KMT’s cozying up to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is alienating voters so deeply that they take to the streets and mount challenges that require your entire apparatus to fend off. If you are in the DPP, your anti-CCP stance is not enough to get you elected anymore, even when a grassroots movement rises up against your opponents.
This was a grassroots movement. Campaigners were vulnerable to threats and even internal disputes, the kind that do not happen in a well-oiled party machine. The difference was clear to anyone doing journalistic work on the ground — while the KMT flooded us with English-language press releases and news conferences, campaigners sent only a few statements in Chinese. The foreign-language media was never going to change the outcome, but the disparity in resources and methods says a lot.
Learning from how the KMT mobilized enough power to block them, many campaigners told me they already plan the next step — to rewire the way canvassing is done entirely — but they now face a dilemma: Do they want more DPP, or less?
Early on, many campaigners were proud to tell me they were doing it alone. Now some regret not receiving more help from the DPP, but even if they had wanted it, nothing guaranteed they would have received party support — or that they ever will. The DPP never believed the recall would succeed. It stayed away at first partly because it wanted to avoid the embarrassment of a potential failure. The DPP has been emphasizing this ever since.
What appears now is that the real divide in Taiwanese politics is not between blue and green voters, and certainly not between pro or anti-CCP views. It is between those who fear China as the most urgent threat, and those who believe that the cost of living and economic pressure are more dangerous in the short term. The latter do not like the CCP, but they are tired of the DPP sleepwalking through domestic issues while winning by default.
For the DPP, that means its tough stance on China would never again be enough to win over people who are struggling to pay the rent or hoping for a pay raise — in short, unless they are given a nation worth defending.
For the KMT, it means its closeness to the CCP now puts it at risk even in its safest seats, where a group of underfunded idealists (who can be better organized next time) could threaten its dominance.
This recall was not an isolated event. It was the first chapter in a deeper political realignment. This is going to be quite a fascinating story to write.
Julien Oeuillet is a journalist in Taiwan. He is the founding editor of Indo-Pacific Open News. He also writes and produces radio and television programs for several English-language publications globally.
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