Former Taipei mayor and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) was indicted on Thursday last week for his alleged role in a corruption case. Prosecutors said that Ko had received bribes of NT$17.1 million (US$521,644) from Core Pacific Group (威京集團) chairman Sheen Ching-jing (沈慶京) and had assisted Core Pacific Group and its subsidiary Dingyue Development Corp (鼎越開發) in gaining unlawful financial benefits of more than NT$12.105 billion, in addition to accepting a bribe or other improper benefits for a breach of his official duties and seeking to benefit another party illegally, among other charges. Prosecutors are seeking a sentence of 28 years and six months and a fine of NT$50 million for Ko.
Codefendants in the case include Sheen and former Taipei deputy mayor Pong Cheng-sheng (彭振聲). The corruption scandal involving collusion between business and elected officials is said to be the largest of its kind over the past few years.
However, following the indictment, there ensued a legal wrangle over bail conditions, with Ko and Sheen released on bail by the High Court, which was contested by Taipei prosecutors who wanted them to remain in detention, which was agreed by a lower court, only for the Taipei District Court to grant bail again on Sunday.
From the initiation of the case against Ko until today, TPP caucus whip Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌) and other party members have insisted on pushing the line that this is nothing but political persecution, and have directly accused President William Lai (賴清德) of pursuing a witch hunt against Ko, accusing prosecutors of acting as Lai’s hired thugs and attempted to reflect Ko’s case as a struggle between political parties.
After the hearing to resume detention following the indictment, Huang even led a group of Ko supporters to the area around the Taipei District Court, which is subject to a prohibition on assembly and group demonstrations, and protested.
After the Taipei District Court ruled that Ko and others should be released on bail, the TPP crowd changed their tune entirely, expressing their gratitude to the judge.
That is, without any regard whatsoever for the evidence: They were only concerned with whether the court’s decision was beneficial to Ko.
However, the reason for the initial granting of bail was that the prosecutors had completed their investigation, and that if Ko was found guilty, he would be liable to a custodial sentence of no less than five years due to the severity of the charges against him.
It also found that there was reason for detention, but that it was not strictly necessary, and so had decided in this instance to grant bail.
From this, it is fair to surmise that the granting of bail was in no way meant to suggest an absence of guilt.
As far as bail for politicians involved in corruption cases is concerned, the amount at which the court set the bail for Ko — NT$30 million — was the highest on record, save for that granted to former Executive Yuan secretary-general Lin Yi-shih (林益世), and was higher, albeit marginally, than the amount set for former vice premier Cheng Wen-tsan (鄭文燦).
It is clear that the presiding judge had already concluded that Ko was up to his neck, and that Ko would not gain any advantage in the upcoming trial as a result of his having been granted bail.
Huang has a doctorate in law, and he should be very aware of this, yet he is unwilling to tell Ko’s supporters the truth, and is instead encouraging them to question the judiciary, and is even prepared to cause social tensions in the attempt.
It leads one to suspect what Huang is up to.
Before the actual verdict is handed down, the principle of the presumption of innocence has to be observed, and the focus of the public’s attention should not be on arguing back and forth or offering speculation on the details of the case; it should instead be on how the TPP, as the third force in Taiwan’s politics, will reinvent itself and transform, so that it does not collapse and survives as a viable party.
In this regard, TPP members could derive some inspiration from comments made by Ko on his release from the detention center where he had been held for 114 days before being granted bail.
His tone and demeanor were completely different from his usual sharp and derogatory register.
He thanked God for giving him the chance to reflect on his life, “which is not always easy,” and said that his heart was not “filled with hatred” because of his detention.
He also said that he believes “positive energy” would make Taiwan a better place.
Who knows whether these words were heartfelt, but they are certainly an important direction that the TPP can take if it is going to transform itself and grow from this experience.
The rise of Ko and the TPP had its origins in Ko’s arrival as a political neophyte a decade ago, fresh and bathed in a virtuous glow, before he found his feet and set himself in opposition to the traditional blue and green dichotomy, directing most of his enmity at the Democratic Progressive Party.
He set himself the goal of attracting swing voters who were disillusioned with the political “status quo,” as well as idealistic but naive younger voters.
If the TPP is to transform itself, the first step must be to divest itself from the development strategy of fanning enmity and social division in Taiwan.
The next problem is to address Ko’s autocratic style of leadership.
Ko has been power-hungry and calculating. He has an autocratic side to his personality and has a penchant for the totalitarian excesses of former Chinese leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東).
Ko lacks the democratic values of openness to diverse opinions and of showing tolerance of others. As a result, as Taipei mayor and as chairman of the TPP, he has been full of the imperiousness of Chinese emperors.
This is why Ko would often use high-sounding names and Chinese pronouns with which to refer to himself, and would order around his subordinates, staffers and public officials as if they were palace eunuchs or court ladies.
As an adherent of Mao, he has long studied his political moves and pugilistic approach, none of which is particularly conducive to a positive energy that would help further Taiwan’s democracy or progress.
Mao would often initiate internal party struggles or social movements to consolidate his power, with little regard for the good of the nation or the populace, in the process impoverishing the country.
Apart from his strategies to secure power, there is little else to learn from Mao, and yet Ko seemed to relish modeling himself on the Chinese autocrat.
If Ko is sincere about introspection, he needs to stop imitating the ways of past emperors, open himself up to divergent views and be more tolerant of diverse values.
If he can do this, the TPP might have a chance to turn itself around.
The TPP is not the only putative third force to emerge in Taiwan’s politics: There have been several before, but none of them have escaped the fate of fading into the background.
In some cases, this has been due to ideological reasons or extreme positions on ethnic grounds.
These movements or parties have enjoyed an initial flourish, only to be spurned when more rational and reasonable voices came to the fore.
Another issue with the “third forces” is that they tend to be centered on an individual and become one-man parties that are far too reliant on the political charisma of the leader. As soon as the myth surrounding the leader dissipates, or the leader lapses into senility, their party withers with them and loses momentum.
The TPP is a perfect example of a one-man party, and its fortunes are tied to Ko.
One major feature of these one-man parties is that they have the need to maintain the mythical status of their leader, and as such become little more than a religious sect: The party chairman is the leader of the sect, and the party followers are brought into the fold not because of the ideas or policies but because of some kind of religious devotion to the sect leader.
For this reason, the party can weather imminent storms, but there is little hope for sustainable growth as a political force.
From the evidence that the prosecutors’ investigation appears to have amassed in Ko’s corruption case, whether it be for profiteering or accepting bribes in contravention of one’s public duties, or of damaging the public interest, the proof does seem to be conclusive.
Even with the indictment, the entire TPP continues to follow the old trope being spouted by people like Huang, saying that the whole affair is nothing but a “political witch hunt” being orchestrated by the green camp, instead of trying to produce some evidence or analysis to refute the allegations put forward by the prosecutors.
The fact that the whole party seems to have descended into a band of ardent Ko devotees not only proves that the TPP places its religious dogma over politics, and that it is little more than a one-man party.
The Ko corruption case is crucial for whether the TPP flourishes or fades away. If it cannot reflect upon its problems and continues to rely on lambasting the judiciary, there is a real possibility that the party would implode if the allegations against Ko are found to be true.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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