Spain is an important partner of China within the EU, regardless of the party in power, and its two major political parties have a close relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The ruling Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) maintains strong ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in government-to-government and party-to-party relations. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez was the first European leader to visit China after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in March last year.
That meeting was seen as an endorsement by one of the most important European statesmen of Xi’s peace plan for the Russia-Ukraine war, signaling an intention to engage with Xi to find a way out of the conflict. Although the visit did not yield the expected outcomes, it empowered Xi and his international standing even more.
A clear indication of Sanchez’s strong relationship with Xi is the Spanish government’s decision last year not to recognize the refugee status of 12 members of the Church of Dios Todopoderoso persecuted by Beijing. They traveled to South Korea, Japan, South America and then Spain, but when they arrived in Europe, their request was denied.
Although the 12 Christians repeatedly told the Spanish police their firm intention not to return to China, indicating their willingness to be transferred to any place other than Beijing or to pay for a specific destination, they were forced to return to China.
The depth of the Spain-China relationship can also be seen in the strong ties between the Popular Party (PP) and the CCP. The PP in 2013 signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with China “marking the official start of the dialogue between the two parties.”
A reference to Taiwan can be found in the MOU: “The two organizations agree upon, on the basis of the principles of independence and autonomy, full equality, mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of the country.”
While not expessly mentioned, Beijing refers to Taiwan as one of its “internal affairs.” While signing the MOU, the PP accepted not to mention Taiwan as a potential point of discussion with China.
The PP and the CCP agreed upon Spain’s role in strengthening EU-China ties by “making the other EU countries more aware of China’s strategic, economic and political importance in the world today.”
Clearly, no significant differences would emerge should the PP rise to power after the next Spanish parliamentary elections.
Another example of the PSOE and PP’s outstretched hand policy toward Beijing is the parties’ decision not to join an inter-parliamentary group to support Tibet’s autonomy from Beijing. The main aim of this group is to gain “royal support” for resumption of substantive dialogue between Chinese authorities and Dalai Lama representatives to ensure a “meaningful autonomy” for the Tibetan people.
Unsurprisingly, the PSOE and the PP have also avoided angering China on Taiwan, Xinjiang and other thorny issues for Beijing. Aside from the parties supporting regional independence in Spain, such as Together for Catalonia, Republican Left of Catalonia or the Basque Nationalist Party, the main idea surrounding the Spanish political landscape is to come to terms with China by accepting its truths and narratives.
The ideological and economic reasons behind those approaches make Spain vulnerable to China’s psychological warfare directed at other countries. The growing emergence of Confucius Institutes also fits in an exemplary way into this scheme. However, no political leader seems to be aware of the risks arising from that “strategic partnership.”
Michele Maresca is an analyst at the online international law journal Il Caffe Geopolitico.
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