As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reach the point of confidence that they can start and win a war to destroy the democratic culture on Taiwan, any future decision to do so may likely be directly affected by the CCP’s ability to promote wars on the Korean Peninsula, in Europe, or, as most recently, on the Indian subcontinent.
It stands to reason that the Trump Administration’s success early on May 10 to convince India and Pakistan to deescalate their four-day conventional military conflict, assessed to be close to a nuclear weapons exchange, also served to deny the CCP/PLA the opportunity to shift its forces to begin a war against Taiwan.
Beijing’s post-conflict professions of support for the India-Pakistan ceasefire reeks of cynicism, as it is China’s all-around military and economic support that made this and so many previous conflicts possible, the most recent being sparked by an April 22 attack by Pakistani-supported terrorists that killed 22 Indians in Kashmir.
In 2023 China gave Pakistan the 20 or so Chengdu J-10CE 4.5 generation fighters with their 200 kilometer range Luoyang PL-15 air to air missiles (AAMs), which embarrassed India on May 6-7 by taking down up to three of its most modern 4.5 generation French-made Rafale fighters out to an unprecedented 181 kilometers.
But to make this Pakistan victory possible, China also provided a “kill chain” network that included data links (according to Chinese sources) and reorganized radar networks and possible direct intelligence support (according to Indian sources) that all supported Pakistan’s J-10CE and PL-15 AAM success.
It is also necessary to remember that most of Pakistan’s nuclear enterprise, from the production of fissile material, the production of long-range solid fuel missiles and their large truck transporters, to new multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, all exist due to China’s “all weather” support.
In December 2024 former Biden Administration Deputy National Security Advisor John Finer revealed that Pakistan may be developing intercontinental range ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States.
Likely technology sources include China or Chinese technology via North Korea.
India and Pakistan are estimated to have about 170 nuclear weapons each, enough to attack the 50 or so major nuclear, air, and naval bases in Pakistan and the 70-plus major military bases in India, or to cause devastation in a range from 20 to 125 million dead.
A nuclear-weapons defeated India would almost certainly have little capacity to significantly attack China, giving the PLA the option to consider moving any portion of the estimated 120,000 PLA troops deployed its Eastern Indian border — a number offered by Taipei Times columnist Brahma Chellaney in a December 13, 2024 posting on “X.”
This conceivably could allow the PLA to transfer up to 24 PLA Ground Force Combined Arms Brigades, with an average estimated complement of 5,000 troops each, to its invasion or occupation forces for Taiwan.
Recent additions to PLA deployments against India, such as modern 5th generation Chengdu J-20 air superiority (from a total that may approach 300), and 4.5 generation Chengdu J-10 multirole fighters, could also be rapidly transferred to assist the Taiwan Campaign.
A worst-case scenario for India following a nuclear war with Pakistan and a subsequent fall of Taiwan could see the CCP savagely exploit India’s weakness and invade the disputed territory of Arunachal Pradesh, which is now India’s 14th-largest state comprising over 2.5 percent of total Indian territory.
A CCP invasion of Arunachal Pradesh would almost certainly be followed by a PLA push though the southern Indian states of Assam and Tripura, which with an “accommodation” from CCP client Bangladesh would likely result in PLA missile, air, and naval bases on the Indian Ocean.
This, in turn, would allow the CCP to further cement its power over Bangladesh and Myanmar, providing a southern bracket of the Straits of Malacca, placing even greater political-economic pressure on Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia, and the economies of the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia.
One need only consult the United States Department of Defense’s annual 2024 China Military Power Report to see on pages 164 and 165 that before its Taiwan War, the PLA has options to shift up to 427,000 troops, up to 5 Group Armies or up to 30 Combined Arms Brigades, plus 1,100 combat aircraft, over to the Indian Theater of Operations.
What becomes clear is that the larger community of democracies have a vital interest in the security of an India free from predations of nuclear Pakistan and China, just as they have a vital interest in deterring and defeating any CCP/PLA invasion of Taiwan.
With the elimination of Taiwan or the hobbling of India, the CCP has options to empower its nuclear weapons client North Korea to menace South Korea and Japan, and/or to empower its ally Vladimir Putin to expand his war against Ukraine to the Baltic States and Poland.
But what is allowing the CCP to succeed with pushing its nuclear and proxy-war strategies is a reluctance or unwillingness by the West to pursue reciprocity for China’s actions at a conventional and nuclear level.
On May 10, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a strong statement of support for India, saying it “expresses firm support for all legitimate and necessary actions taken by the government of India to safeguard national security and fight terrorist forces that cross borders to attack innocent civilians.”
But it is unfortunate that India’s support for Taiwan’s freedom does not reflect the degree to which a PLA-conquered Taiwan would facilitate massive new threats to India, or that even begins to respond to the degree to which China has turned Pakistan into a nuclear existential threat to India.
No, this is not to suggest that India reciprocate for China’s perfidy by providing nuclear warheads to Taiwan, but what about considering the sale of its reportedly 800-kilometer range Brahmos-II supersonic antiship missile, as it has sold shorter-range versions to Vietnam and the Philippines.
For Washington and its allies, China’s escalation of its nuclear proliferation and proxy war strategies to directly empower and benefit from Pakistani, North Korean, and Russian aggression should prompt consideration of rapid elevation of its strategic support for Taipei.
China’s demonstration, via Pakistan, of successful Chinese-made electronic support network enabled 180-plus kilometer range air intercepts with its PL-15 only preview the capabilities of its reported 400-plus kilometer range ballistic-profile PL-17, out-ranging Taiwan’s 100 kilometer or less US-sourced AIM-120 AAMs.
One reciprocal US response would be to consider the sale to Taiwan of the new reportedly 240-kilometer range (but most likely longer range) Raytheon AIM-174B AAM and the sale of a long-range missile interceptor like the Lockheed Martin Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) or the Raytheon SM-3.
With US electronic support, these missile interceptors would have a very long ballistic range that may enable the interception of PLA Air Force H-6K bombers beyond the 1,500-kilometer range of the CJ-20 land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) aimed at Taiwan and US forces assisting Taiwan — targeting US aircraft carrier battle groups, each armed with four 400-kilometer range YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missiles.
Or the US should reconsider offering or even leasing a small number of Lockheed Martin F-35B short take-off or vertical landing (STOVL) capable 5th generation fighters, with advanced long-range radar, long-range optical sensors and stealth protection enabling the guidance of long-range AAMs and missile interceptors.
As part of its electronic support network to manage its air campaign over Taiwan, the PLA maintains about 100 radar sites opposite Taiwan along the coastal provinces of Fujian and Guangdong.
An appropriate response to assist Taiwan’s air defense would be a crash transfer of 200 Lockheed Martin Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS), to supplement the 66 sold by the first Trump Administration.
But what the Pakistan-India clash demonstrates most clearly is that a regional nuclear balance against China is the first prerequisite to have any chance of containing to a non-nuclear level any future fight over a CCP/PLA invasion of Taiwan, and this now requires that the US urgently increase its regional/tactical nuclear forces in Asia, to include North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) style joint basing with willing allies.
Richard D. Fisher, Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.
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