China has not been a top-tier issue for much of the second Trump administration. Instead, Trump has focused considerable energy on Ukraine, Israel, Iran, and defending America’s borders. At home, Trump has been busy passing an overhaul to America’s tax system, deporting unlawful immigrants, and targeting his political enemies. More recently, he has been consumed by the fallout of a political scandal involving his past relationship with a disgraced sex offender.
When the administration has focused on China, there has not been a consistent throughline in its approach or its public statements. This lack of overarching narrative likely reflects a combination of factors, including the diversity of viewpoints on China that coexist inside the administration, Trump’s impulsive decision-making style and his personal involvement in China policymaking, as well as the reduced role of the National Security Council as a coordinating body across the government.
This approach differs from Trump’s first term. During that period, Trump’s National Security Council was the key developer of strategy and coordinator of its implementation. Members of Trump’s NSC staff developed a detailed 10-page strategy document for the Indo-Pacific region, which they declassified and published in their waning days in office. In that strategy document, Trump’s NSC directed that strategy should be oriented around maintaining America’s “diplomatic, economic, and military preeminence” in the Indo-Pacific region.
When asked in private settings whether the second Trump administration has a strategy on China, officials will variously suggest either that the policy framework from the first administration remains operative, or that the strategy is reflected in the mosaic of decisions and executive orders President Trump has signed that relate to China, or that it remains early days in the second term and his team is committed to preserving Trump’s policy space to make decisions as he deems fit. In other words, there is not consensus among Trump’s own team whether a China strategy exists, let alone what that strategy might be.
Even if there is not a detailed classified plan sitting in a safe in the White House, there nevertheless is a pattern and direction to the Trump administration’s approach toward China. It starts from a broadly shared critique of the Biden administration for being predictable, process-oriented, and naive in investing so much energy in working to stabilize relations with China. It is infused by a lament over America’s loss of national prestige, wealth, and confidence in recent years. And it is topped with a heavy dose of skepticism of the value of trying to solve problems through diplomacy with China.
Even so, Trump is the key decisionmaker on China policy. He continues to personalize international relations as an extension of his own relationship with his foreign counterpart. And Trump believes he can make deals with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平).
Trump likely will test this proposition in the fall if he meets Xi for a summit, as is widely expected. At that meeting, Trump could seek commitments from Xi that China will increase purchases of American exports, increase Chinese investment in non-national security sectors of the US economy, expand market access for American firms in China, tighten control over the export of fentanyl precursors, approve the sale of TikTok, and ensure uninterrupted flow of rare earths products.
If such a meeting materializes, Xi will have asks of his own for Trump. He could press Trump to publicly recognize the importance of the US-China economic relationship for people in both countries. He could urge Trump to pull back on US export controls of high-tech products, as Trump recently did in authorizing Nvidia to sell H20 semiconductor chips to Chinese customers. Xi might also press Trump to clarify his stance on Taiwan.
If so, this would not be the first time Chinese diplomats seek to use a leader-level meeting to press the United States to affirm or amend its posture on Taiwan. In fact, this has been a consistent focus for Chinese diplomats in the run-up to leader-level summits for many years.
As he prepares for a potential summit with Xi, it will help for Trump to see Taiwan as an opportunity as opposed to a problem or obstacle to his goals. After all, Taiwan’s companies hold the keys to unlocking Trump’s AI ambitions. They produce the semiconductor chips and critical inputs upon which America’s leading companies depend. Without strong partnership between leading Taiwan and US companies, America’s road toward agentic AI and artificial general intelligence will be longer, slower, and cost much more to navigate.
This is where the focus of the US-Taiwan relationship needs to be for the coming period. Now is the time to celebrate the depth, strength, and mutual benefit of the US-Taiwan economic and technological partnership. It is a time to underscore Taiwan’s commitment to preserving the cross-Strait status quo. After all, America’s foremost interest is in upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
I recognize there are strong partisan passions in Taiwan right now. There are many more debates to be had around issues like energy, identity, and international standing. There will be a time and place for those debates. Now is a moment for steadiness and statesmanship.
Ryan Hass is a senior fellow, the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, and the Director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution.
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