As global power plays escalate, the room for the island democracy to maneuver has grown narrower. The idea of the “status quo” often implies stability and immutability, but in the context of Taiwan, it is anything but static.
The “status quo” is a myth; it is a dynamic and volatile state of affairs requiring constant adjustment and recalibration. It is better conceptualized as a “zone,” akin to the catchy phrase “gray zone.” This zone must acknowledge the interests of China, Taiwan and the US, aiming to maintain peace without escalating into full-blown conflict.
Embracing a mindset of “status zone” rather than “status quo” offers Taipei a realistic framework. It allows for the drawing of clear boundaries — what can be bargained, managed or even sacrificed — against what is unquestionably non-negotiable.
President William Lai (賴清德) underscores the importance of upholding former president Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) “Four Commitments” — ensuring Taiwan’s free and democratic constitutional system, asserting that the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China should not be subordinate to each other, defending against encroachments on sovereignty, and affirming that Taiwan’s future is determined by its people.
These commitments, described by Tsai as the “bottom line” and “common denominator,” offer reassurance to Taiwanese and Washington, but not Beijing.
When Lai announced his intention to engage in dialogue with China based on the principles of “mutual respect, mutual benefit, dignity and without preconditions” — echoing Tsai’s stance — it essentially translates to a pre-emptive refusal. While emphasizing consistency might resonate with audiences in Washington and Taiwan, Lai’s reputation as a “die-hard separatist” means that any overture to Beijing is unlikely to satisfy, which leads to a cross-strait stalemate.
Tsai’s approach might have sufficed during her tenure, but it appears less effective now as China ramps up its unification efforts through diverse forms of warfare, especially in law domain. This is not to suggest that Lai should discard Tsai’s principles; instead, he must contemplate novel strategies to counter the increasing intensity, scale and frequency of threats.
While Lai has inherited Tsai’s national security team and focuses primarily on domestic issues — areas in which he has extensive experience — this focus constrains the innovative, out-of-the-box discourse required to counter Beijing’s adept use of coercive tactics. Lai must recognize the advantageous international environment that Tsai has bequeathed him, but at the same time devise fresh ideas and strategies to fully leverage this environment.
Essentially, Taiwan is at the right time and place now, but it needs the right people with strategic, flexible and nimble approaches.
Lai must now navigate foreign affairs as the primary pilot, a role less familiar to him compared with Tsai. While his focus on winning mid-term local elections by prioritizing domestic issues is pragmatic, it is essential that he strikes a balance. He should closely monitor domestic affairs while delegating significant authority to the premier. Micromanaging domestic matters is tempting, but impractical for a president whose nation is at the heart of global geopolitics.
Navigating the turbulent waters of cross-strait relations requires a fresh outlook; confronting China’s “gray zone” tactics demands ingenuity and the strategic use of asymmetric advantages. Lai must rise to the occasion by establishing a cross-ministerial maritime committee focused on evaluating current resources and identifying future capabilities for law enforcement. This initiative would demonstrate to the Taiwanese a government that is proactive, unwavering in its seriousness and committed to maritime security.
A pivotal step would be the formation of Taiwan’s own maritime militia, amalgamating all pertinent bureaucratic entities, and mobilizing personnel from diverse military and civilian backgrounds. This force would be charged with executing law enforcement within Taiwan’s maritime zones.
Moreover, Taipei must engage and cultivate a cadre of lawfare experts to navigate the complex and evolving landscape of modern warfare adeptly. This expertise, long overlooked, is now a necessity that Taiwan can no longer afford to ignore.
By bolstering its intellectual arsenal, Taiwan will be better equipped to confront and neutralize the legal and tactical intricacies posed by China’s aggressive maneuvers.
In this high-stakes geopolitical chess game, mastering the art of lawfare is not merely optional — it is imperative.
The sands of time favor Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), not Lai. The challenge of creating a discourse acceptable to Beijing and Taiwanese stakeholders remains on the to-do list in the “urgent, but difficult” category. This effort requires a delicate balance — asserting Taiwan’s unique identity while fostering a constructive dialogue with China.
In the evolving landscape of cross-strait relations, clarity, innovation and strategic foresight are essential. Lai, over the next four years, must navigate this complex terrain with diplomatic skill and a nuanced understanding of cross-strait dynamics, forging a path toward lasting peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Cathy Fang is a policy analyst at the Project 2049 Institute and a research associate at Armitage International, LC.
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