A foreign colleague of mine asked me recently, “What is a safe distance from potential People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force’s (PLARF) Taiwan targets?” This article will answer this question and help people living in Taiwan have a deeper understanding of the threat.
Why is it important to understand PLA/PLARF targeting strategy?
According to RAND analysis, the PLA’s “systems destruction warfare” focuses on crippling an adversary’s operational system by targeting its networks, especially leadership, command and control (C2) nodes, sensors, and information hubs.
Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, noted in his 15 May 2025 Sedona Forum keynote speech that, as early as 2023, the PLA had developed capabilities to execute Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) directive to conquer Taiwan no later than 2027. Specifically, Admiral Paparo declared that the PLA has already achieved Xi’s 2027 benchmark for missile and space capabilities. PLA’s cyber capabilities against Taiwan are also ready. The PLA can use these three capabilities at any time very quickly. Meanwhile, the PLA is completing their other capabilities to meet Xi’s 2027 invasion benchmark.
With respect to Taiwan’s missile defense from PLARF missiles, as in all war, the enemy has a vote, and the PLA will target Taiwan’s missile command and control centers and other targets related to the PLA’s systems destruction warfare to degrade Taiwan’s ability to respond to the PLA.
If Xi decides to take Taiwan, the PLARF has been practicing attacking Taiwan for at least 30 years, and its solid-fueled missiles are ready to launch anytime. For example, in 1995–1996 during the Third Taiwan Crisis, the PLA fired ten missiles at Taiwan and during the 2022 Fourth Taiwan Crisis launched eleven missiles and some rockets.
During the 1995/1996 crisis, the PLA’s 613th Brigade launched ten Dongfeng-15A (DF-15A also called CSS-6), six during 21–24 July 1995, and four DF-15As during 8-13 March 1996.
After then speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, the PLA fired eleven DF-15B 350-700km from the PRC to targets in the sea close to Taiwan and an unknown number of PHL-16 rockets (from Pingtan Island into the sea). The PLARF units that fired the DF-15B missiles close to Taiwan, the 613 Brigade (Shangrao, Jiangxi), 616 Brigade (Ganzhou, Jiangxi), 617 Brigade (Jinhua, Zhejiang) and PLARF Base 61 (Anhui Province), fired four DF-15B missiles that overflew Taiwan.
Some sources note that the PLARF had planned to fire 16 missiles. Taiwan detected only 11 and Japan detected only nine missiles, five of which landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Some suspect that the five missing missiles misfired or suffered other technical difficulties, which partially explains Xi’s subsequent firing of the PLARF senior leadership.
North Koreans began firing ballistic missiles over Japan in 1998, and into Japan’s EEZ in 2016. The August 2022 missile shots were the first that the PLA fired into Japan’s EEZ.
What are the known PLARF missile bases targeting Taiwan?
Director of the Graduate Institute of China Military Affairs Studies, National Defense University Jing Yuan-chou (荊元宙) and Counterintelligence Officer in the Ministry of National Defense Lai Yi-ren (賴顗任) state, in their 2021 article published in the Jamestown’s China Brief, that the PLA assigned 61 Base (Huangshan, Anhui) as the headquarters and five subordinate missile brigades to target Taiwan: 613th Brigade (Shangrao, Jiangxi) DF-15B/17 missiles targeting Northern Taiwan; 614th Brigade (Yong’an, Fujian) DF-11A/17 targeting Central Taiwan; 615th Brigade (Meizhou, Guangdong) DF-11A missiles targeting Southern Taiwan; 616th Brigade (Ganzhou, Jiangxi) DF-15B/17 missiles targeting Southern Taiwan; and 617th Brigade (Jinhua, Zhejiang) with DF-16A missiles targeting Northern Taiwan.
As noted earlier, 61 Base and three of the five designated brigades had practiced attacking Taiwan during the Third and Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.
The 2025 Nuclear Notebook of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists states that the PLA has 45 PLARF missile brigades. Six additional listed conventional missile brigades could also be tasked to support striking Taiwan based on their respective missile ranges: DF-16A (636 Brigade-Shaoguan); three DF-17 brigades (627 Brigade-Puning, 635 Brigade-Yichun, and 655 Brigade-Tonghua); CJ-10A (DF-10A) cruise missile (623 Brigade-Liuzhou); and the 4,000 km supersonic cruise missile CJ-100 (656 Brigade-Linyi).
Jing and Lai noted in 2021 that the number of PLA short and medium range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles targeting Taiwan has risen rapidly from about 200 missiles in 2000, 496 in 2003, 784 in 2005, 988 in 2006, and about 1,500 in 2015. Today, analysts estimate that the PLARF has at least 1,700 missiles targeting Taiwan.
The number of launchers limits the quantity of missiles that can be fired at any time. According to DOD 2024 annual report on the PLA, only 300 launchers are available to fire the 900 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM), mainly the DF-11/15/16 missiles targeting Taiwan. The quantity of DF-17 missiles and launchers is not available.
The two large Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) missile strikes against Israel provides a contemporary example of the launcher-missile relationship and missile defense excellence. The IRI launched more than 330 air threats on 13 April 2024 (i.e., 120 ballistic missiles, 170 drones and 30 cruise missiles) that were all scheduled to arrive over Israel about the same time to overwhelm air and missile defenses. On 1 October 2024, the IRI launched 180–200 ballistic missiles: Fattah I/II, Ghadr-110 (Qadr-1), and Emad missile (based on North Korea’s Nodong-1 missile) that all ranged from 1,200-1,700km and with warheads varying from 350-1,000kg.
The IRI tried to design their October 2024 attack to overwhelm the upper tier Israeli missile defense systems, Arrow II/III. Iranian planners assumed that Israel had depleted its stockpiles in the previous April 2024 attack. Iranian planners underestimated Israel’s missile stockpiles and launchers of Arrow II/III systems, and allied support. These Iranian attacks caused no considerable damage. However, the Iranian attacks during June 2025 at Israel have caused death and injuries.
Israel built three layers of missile defense to shoot down Iranian drones, ballistic and cruise missiles: Arrow II/III, David Sling, and Iron Dome, air-to-air missiles such as the US AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9L Sidewinder, Israeli Python 5, and Derby missiles. Israel also had assistance from allies, such as two US Aegis Navy destroyers deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and, according to a UK parliamentary report, assistance from Jordan, the UK, France, and intelligence support from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Taiwan has capabilities against PLA drone, ballistic and cruise missile threats, but needs more, along with similar support from allies in the region.
The PLA will use a similar strategy of launching from multiple locations and multiple types of rockets, missiles, and drones timed to arrive over Taiwan at the same time. Recall that the PRC and the Islamic Republic of Iran have a close relationship as a result of their US$400 billion 25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement signed in June 2020, which included, according to the New York Times, joint military exercises and training, research and weapons development, and intelligence sharing.
An April 2023 US Naval Institute article estimated the number of conventional missiles available for the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) as follows: 192xDF-11A missiles, 144xDF-15A, 144xDF-15B, 480xDF-16, 360xDF-17HGV, 480xDF-21D (anti-ship), 108xDF-26B (anti-ship), and 384xHN-3 and Southern Theater Command (STC) 672 missiles (480xDF-16 and 192xHN-2). Removing the DF-21D anti-ship missiles, the total number of ETC and STC missiles that could strike Taiwan is almost 1,700.
Taiwan’s military does have a variety of missile defense systems, such as the Sky Bow I/II/III, Antelope, PAC-III, and NASAMS (soon). However, the quantity of missiles and launchers does not provide comprehensive protection. The same challenge exists for air defense against drones.
What can individuals do to reduce the PLA missile, rocket and drone threat to themselves?
I experienced missile and rocket attacks in Baghdad, Iraq, during 2005, and in Israel during 2014 (Tel Aviv) and again in 2018 (Beersheva). The best action is to find shelter from these flying bombs. Taiwan has over 100,000 bomb shelters, with Taipei having 4,600 shelters. However, most are not designed for long term use. If a person cannot find an official shelter in time, then the best place to be is underground (parking garage, basement, or MRT underground station) since each floor is made from reinforced concrete. If no underground location is available, then the cement stairwell is the strongest part of a building. If in a car and no buildings are nearby, pulling off the side of the road and lying down in a least exposed location is the best solution. In summary, know where to shelter near your home, work, shopping, and entertainment areas.
Given enough warning prior to a missile attack, civilians near potential PLA targets (ROC military headquarters and key bases, politically significant buildings, critical infrastructures, and other significant places associated with their “systems destruction warfare”), should consider safely distancing themselves from these locations. For example, after 7 October 2023, Israel ordered the evacuation of about 200,000 people from the border areas that Israel shares with the Gaza Strip and Lebanon as a matter of precaution from terrorist rocket and missile threats. The Israeli government allowed residents back to northern Israel only on 1 March 2025. Even Ukraine has over 3.7 million people internally displaced, and 6.7 million refugees fled to other countries,
Based on careful analysis of the PLA rocket and missile threat, I recommend at least a two-kilometer distance from PLA targets. This calculation is based on the PLA’s missiles’ Circular Error Probable (CEP) which is the measure of a weapon’s accuracy (or inaccuracy) and the warhead blast danger area (PHL-03: 280kg warhead to DF-26: 1,800kg warhead).
Russia has devastated Ukrainian cities by rockets, drones, and missile strikes. Israel and Ukraine continue to be attacked by these even today. I hope Taiwan does not have to face this threat. Nevertheless, countries and terror groups have designed force structures and strategies to cause damage to civilian infrastructure and to kill civilians. The CCP’s highly belligerent nature and indifference to civilian casualties makes danger to civilians a certainty, and the public should know where to go and what to do before and during a missile strike.
Guermantes Lailari is a retired US Air Force Foreign Area officer specializing in counterterrorism, irregular warfare, missile defense, and strategy. He holds advanced degrees in international relations and strategic intelligence. He was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellow in 2022, a visiting scholar at National Chengchi University and National Defense University in 2023, and is a visiting researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in 2024.
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