As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) concludes his fourth visit to China since leaving office, Taiwan finds itself once again trapped in a familiar cycle of political theater. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has criticized Ma’s participation in the Straits Forum as “dancing with Beijing,” while the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) defends it as an act of constitutional diplomacy.
Both sides miss a crucial point: The real question is not whether Ma’s visit helps or hurts Taiwan — it is why Taiwan lacks a sophisticated, multi-track approach to one of the most complex geopolitical relationships in the world.
The disagreement reduces Taiwan’s cross-strait options to a false binary: You are either “pro-unification” or you are “pro-independence,” either you engage with Beijing or you do not. This oversimplification does a disservice to Taiwan’s sophisticated democracy and the public’s nuanced views on cross-strait relations.
Ma’s visit — regardless of political affiliation — represents something Taiwan’s leadership struggles to provide: sustained, high-level engagement with Beijing that does not require official government endorsement. In diplomatic circles, this is known as “track II diplomacy” — informal channels that can maintain dialogue when official ones are frozen.
The DPP’s reflexive condemnation of Ma’s visit reveals a strategic blind spot. By treating any engagement with Beijing as inherently treasonous, Taiwan’s ruling party has effectively ceded the entire diplomatic space to the opposition.
This is not just politically shortsighted, it is strategically dangerous.
Consider what Ma’s presence at the Straits Forum achieves, beyond its symbolism.
First, it maintains Taiwan’s voice in cross-strait discourse at a time when official channels remain largely shut. Second, it provides Beijing with a credible Taiwanese interlocutor who can articulate Taiwan’s democratic values and political constraints, which Beijing desperately needs to understand. Third, it ensures continued access for Taiwan’s business community and civil society to China’s networks that drive economic and cultural exchanges.
Critics are right to be wary of Beijing’s “united front” tactics. The Chinese Communist Party undoubtedly uses events such as the Straits Forum to legitimize its claims over Taiwan and sow division within Taiwanese society, but the answer is not to disengage — it is to engage more strategically.
Instead of condemning Ma’s visit outright, the DPP should be asking harder questions, such as: How can Taiwan leverage multiple channels of engagement to advance its interests? How can it ensure that informal diplomacy complements rather than undermines official policy? How can dialogue be maintained without compromising Taiwan’s interests?
The Mainland Affairs Council’s response — expressing “deep regret” and warning about propaganda — reads like something from the playbook of an authoritarian government fearful of unauthorized contact with the enemy. That is not how confident democracies behave.
Israel maintains robust unofficial channels with adversaries through academic institutions, business networks and former officials, as do South Korea, Japan and numerous other democratic nations facing complex security challenges.
One aspect of Ma’s visit that deserves particular attention is his focus on youth exchanges.
Whatever one thinks of Ma’s politics, the fact that he is taking young Taiwanese to China serves Taiwan’s long-term interests in ways that government officials seem reluctant to acknowledge.
The young people would return to Taiwan with firsthand knowledge of Chinese society, its economy and governance. They would be better equipped to navigate cross-strait relations in their professional lives and more sophisticated in their understanding of the challenges Taiwan faces. In an era in which Beijing increasingly shapes global narratives about Taiwan, having Taiwanese who can engage knowledgeably with Chinese counterparts is an asset, not a liability.
The alternative — a generation of Taiwanese who know China only through political rhetoric and media reports — leaves Taiwan more vulnerable to miscalculation and misunderstanding.
Taiwan’s political leaders should stop treating cross-strait engagement as a zero-sum game where any contact with Beijing automatically serves Chinese interests. This mindset reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how modern diplomacy works in complex, interdependent relationships.
Consider Taiwan’s relationship with Japan, which involves extensive unofficial exchanges despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations. Former Japanese officials regularly visit Taiwan and maintain ongoing dialogues with their Taiwanese counterparts. These exchanges do not compromise Japan’s commitment to its “one China” policy; they enhance mutual understanding and strengthen the relationship within existing constraints.
Taiwan could develop a similar framework for cross-strait engagement — one that acknowledges the so-called “1992 consensus,” while maintaining strategic ambiguity about its applicability. This would allow for continued dialogue without requiring either side to surrender their core positions.
Academic and think tank exchanges could maintain dialogue on cross-strait issues through universities and research institutions, providing space for candid discussion of sensitive topics without requiring government endorsement. Intellectual forums allow for the exploration of complex policy questions in ways that official diplomatic channels often cannot accommodate.
At the same time, business and economic forums should continue facilitating commercial dialogue that benefits both sides, while carefully avoiding political complications that could disrupt vital economic relationships. Taiwan’s economic prosperity remains deeply intertwined with China, and maintaining these commercial channels serves practical and strategic purposes, even during periods of political tension.
Cultural and social exchanges are another crucial dimension, promoting people-to-people connections that build understanding and lower the risk of conflict, particularly among younger generations, who would inherit the cross-strait relationship.
Finally, utilizing retired leaders and diplomats to maintain high-level communication channels, as Ma is doing, provides a valuable safety valve for managing tensions, while preserving official positions on both sides.
Ma’s China visit is neither helpful nor harmful in isolation — its value depends on how Taiwan’s broader political leadership chooses to contextualize and leverage it.
If it remains an isolated initiative by an opposition figure, it would indeed serve Beijing’s interests more than Taiwan’s.
However, if it is integrated into a coordinated, multi-track approach to engagement, it could meaningfully serve Taiwan’s interests.
Taiwan’s survival and prosperity depend not on ideological purity, but on strategic flexibility and diplomatic creativity. Ma’s visit should be the beginning of that conversation, not the end of it.
Y. Tony Yang is an endowed professor and associate dean at George Washington University. He earned his law degree from National Taiwan University and his doctoral degree from Harvard University.
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