In a world increasingly defined by unpredictability, two actors stand out as islands of stability: Europe and Taiwan. One, a sprawling union of democracies, but under immense pressure, grappling with a geopolitical reality it was not originally designed for. The other, a vibrant, resilient democracy thriving as a technological global leader, but living under a growing existential threat.
In response to rising uncertainties, they are both seeking resilience and learning to better position themselves. It is now time they recognize each other not just as partners of convenience, but as strategic and indispensable lifelines.
The US, long seen as the anchor of liberal values, is entering a dangerous period of volatility. Whether through isolationist mood swings, reinvigorated protectionism or transactional diplomacy, under US President Donald Trump, Washington is becoming less predictable and therefore less reliable.
Meanwhile, China has grown more assertive, betting on the world being too distracted or too divided to respond to its creeping coercion of Taiwan. Europe and Taiwan find themselves caught in the middle — a position that neither is comfortable with.
This is why and where the EU must step up — and where Taiwan must look west.
The European Parliament has already made bold moves: It has continued and even intensified official visits to Taipei, consistently supported the nation’s global participation through resolutions and plenary debates, and repeatedly urged investing in resilience and joint efforts, particularly through tech collaboration, an area where global competition has become the toughest.
The parliament has shown that parliamentary diplomacy works. Yet, it is clearly not enough. It must be supported by member states, whose collective weight is not negligible, especially for China and its global aspirations.
EU member states have converged in appreciating Taiwan’s strategic importance to their security and prosperity. For example, this includes voicing concern about growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait in their council conclusions. Yet, it is hard to identify and evaluate concrete steps through which they plan to increase their contribution to deterring an assertive China in the Strait.
At present, the EU’s approach to China is going through a rethink — more pushback against Beijing in all fields and overall more investment in strategic autonomy. This has been a positive development, most recently tested by Trump’s attack on Europe and everything it stands for. Whether the EU continues on its path of geopolitical rethink would also shape the credibility of its claims that it has elevated Taiwan on its agenda.
However, steps taken so far by the different EU institutions remain fragmented. They lack urgency. The EU is a multi-layered governance structure and its performance must be assessed as such. In such a structure, ensuring consistency would continue to be exceptionally difficult, yet there is no way around it if the EU is serious about its geopolitical shift. Therefore, what is needed now is clarity in language, and creativity and consistency in action.
The EU’s approach to Taiwan already has a solid foundation, namely shared democratic values, and international standards and principles, which the EU has started to assert much more clearly in its narrative.
Taiwan is already integrated in the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy adopted in 2021. Yet, although clearly articulated on paper, in practice it remains difficult to evaluate the implementation of the strategy and identify tangible progress.
The EU must now set clear priorities and pursue them consistently — bolstering its ability to develop, secure and sustain critical technologies — while embracing a more realistic approach to geopolitics. This would require a great deal of creativity. With supply chain concerns on the rise, investing in resilience requires trusted partners.
Amid heightened geopolitical tensions and in the aftermath of COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan has proven to be a reliable ally. Europe knows as much, but it must do more than talk. EU institutions all have a role to play and they should each do their part — and be evaluated accordingly.
The parliament should institutionalize annual parliamentary visits to Taiwan to ensure consistency and predictability. It should also adopt regular stand-alone reports on Taiwan (like it does on China). Its first-ever Taiwan report in 2021 was groundbreaking, but has been the last one so far.
The EU should expand educational and research cooperation with Taiwan, including youth exchanges and institutional partnerships, while continuing to press for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international forums such as the WHO and the International Civil Aviation Organization.
In line with their different strengths and ambitions, member states should explore ways to expand sectoral agreements on digital technology, renewables, cybersecurity and foreign information manipulation — and yes, a serious conversation about a bilateral investment agreement is long overdue, and the European Commission should seriously consider it.
This is not about recognizing Taiwan as a state. It is about recognizing it as a partner — one that shares Europe’s values, complements its economic needs and stands on the frontlines of the global contest between openness and authoritarianism.
Taiwan, for its part, should seize this moment to diversify its global alliances. Europe offers what Taiwan needs most: stability, predictability, legitimacy and policy consistency — without the chaos that increasingly defines US politics.
Taiwan is not just the world’s semiconductor hub. It is a democratic bellwether in Asia. Europe’s Indo-Pacific strategy cannot be serious if Taiwan is treated as a footnote. At a time when Russia pursues its brutal attack to destroy Ukraine and China deepens its authoritarian playbook, pretending Taiwan is not central to the global balance is a dangerous delusion.
If the 2020s have taught us anything, it is that alliances must be built not just on power, but on principle and predictability. Europe and Taiwan offer that.
In an era of crumbling certainties, it is time they see each other not through the fog of China or the US — but clearly, and directly.
Simona Grano is head of the Research Area China-Taiwan Relations and director of the Taiwan Studies Project at the University of Zurich. Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy is assistant professor at National Dong Hwa University in Hualien, Taiwan.
Chinese agents often target Taiwanese officials who are motivated by financial gain rather than ideology, while people who are found guilty of spying face lenient punishments in Taiwan, a researcher said on Tuesday. While the law says that foreign agents can be sentenced to death, people who are convicted of spying for Beijing often serve less than nine months in prison because Taiwan does not formally recognize China as a foreign nation, Institute for National Defense and Security Research fellow Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲) said. Many officials and military personnel sell information to China believing it to be of little value, unaware that
Before 1945, the most widely spoken language in Taiwan was Tai-gi (also known as Taiwanese, Taiwanese Hokkien or Hoklo). However, due to almost a century of language repression policies, many Taiwanese believe that Tai-gi is at risk of disappearing. To understand this crisis, I interviewed academics and activists about Taiwan’s history of language repression, the major challenges of revitalizing Tai-gi and their policy recommendations. Although Taiwanese were pressured to speak Japanese when Taiwan became a Japanese colony in 1895, most managed to keep their heritage languages alive in their homes. However, starting in 1949, when the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) enacted martial law
“Si ambulat loquitur tetrissitatque sicut anas, anas est” is, in customary international law, the three-part test of anatine ambulation, articulation and tetrissitation. And it is essential to Taiwan’s existence. Apocryphally, it can be traced as far back as Suetonius (蘇埃托尼烏斯) in late first-century Rome. Alas, Suetonius was only talking about ducks (anas). But this self-evident principle was codified as a four-part test at the Montevideo Convention in 1934, to which the United States is a party. Article One: “The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government;
The central bank and the US Department of the Treasury on Friday issued a joint statement that both sides agreed to avoid currency manipulation and the use of exchange rates to gain a competitive advantage, and would only intervene in foreign-exchange markets to combat excess volatility and disorderly movements. The central bank also agreed to disclose its foreign-exchange intervention amounts quarterly rather than every six months, starting from next month. It emphasized that the joint statement is unrelated to tariff negotiations between Taipei and Washington, and that the US never requested the appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar during the
RSS