While the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) consistently sends drones to harass military bases in Taiwan’s outlying islands and along the coastline, new US Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo told the Washington Post that the US military would implement a “Hellscape” strategy involving thousands of uncrewed systems to deter a Chinese invasion.
Josh Rogin, who authored the article which was published on Monday last week, spoke to Paparo on the sidelines of the recent Shangri-La Dialogue defense forum in Singapore.
Paparo told him that as soon as China’s invasion force began to move across the 180km Taiwan Strait, the US military would deploy thousands of uncrewed submarines, surface ships and aerial drones to flood the area and give Taiwanese, US and partner forces time to assemble a full response.
“I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities,” Paparo said. “So that I can make their [the PLA’s] lives utterly miserable for a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything.”
A Naval News publication released on Monday analyzing the “hellscape” concept said the US took lessons from Russia’s war on Ukraine, where Ukraine’s deployment of cheap drones had a great effect in repelling Russian advances. Its government since last year has invested in dozens of active programs to develop new uncrewed capabilities, including spending more than US$1 billion on a Replicator Initiative program to build swarms of uncrewed surface ships and aerial drones within the next two years.
Taiwan also has a similar strategy to strengthen deterrence. The Ministry of Defense aims to incorporate uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) into their force buildup plans and produce 7,700 UAVs for military use by 2028, it said in its “Republic of China National Defense Report 2023.”
Taking advantage of the nation’s excellence in information and communication technology, Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo (顧立雄) said that the government would work with private contractors to develop advanced commercial drones for use by the military, such as medium and large military drones and attack drones with military specifications. It also plans to acquire about 1,000 drones equipped with artificial intelligence and machine learning abilities this year, as part of its efforts to bolster the military’s modern combat capabilities, Koo added.
However, China has long been a globally leading country in the mass production of uncrewed vehicles. China’s Da-Jiang Innovations (大疆創新) has become the world’s largest drone maker, supplying more than 70 percent of the world’s consumer drones.
Chinese media reports say the PLA has already established UAV forces for a strategic shift toward drone-led special operations in war scenarios, including a potential conflict with the US over Taiwan.
With China aiming to have the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027, the major and urgent challenges faced by the nation, the US and like-minded allies should be to address funding shortages and increase the capacity for the mass production of UAVs.
It is difficult, but also necessary to remove influence from the Chinese supply chain, since a growing number of Taiwanese and US UAVs have been found to be equipped with components made in China.
Taiwan should also accelerate the buildup of its special forces and facilities for UAV-related warfare, not only to be able to practice UAV operations, but also to fight against the PLA’s UAV attacks and harassment, which have increased rapidly this year.
Setting up a hellscape defense in the Taiwan Strait to deter and break through China’s likely ploy to overwhelm Taiwan with a massive attack, takes not only tens of thousands of UAVs, but also a lot of talented personnel, skilled at asymmetric warfare tactics and strategies.
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