Amid a fervor in the global media, US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi and her congressional delegation made a high-profile visit to Taipei.
President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) awarded a state honor to her at the Presidential Office. Evidently, the occasion took on the aspect of an inter-state relationship between the US and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, despite no mutual state recognition between the two.
Beijing furiously condemned Pelosi’s visit in advance, with military drills in the waters surrounding coastal China to check the move. Pelosi is a well-known China hawk, and second in the line of succession to the US presidency, now in a unified government under the Democratic Party, which has sustained a hardline policy against China.
Naturally, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is concerned that the US might ignore the “one China” policy, which has been the foundation for strategic stability across the Taiwan Strait, and openly challenge his top core interest — unification with Taiwan.
Xi needs stable US-China relations because he faces a sensitive political season at home for his presidency to be extended.
Pelosi did not heed attempts by the administration of US President Joe Biden to dissuade her from making the visit. She needed to appeal to those liberal supporters who were against unspeakable human right abuses in China, given that US mid-term elections are approaching with her Democratic Party facing floundering approval ratings. No wonder Pelosi collided with the Biden administration, which also needs stable US-China ties to improve its approval rating by removing some tariffs on Chinese goods to counter soaring inflation.
Also, she desired to seal her legacy before relinquishing the speaker’s gavel.
Her visit resulted from the dynamics of domestic politics in the US and China, as well as the structure of the bilateral strategic rivalry.
Washington and Beijing have to carry out effective crisis management, but neither can back down easily, because they each fear a domestic political backlash in their own nations, especially as the media coverage of the visit was extensive.
Xi is not likely to initiate a military response to the Pelosi visit and run the risk of an open armed confrontation against a still-ascendant US military. He is at his most risk-averse due to his focus on extending his time in office.
Still, Beijing has to play up strong countermeasures, while Washington needs to cope with them militarily and economically.
Beijing has sharply intensified its saber rattling by conducting large-scale military drills concurrently in six areas designed to encircle Taiwan. This includes missiles fired from and into the areas, the intrusion of military aircraft into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone and crossing of the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which has been long been a de facto boundary.
Naturally, the intimidating moves have incurred the substantial risk of an accidental incident that might escalate into a full-scale armed conflict. In addition, if the saber rattling is protracted, Taiwan’s military will inevitably be exhausted, jeopardizing national security.
Also, Beijing has already initiated de facto economic sanctions against Taiwan, now focusing on suspension of its imports of citrus fruit and marine products, to be followed by far more extensive and stronger measures. Given its high dependence on trade with China, Taiwan has to prepare for economic hardship and perhaps a serious recession. This will surely frustrate Taipei’s efforts to beef up its defense capabilities against possible Chinese aggression.
Given the backdrop, Tsai probably misidentified the significance of Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan as a golden opportunity in diplomacy, rather than as a troublesome challenge.
Also, she needed to play up her diplomatic performance to the public to recover lingering popular support for herself and her Democratic Progressive Party, as nationwide local elections are approaching this fall.
True, Tsai had no choice but to receive the Pelosi-led delegation. She was unable to prevent the visit.
However, she could have controlled damage to cross-strait stability by de-emphasizing the appearance of an inter-state relationship between the US and the ROC on Taiwan by fine-tuning how she received Pelosi and the delegation.
On the contrary, Tsai overemphasized the appearance, demonstrating that she made light of the constraints of the distinct “one China” policies of the US and China.
More specifically, Tsai could have avoided awarding the state honor to Pelosi and the delegation at the Presidential Office or broadcasting the entire ceremonial process online. Instead, she could have had a practical exchange meeting elsewhere, such as at the legislature or the de facto US embassy in Taipei, or held a power lunch meeting at a major local hotel.
It is quite understandable that Tsai as well as the Taiwanese public have a strong sense of international isolation and marginalization, meaning they want to embrace the US as a security guarantor more tightly, but an opportunistic move in the structure of the US-China rivalry is counterproductive to Taiwan’s medium and long-term interests.
Taiwan’s security is alright for the short term, but while it has the advantage of cross-strait stability, it has to focus on building as much defense capability as possible to counter Chinese aggression.
Masahiro Matsumura is a professor of international politics at St Andrew’s University in Osaka, Japan.
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