Nearly forty years ago Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), China’s last great statesman/leader, unveiled a new concept: “one country, two systems.” He did this in the context of pending talks between Beijing and London on the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, after one and a half centuries of British rule. Deng, who returned to power in the aftermath of Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) disastrous policies, then embarked upon a remarkable economic and political program designed to catapult China into the modern world economically, if not politically. He drew inspiration from the achievements of several Asian “tigers” of the era, including South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, which had been experiencing double digit GDP growth under their own authoritarian leaders throughout the sixties and seventies.
Great Britain’s forceful new leader, Margaret Thatcher, aware of the 1898 treaty governing Hong Kong’s status, wanted to begin talks on some sort of arrangement that would permit extension of British sovereignty over the economic and business center there. Deng had other plans. He made it clear China intended to bring Hong Kong under the mainland’s control, something that had really never existed before.
When London seized control of Hong Kong in 1842, it was little more than a fishing village on a rocky island off the southeastern shore of Qing Dynasty China. The British turned the place into a thriving trading center by the end of the 19th century, and continued to transform the territory, buttressed by purchase of additional land, into one of the most dynamic commercial centers in Asia.
The “Iron Lady,” as Mrs. Thatcher was known, quickly recognized she held few cards in the negotiation. The Treaty governing Hong Kong’s status lapsed in 1997, and Deng was insistent that he wanted Hong Kong back. The pragmatic Deng recognized that a poorly managed deal on the business hub would damage not only the city and its people, but also China’s shaky new reputation as a dependable partner in the world community, following the Maoist era.
By 1984 an arrangement had been worked out whereby Hong Kong would revert to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, but would enjoy a special status, known as “one country, two systems,” for at least fifty years, or until 2047. At the time, Deng held out the promise that this system would be sufficiently successful to serve as a model for resolution of the much thornier Taiwan question. As he framed the issue, China would do such a marvelous job in preserving Hong Kong’s preeminent status, that the people of Taiwan would overcome their doubts and sign on to a deal returning that island to PRC sovereignty at some future date.
From the very beginning, Taiwan’s leaders consistently rejected any such linkage. As it developed, many Taiwan friends quietly hoped that that China would never pull the Hong Kong plan off, making their case for no settlement with Beijing all the stronger over time.
I was a regular visitor to both Hong Kong and Taiwan during these years, and found myself fascinated by the dynamics in both places. Most Hong Kongers decided to give things a chance, though many of them hedged their bets by obtaining citizenship status in friendly states like Canada, Australia and the US, just in case. The idea was that they would continue living and working in Hong Kong, but with the escape hatch of a foreign passport to fall back upon if things went south following 1997.
In time, relations between Beijing and Taipei also began to thaw. I remember coming across Taiwan tourists visiting China in the late eighties. Later on, I followed the flow of Taiwan business and capital into the China market in the nineties, as Deng’s economic policies offered opportunities for astute businessmen to make money in the mainland.
China grew economically while Taiwan prospered and democratized. As the cost of labor increased in Taiwan, local businesses began shifting their manufacturing and assembly operations across the Taiwan Strait, to take advantage of cheaper labor costs and reliable partnerships. It seemed like a “win-win” for everyone involved.
On June 30, 1997, the Union Jack finally came down over Hong Kong. But the newly minted “Special Autonomous Region” (SAR) that replaced British sovereignty after 1997 continued to flourish. Rudimentary democracy was instituted there, with the promise that this trend would continue and deepen in the coming years. Some felt that Hong Kong’s return to Beijing sovereignty had been so successful that its gradual transition into a fully Chinese political entity by 2047 would become anticlimactic.
Enter Xi Jinping (習近平). Mr. Xi — son of a high-ranking PRC official, who like his father had suffered during the Cultural Revolution before being rehabilitated, quickly rose through the ranks, and became China’s top leader in 2012. Over the past six years, he has amassed control of the political, military and economic levers of power, becoming today the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng. Many believe Mr. Xi’s real ambition is to become the second Mao of China, eclipsing other leaders who never rose beyond the position of first among equals in a loose collective leadership.
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s democratic trajectory astonished observers around the globe. The island has emerged not only as a powerful economic engine, constantly reinventing itself to remain one of the most impressive models of growth in a dynamic region. It has also become a symbol of successful democratization, having transitioned through several peaceful democratic changes of power since the early 1990s.
But let’s go back to Hong Kong. Mr. Xi doesn’t seem able to leave a good thing alone. His aggressive policies toward Hong Kong have drawn into question whether any promise China makes there is worth the paper it is written on. A widely applauded pledge to allow the people of Hong Kong to select their own leaders, first in their legislative branch, then in selecting the Chief Executive, has been watered down to the point that many Hong Kongers despair of their future.
The emergence in Hong Kong of a vocal youth movement calling for true democracy and autonomy has complicated matters for Beijing. For the teenaged protesters in the streets today, 2047 is no longer an abstraction. Many of them are young enough that they will be in the prime of life 29 years from now. If China continues to renege on its pledges, they see their future in Hong Kong as fragile and perishable. Most recently, Hong Kong’s freedom of expression has been shaken by the refusal to allow speakers known for their liberal views to be heard in public fora there.
One has to wonder why the wily Xi Jinping has chosen to force this issue at this time. Not only has he thrown Hong Kong politics into turmoil. He has also significantly diminished the attraction — such as it was in Taiwan — of closer political or even economic links to the mainland. One suspects he fears the influence of such more liberal practices on the doorstep of China proper.
Sadly, the world will probably shake their heads, but then turn away, if Hong Kong reverts to becoming simply another part of authoritarian China. This seems increasingly likely, given Mr. Xi’s callous approach to the territory. But given American political support and defense commitments, Taiwan has an alternative to drifting further into Beijing’s orbit. Meanwhile, all but the most naive observers there can now dismiss the illusion that China’s treatment of Hong Kong offers anything useful to the people of Taiwan.
Ambassador Stephen M. Young (ret.) lived in Kaohsiung as a boy over 50 years ago, and served in AIT four times: as a young consular officer (1981-’82), as a language student (1989-’90), as Deputy Director (1998-2001) and as Director (2006-’9). He visits often and writes regularly about Taiwan matters. Young was also US Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan and Consul General to Hong Kong during his 33-year career as a foreign service officer. He has a BA from Wesleyan University and a PhD from the University of Chicago.
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