More than 60,000 people took to the streets of Hong Kong on Monday to protest against a planned anti-subversion law, which falls under the territory's Basic Law.
Before Hong Kong returned to Chinese rule, the diplomatic wrestling between the British and Chinese governments resulted in a compromise to the effect that the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) should be responsible for legislation regulating treason, secession, sedition and subversion (as stipulated in Article 23 of the Basic Law).
Just as is the case with a Constitution, therefore, implementation of the Basic Law requires additional legislation and administrative orders. However, the motives behind this piece of legislation are being questioned. The process has been met with distrust, and there are disputes over essential points in the law. This is what has caused such a strong reaction among the citizens of Hong Kong.
As for motives, the question of whether Article 23 should be implemented through additional legislation or through amendments to relevant existing legislation has been disputed ever since the SAR government was created five years ago. On Sept. 24, the SAR government published a "Consultation Document on Proposals to Implement Article 23 of the Basic Law" (also known as "the blue bill").
It is generally believed that the main reason an implementation draft was proposed at that time was that Beijing demanded it. In June this year, one of China's vice premiers, Qian Qichen (錢其琛), requested that the SAR government implement Article 23 as soon as possible. In a speech in July, China's president, Jiang Zemin (江澤民), stressed Hong Kong's importance for China's security and stability.
The reason for this is that China worries that Hong Kong will become a place where Falun Gong and Tibetan separatists can freely express their opinions and cause instability in the Chinese interior.
China also worries that dissemination of statements by Taiwanese independence forces in the Hong Kong media may be detrimental to its unification efforts. The motives for legislation, therefore, are not to be found among the needs of the Hong Kong Semi-Autonomous Region itself, but they come from central government pressure.
Second, looking at the process, the Hong Kong SAR government follows the example of the British colonial government by issuing a public consultative document (the essential points of legislation) or a public white draft (the actual legislative text) three months prior to legislation to consult with the people of Hong Kong.
The consultative document issued by the SAR government this time around does not include the legislative text. Democratic parties and people concerned about Article 23 legislation cannot obtain the exact meaning and implementation of terms and criminal charges from the consultative document.
They are therefore suggesting that the SAR government, after completing consultation via the blue bill, once again consult with the people of Hong Kong regarding the draft text of the law using the white document. The SAR government, however, still refuses to publish a white consultative document, an attitude which causes further worries among Hong Kong's democratic parties and citizens.
Taking a look at the essential points of legislation in the blue bill, the following criticisms have been raised by Hong Kong media and the public:
One, the definitions of "sedition" and "subversion" are not clear: its inability to clearly define what kind of behavior or statements constitute sedition and subversion could easily lead to abuse.
Two, it punches a hole in Hong Kong's Common Law: Hong Kong civil organizations proscribed by the central Chinese leadership may also be banned in the territory, which means that orders by the central Chinese leadership can extend to Hong Kong.
Three, the media's freedom to report will be circumscribed: reports about Tibetan separatists and Taiwanese independence proponents may be deemed illegal "seditious" behavior, and would lead to the media being silenced.
Four, it diminishes the regulations in the Basic Law: Article 23 of the Basic Law only mentions regulations restricting Hong Kong and foreign political organizations and groups, but the blue bill adds regulations regarding Taiwanese political organizations, thus expanding the extent of restrictions.
If the SAR government really does go against public opinion and forces the passage of legislation related to Article 23 of the Basic Law (laid down according to the current set of main legislative guidelines), not only would freedom of speech within Hong Kong be restricted, but it would also have an effect on Taiwan:
First, to avoid sensitive issues, even fewer statements by Taiwanese government officials would make it into the Hong Kong media.
Second, the operations of Taiwan's representative organization in Hong Kong could at any time be in violation of Hong Kong law.
Third, exchanges between Taiwan and Hong Kong would be restricted, and the freedom of exchange between social organizations and political groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan would shrink.
Most importantly, in the past, Hong Kong always filled the function of initiating democratic opening in China.
The implementation of the Basic Law would further weaken democracy in Hong Kong. In the Chinese world, Taiwan would become lonely in its pursuit of liberal democracy for China.
Cheng An-kuo is a former general manager of the Chung Hwa Travel Service in Hong Kong. Andy Hu is an assistant research fellow with the National Policy Foundation.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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