When the East-West conflict ended over 10 years ago, many hoped that the democratic changes in Eastern Europe would inspire peaceful resolution between the claims of human rights and those of state sovereignty throughout the world.
Instead, ethnic conflicts have multiplied, shaking many East European and Asian countries.
Minority and ethnic rights, it appears, are only given to those who use violence, as in Chechnya and East Timor. Why is this so?
ILLUSTRATION: MOUNTAIN PEOPLE
The call for "human rights," which has been made repeatedly since 1989, accents the rights of individuals in their struggles against overweening state institutions. Freedom of thought, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly: these were the rights that have been stressed most often, probably because they closely embody the individual liberties smothered under communism.
But human rights confined to the context of freedom for individuals are insufficient to aid in the resolution of ethnic conflicts, the communities cannot use the mechanisms used to defend human rights laws and agreements to secure an effective hearing for their claims. States, after all, are usually the forces suppressing their demands. Minority and ethnic violence arises out of the sense of frustration that results.
For the international community to use the concept of human rights to resolve and settle ethnic conflicts, a concept of community must be incorporated within the framework of our understanding of human rights.
Only if groups are offered corresponding instruments to assert their own collective human rights will there arise a chance that ethnic minorities will not resort to violence in order to achieve their ends, but will seek satisfaction in a civic forum.
A court, a place that furnishes binding jurisdiction for both oppressed minorities and for the countries riven by ethnic disputes is now required. We need an international court for minorities that would act in similar ways to the International Court of Justice to make decisions concerning the legitimacy of claims in this area.
Today, the most virulent examples of such minority and ethnic assertions of their group rights are to be found in Afghanistan. Ever since the former Soviet Union withdrew its invading army from that country, a political vacuum has existed. Civil war, motivated by ethnic and religious divisions, followed. The disintegration of what little remained of the central government contributed decisively to the establishment of what can only be called sub-state terrorist structures. Terrorists rule where the Afghan state once did.
Why did this happen, and why has this experience been repeated time and again? Why does it appear to be impossible to resolve national and ethnic conflicts by non-violent civil and political means?
One reason for this failure is that the notion of human rights, despite everything that has been done in its name over the past half-century, remains undefined in a critical way. After 1989, human rights were understood as a universal code to tame state despotism.
However, human rights cannot be used as a universal idea for resolving ethnic conflicts unless the concept obtains a clear-cut and expanded definition, which includes ethnic and minority rights.
An international court for minorities would provide a forum to define these collective rights.
What would be its work? First, it would be a place for minorities who believe their legitimate rights within a state are being violated to seek redress. Charges could be filed and justice sought.
The court would not only allow minority groups to stake their claims, but the accused national state would also have a chance to be heard in order to defend itself, perhaps, against undeserved propaganda.
Should the court conclude that the rights of the minority in question were violated it could issue a binding decision demanding that the state concerned change its laws and practices. Should it fail to do so the international court for minorities could demand that the UN Security Council provide protection to the endangered minority.
This court would be a place for civilized settlement between ethnic minorities and state sovereignty. It would thus re-balance the UN charter, which now stipulates that discrimination against individuals is prohibited but says nothing about discrimination against ethnic groups.
The court should be an arbitrator with the power to issue binding decisions and to set standards that would regulate the legitimate rights of minorities, and would so become a global bulwark against not only state despotism but the license to violence aggrieved ethnic groups often claim. For in order to appeal to the court, minority groups must refrain from using violence.
Of course, no conflict can be resolved in a one-sided manner, benefiting either the state or an ethnic group but not the other. Just as states would no longer be able to stress their sovereignty as a trump card over minority claims, ethnic groups could no longer insist that their right to self-determination justifies any action.
No state may exercise its sovereignty without restriction; not every ethnic group has a right to its own national state. The court's objective must be discuss the claims made by both parties and seek a just and peaceful resolution.
The international court for minorities that I propose would be both therapeutic and preventative. It may moderate and, optimally, settle existing conflicts -- say, the Middle East conflict, for example.
It could also serve as a tool to ferret out potential conflicts and prevent them from becoming violent. Here, I am particularly concerned about multiracial countries such as China, Brazil, Indonesia and India.
Ethnic conflicts, and in extreme cases, ethnic terrorism, now pose a clear and present danger to world peace. They will continue to pose that threat unless the world acts. Creating an international court of justice for minorities offers a means to head-off such violence and help secure global peace.
Antje Vollmer is vice president of Germany's parliament.
copyright: Project Syndicate
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