On Sept. 17, the people of Hong Kong elected the second Legislative Council (LegCo) since the former UK colony's 1997 handover to China. In most other electoral systems, you usually know by the end of the day who has won. This is not the case with Hong Kong. On the one hand, the Democratic Party (liberal-democrats) won the biggest bloc of seats of any single party having secured the largest share of votes among all individual parties. The alliance of pro-Beijing parties (led by the DAB -- Democratic Alliance for [the] Betterment of Hong Kong), combined, however, gained even more seats and with them the power to check any moves by the liberals.
This election was heavily riddled with scandals and mudslinging, and, took place in an atmosphere of widespread disenchantment with the Hong Kong government and its Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa (董建華).
Two major scandals broke out before the election. In the first case, DAB vice-chairman Cheng Kai-nam (
This year there were three sets of elections to the LegCo -- the geographical constituencies (where everyone got a vote), the functional constituencies (where most professionals and their organizations may vote) and the election committee (where few may vote).
The geographical constituency (GC) elections were dominated by competition between the Democratic Party and the DAB. At last year's District Council (Hong Kong's lower tier of government) elections, the GC elections were dominated by livelihood issues such as housing, pensions and other grassroots socio-economic concerns. Like last year, the DAB positioned itself this time to take advantage of these concerns, while the Democrats remained committed to broader, abstract principles of democracy and the rule of law, ideals that jar with the harsh reality of a poorly performing local economy.
The functional constituencies (FCs) elect representatives from most of the professions, particularly the commercial sectors. They are, however, fundamentally conservative and a check on the broader democratic aspirations of the Hong Kong people, expressed through polls and voter preferences in the geographical constituencies. It may be said that without the FCs, conservative and pro-business parties such as the Liberal Party would not exist. These groups and independents cluster in the functional constituencies, having repeatedly failed to establish themselves in the geographical constituencies.
If these groups provide a conservative check in the functional constituencies, we may nevertheless say that they still follow a form of constitutional democracy. The Hong Kong government, however, is also a player in the constituencies, giving its different organs votes in their relevant sectors. The Hong Kong Airport Authority, for example, has a vote in the transport constituency. This means that the state may vote to protect its own interests.
The Election Committee, is a "small circle" election process dominated by pro-Beijing and conservative forces. Although slated for demise in 2004 (when its seats will be replaced by new GC seats) the Election Committee's real strength will persist through its election of a new Chief Executive in 2002.
This party axis managed to gain 37 seats in the LegCo - most of which were in the functional constituencies and election committee seats. The strength of the DAB and related forces lies in their extensive community network. Further, the DAB has been actively professionalizing its representatives -- enrolling some 20 members in a Masters program to help them better understand administrative and political processes. The challenge for the DAB will be to extend its appeal to voters concerned with more abstract political issues.
The inability of the Democratic Party to address widespread social concerns will only serve to exacerbate existing internal tensions between the old guard and the so-called "young turks." A good example of the political division was seen in the Young Turks' support for a minimum wage. This almost split the party before last year's District Councils election and was never adequately resolved. Indeed, the slowly growing support base for Frontier and the return of the Association for Democracy and people's Livelihood (ADPL) show that a focus on social issues can benefit pro-democracy groups. In fact, there is some talk about the formation of a Labour Party involving disgruntled democrats as well as unionists and other liberals. With the loss of several key Councilors this plan may be put on hold.
The failure of the Democrats to commit themselves to socio-economic issues highlights the primary challenge facing the party in the new legislature. If the party is to remain relevant to Hong Kong politics, it will have to remove itself from abstract ideological debates and concretely address the pressing needs of the electorate. In polls conducted by the Hong Kong Transition Project, the Democratic Party was considered the best party to address issues such as upholding the rule of law or safeguarding the `One Country, Two Systems' model. But when it came to questions such as housing, employment and old age, the party lacked voter confidence. This was one reason why some 170,000 Democratic voters (approximately 7.5 percent) did not vote in the election.
Overall, liberal-democratic parties and individuals gained 23 seats -- most of them in the geographical constituencies. Although this will limit their influence during this LegCo term, the strong support for these parties in the directly elected seats suggests that, as the proportion of directly elected seats rises, so will their representation.
So what does all this mean for the people of Hong Kong? There will be a protracted struggle between the Democratic Party and the DAB for the electoral middle ground. This struggle is likely to focus on grassroots socio-economic issues. Both parties will need to stake out their positions soon. At present the DAB is in front but the Democrats have pledged a wholesale review of their political strategies and may be able to regain the upper hand.
The poor public perception of Tung is likely to continue to affect voter confidence in Hong Kong's political and administrative institutions. But Tung's split loyalty between Beijing and local concerns is a micro-example of the broader democratic development of Hong Kong under Chinese socialism. This struggle is referred to as a "birdcage democracy," the bird of democracy trying to break out of the cage of corporate governance.
Nick Thomas is a research fellow at the Asia-Australia Institute, Australia's pre-eminent think tank on regionalism and second- track diplomacy.
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