The resurgence of Confucianism in China is of great political significance, because the Chinese Communist Party leadership is keen to reshape the ideological landscape at home.
Under Deng Xiaoping’s (鄧小平) economic reforms, the ethos of capitalism has dominated every aspect of society, but rapid transformation has caused much anxiety among the populace. Rampant corruption, ruthless competition and consumerism are the symptoms of popular insecurity. Many people worry about the absence of a moral code to replace Maoism.
Some people have turned to Confucianism for psychological support in order to deal with the stress and strain of a fast-changing economy. Prominent writer Yu Dan (于丹) adapts many of Confucius’ (孔子) ideas for the tired and stressed-out, weaving his ancient sayings with the daily experiences of her urban audience and providing self-help guides on personal fulfillment.
Meanwhile, Confucianism gives government officials an invaluable resource for addressing the nation’s new political needs. With a sense of confidence about China’s economic accomplishments, the Communist leadership is articulating unique Chinese perspectives on many developmental and governance issues.
Even though some party leaders fall short of embracing Confucianism, they recast this philosophy as a new soft power to compliment the country’s growing status, and have founded hundreds of Confucius Institutes (孔子學院) worldwide. Funded by the Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (中國國家漢語國際推廣領導小組辦公室) and formed in partnership with many universities, high schools and cultural institutions, the Confucius Institutes promote the study of Mandarin abroad and establish exchange programs between hosting organizations and Chinese universities.
The appeal of China’s top-down developmental model seems to have become an irresistible alternative to the West. The Communist leaders acknowledge that Confucianism does more than justify an alternative model of state-led capitalism; it can counter the West and reframe the normative order of the international system. This reveals Beijing’s determination to use Confucianism as a new weapon in the global battle of ideas and to rebrand China as an alternative model of modernization based on non-interference, freedom from Western hegemony and a more dominant role for the state.
Evidently, the Communist regime seeks to appropriate Confucianism as a new cultural force against the West. After all, the state can no longer employ Mao Zedong (毛澤東) as a political icon, because of the unprecedented pain and suffering that he caused during the Great Famine (1958–1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).
Nevertheless, such an authoritarian rhetoric lacks theoretical substance and reveals nothing about the reality of China. The pro-independence uprisings in Tibet and Xinjiang, the escalation of social conflicts and labor unrest, and the cries for democracy in Hong Kong suggest that the country is plagued with severe internal discontent.
Perhaps intellectuals and community activists ought to apply the Confucian principle of good governance to defend civil society against complete incorporation by a powerful state. In a similar fashion, the Communist leaders should take seriously Confucius’ idea of political legitimacy to assess their own leadership qualities and to envision a more cosmopolitan identity for the country. Otherwise, the idea of a changing mandate of heaven might become a fulfilling prophesy in the 21st century.
Joseph Tse-hei Lee is professor of history and co-director of the Global Asia studies program at Pace University in New York.
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