At the party conference at the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) Tainan County headquarters a few days ago, party representatives from Yunlin, Chiayi and Tainan bluntly said that their losses in several Tainan mayoral and county commissioner elections were not because of grassroots problems, but rather the result of major party figures messing up.
They said these senior figures not only failed to support one another, they also deliberately caused each other trouble. Other representatives said that 30 percent of KMT grassroots supporters disliked President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who doubles as party chairman, and this was something the party should take under consideration. However, just like the KMT leadership, grassroots supporters may not necessarily understand the real reasons behind these losses.
Tainan County is the home of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and it is to be expected that the area would feel a special affinity to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), much in the same way that Nantou County residents felt proud when Wu Den-yi (吳敦義) was appointed premier. This is why the KMT has held the upper hand in Nantou these last couple of years.
Tainan city and county have a special regional relationship and both have a special relationship to Chen, so it is to be expected that the DPP would have the upper hand there. The KMT should concern itself with other areas that are shifting from the KMT to the DPP.
Historically, the whole nation was the KMT’s territory. What caused them to gradually lose their grip?
To give one example, Kaohsiung City used to be KMT territory — in the 1994 mayoral elections, the DPP’s Chang Chun-hsiung (張俊雄) lost to Wu by more than 90,000 votes. Kaohsiung County shifted between the KMT and the Yu (余) family, but when the KMT’s Peter Tsai (蔡明耀) lost to Yu Chen Yueh-ying (余陳月瑛), Kaohsiung County joined the DPP empire. Currently, Greater Kaohsiung is green and unless something unexpected happens, the KMT will have little chance to regain power there.
After Taiwanese elections became free, factions gradually started to form. In some areas, like Taichung County, all factions were incorporated into the KMT’s forces. In other cities and counties, factions could not coexist, and large factions were incorporated into the KMT, while smaller factions became part of the dangwai movement and later joined the DPP. The only large faction that was not incorporated into the KMT was Chiayi City’s Chang (張) family, sometimes referred to as the Hsu (�?amily group, but they did not join the DPP either.
The KMT runs elections through vote captains that control voters. These vote captains are controlled by local factions, which in turn are controlled by the party, thus creating an unbreakable network reaching from the core of the party all the way down to voters.
The DPP, on the other hand, relies on political ideology to attract voters in an attempt to break through the KMT’s personal connections. It was mainly workers that rose above personal connections to support the dangwai movement, and later the DPP, because they are more independent and difficult to control through personal connections.
Currently, the reason for the DPP’s gradual rebound is that they have started to establish personal connection networks. The KMT is doing the exact opposite, as their network of connections is gradually falling apart.
This reversal stems from the collapse of the DPP a few years ago, which precipitated the KMT’s misunderstanding that they can rule forever.
The DPP’s popularity started to drop beginning with the three-in-one elections in 2005 because swing voters viewed the party as corrupt, and by the 2008 legislative and presidential elections, the party had all but collapsed. In the joy over their huge win, the KMT forgot that they too were going downhill.
Had the KMT won only narrowly, it would have kept the sense of urgency that has now evaporated amid its joy over their landslide victory. As everyone was clamoring for political resources, faction struggles appeared and the network of vote captains started to dissolve. However, the DPP started to increase its network of vote captains. This failed to set off any alarm bells within the KMT, who did not realize that they had not won a great victory, but rather the DPP had collapsed.
The KMT did not realize that their standing was deteriorating until they had lost several legislative by-elections, but by then it was too late.
In the early days of the Ma administration, the KMT continued to spend all its energies on attacking corruption, thinking this trick would last forever and that they could use it as a tool every time they needed votes. Thinking they could never lose, the KMT did not put its collective mind to governing, which led to public dissatisfaction. At the same time, DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has managed to reverse the DPP’s corrupt image, and, even more importantly, several major corruption cases have been linked to the KMT.
The KMT returned to power because the DPP collapsed, but because they have relied too much on that collapse, they have not put their minds to governing. They have failed to strengthen their organization and now face the risk of losing government power.
Chen Mao-hsiung is a former professor at National Sun Yat-sen University.
TRANSLATED BY DREW CAMERON
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