No sooner had President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) launched his rapprochement initiative with Beijing than some international wire agencies began referring to Taiwan and China as “former bitter rivals.” This characterization of an ongoing process is not only inaccurate but also creates the false impression that the threat the Taiwan Strait represents to regional stability is a thing of the past. Nothing could be further from the truth.
While it is true that on the surface tensions between Taipei and Beijing have diminished, relations between the two have always been characterized by ups and downs. The argument could be made that the threat of war was significantly higher in the 1950s, and again in 1995-1996, than in 2000 and after, when the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party was in power. During those eight years, however, did media outlets refer to Taiwan and China as “former bitter rivals”? Of course not.
The same fallacy applies today. By only casting a superficial glance at ties between Taipei and Beijing — tourist arrivals, the resumption of cross-strait talks and economic deals — reporters are ignoring the more complex undercurrents that still exist. If Taiwan and China were indeed “former bitter rivals,” the People’s Liberation Army would not continue its military build-up by adding to the ballistic missiles it aims at Taiwan, conducting simulations of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan or developing a variety of weapons systems — from submarines to anti-ship ballistic missiles — that could be used in a war over Taiwan. Nor would Beijing be using Chinese tourists as an economic weapon to punish Taiwan when the latter invites political figures Beijing abhors or screens documentaries banned in China.
In fact, if the two were no longer “bitter rivals,” Beijing would not be pressing for an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with so much vigor, simply for the fact that the Chinese leadership sees the agreement — and has said so openly — as a means to engulf the Taiwanese economy and make unification inevitable.
Yes, we’re seeing smiles, handshakes and long banquet tables, but anyone who knows anything about cross-strait ties would know that such a facade of politeness existed in the 1990s before the Chinese military started firing missiles into Taiwanese waters. The reality is, beyond the veneer of peace lie the same old ghosts that have made true, lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait so elusive.
Beyond China’s breakneck militarization lies a political system that is repressive, anti-democratic and unpalatable to the great majority of people in Taiwan — even those who support Ma’s policies. As long as the political systems on both sides of the Strait cannot be reconciled, meaningful peace will be impossible to achieve, at least as long as Beijing continues to harbor designs on Taiwan’s sovereignty.
Beyond all this, many things could go wrong at every turn of cross-strait talks, especially once sensitive political issues are laid on the table. If Ma were seen to be giving too much, the Taiwanese polity would threaten to undermine his efforts and could oust him from office in 2012. Conversely, if Ma were seen to be dragging his feet on unification, Beijing could grow impatient and become more belligerent in its approach. Either way, instability would be the result and it would soon become evident that the “former bitter rivals” are, in fact, still bitter rivals.
A little patience on the part of those who write about cross-strait relations and a little more attention to detail would do everybody a great service.
Taiwan should reject two flawed answers to the Eswatini controversy: that diplomatic allies no longer matter, or that they must be preserved at any cost. The sustainable answer is to maintain formal diplomatic relations while redesigning development relationships around transparency, local ownership and democratic accountability. President William Lai’s (賴清德) canceled trip to Eswatini has elicited two predictable reactions in Taiwan. One camp has argued that the episode proves Taiwan must double down on support for every remaining diplomatic ally, because Beijing is tightening the screws, and formal recognition is too scarce to risk. The other says the opposite: If maintaining
India’s semiconductor strategy is undergoing a quiet, but significant, recalibration. With the rollout of India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0, New Delhi is signaling a shift away from ambition-driven leaps toward a more grounded, capability-led approach rooted in industrial realities and institutional learning. Rather than attempting to enter the most advanced nodes immediately, India has chosen to prioritize mature technologies in the 28-nanometer to 65-nanometer range. That would not be a retreat, but a strategic alignment with domestic capabilities, market demand and global supply chain gaps. The shift carries the imprimatur of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, indicating that the recalibration is
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), during an interview for the podcast Lanshuan Time (蘭萱時間) released on Monday, said that a US professor had said that she deserved to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize following her meeting earlier this month with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Cheng’s “journey of peace” has garnered attention from overseas and from within Taiwan. The latest My Formosa poll, conducted last week after the Cheng-Xi meeting, shows that Cheng’s approval rating is 31.5 percent, up 7.6 percentage points compared with the month before. The same poll showed that 44.5 percent of respondents
China last week announced that it picked two Pakistani astronauts for its Tiangong space station mission, indicating the maturation of the two nations’ relationship from terrestrial infrastructure cooperation to extraterrestrial strategic domains. For Taiwan and India, the developments present an opportunity for democratic collaboration in space, particularly regarding dual-use technologies and the normative frameworks for outer space governance. Sino-Pakistani space cooperation dates back to the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, with a cooperative agreement between the Pakistani Space & Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, and the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace Industry. Space cooperation was integrated into the China-Pakistan