Rescue alternatives
The US has responded to a request from the government of Taiwan by sending a heavy-lift helicopter to carry rescue equipment to otherwise inaccessible areas following Typhoon Morakot, and China has also offered to loan helicopters if Taiwan needs them.
There are two other kinds of vehicle that Taiwan could consider requesting from other countries on this occasion.
Hovercraft can travel over water, mud, marsh and dry land as long as it is reasonably flat, allowing access to places where boats and wheeled or tracked vehicles cannot reach. They may be useful in Taiwan now in places where there is deep mud. Two hovercraft were purchased by coastguards at Burnham-on-Sea in England after a girl died on mudflats. Since then they have been used to rescue people and animals from the town’s mudflats on several occasions. Hovercraft have also been used to rescue people from flooding in Japan. Hovercraft of various sizes are used by the armed forces and/or coastguard in at least the following nearby countries: China and North and South Korea.
Helicopters have proved essential for rescue in Taiwan over the last few days, but unfortunately three crew members died when their helicopter crashed on a mountainside. Following the 921 Earthquake, there was an unfortunate accident in which downdraft from one of four helicopters carrying President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and his inspection team broke off a tree branch, which killed one girl and injured four other people. Downdraft also blew down tents in which earthquake victims were living. These accidents might have been avoided if airships were used instead of helicopters. In Japan, airships operated by the Nippon Airship Corporation have been used for surveillance and rescue following natural disasters such as landslides. Helicopters and airships serve a similar purpose, each having their advantages and disadvantages. Taiwan could consider requesting loan of one or two airships from Japan for use as an alternative to helicopters in appropriate conditions.
JULIAN CLEGG
Taipei
Rethinking emergencies
Much criticism has been published in your pages of the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration’s response to the disaster wrought upon southern Taiwan by Typhoon Morakot. Naturally, much of this criticism has drawn attention to the implication that Taiwan’s central ideological dispute, which roughly parallels a north-south geographical divide, was a dispositional factor in determining the nature of the government’s response to Morakot.
I do not dismiss this view, but I would urge the people of Taiwan not to allow their resulting rancor to be transformed into “political capital” by the opposition movement. Political point scoring is a potentially fatal distraction from a rational attempt to address the practical problem of how best to manage this sort of disaster in the future. It is with respect to this problem that I should like to make some observations together with a suggestion for improvement.
The essential problem with the organization of the disaster response has been the fact that resources are under centralized bureaucratic control. Difficulties in resource allocation and communication channels are precisely what one must expect from the inherently inefficient and blundering nature of government, quite irrespective of any ideological tension. Even if Morakot had befallen Taiwan during the Democratic Progressive Party administration, such problems would still have existed and that is because they are the natural consequences of trying to solve the problem of resource allocation by state bureaucracy. Who happens to be in charge of the bureaucracy is of far less importance than the removal of the bureaucracy itself.
A potentially better way of managing the impact of such disasters in future is to replace the state bureaucracy’s control over allocating resources such as trucks, helicopters, search and rescue teams, food, water and medical supplies, with a private insurance model. Why not allow the citizens of each county to voluntarily fund a privately run insurance plan — not to replace the value of damaged property in cash terms — but to provide the necessary resources for disaster management and to take responsibility for the direction and management of this response?
This solution — the private insurance model — has several advantages over the current system.
First, it allows for the development of much more finely honed communication channels and logistical organization systems than does the current system of the military, central government and county governments all just shouting past each other.
Second, because such an insurance model would have to emerge from the private sector, there would likely be structural incentives for the continuous improvement of logistical, communication and general organizational efficiency due to the presence of market competition – say, between insurers operating in different counties for example.
Third, there could be no party political fallout from any future disaster with the resulting implication for rising political tensions across the island.
In short, a private insurance model could be a much more constructive way forward in respect of preparing for and dealing with such disasters as Morakot in the future.
MICHAEL FAGAN
Tainan
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