The First National Assembly held its eighth meeting in 1991. At the session I hosted on April 22 that year, the delegates completed two major constitutional achievements: They added 10 Articles to the Constitution of the Republic of China and abolished the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion.
On May 1, then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) officially announced that the period had ended. The media quoted the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in what has become a famous statement: “I don’t know anymore what kind of relationship the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have.”
On Feb. 23 that year, not long before Lee’s announcement, the National Unification Council proposed the National Unification Guidelines. On March 14, the Cabinet passed the guidelines, which have been the fundamental principle for Taiwan’s China policy. It also issued a statement, “The Meaning of ‘One China,’” in which it made the pragmatic concession that the Republic of China (ROC) only has jurisdiction over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, despite its “de jure sovereignty” over China.
The statement said that “each side of the Taiwan Strait is administered by a separate political entity.” As far as the KMT is concerned, this statement still stands.
Political scientists generally hold that “political entity” and “state” are synonymous. Since cross-strait relations are indeed different from relations between two independent states, the government used the term “political entity” instead of “state” to show China its goodwill. Unfortunately, Beijing condemned the guidelines because of their implications.
During his interview with the Mexican daily Sol de Mexico on Aug 26 this year, Ma defined cross-strait relations as “special relations,” but not a “state-to-state” relationship, and stressed this “very important point.”
But if cross-strait relations are not considered state-to-state, can they still be described as special relations between two separate political entities? If cross-strait relations are now neither, Ma’s definition would seem to have strayed from the National Unification Guidelines.
As private cross-strait exchanges multiply, more problems are arising.
Additional Article 11 of the Constitution states that: “Rights and obligations between the people of the Chinese mainland area and those of the free area, and the disposition of other related affairs may be specified by law.”
This is the constitutional basis for separate treatment of the people on each side of the Taiwan Strait. To regulate cross-strait exchanges, the legislature later passed the Act Governing the Relations Between the Peoples of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area (台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例), which is the basis for judging certain legal cases.
The “Chinese mainland area and free area” in the ROC Constitution and the “Taiwan area and mainland area” in the law are terms used to distinguish the two regions in discussing the rights and obligations of their inhabitants, as well as legal cases. Such terms are unrelated to the definition of cross-strait relations.
On Sept. 4, Presidential Office Spokesman Wang Yu-chi (王郁琦) made the surprising claim that Ma’s remarks had been based on the ROC Constitution and the above act. Calling the two sides of the Strait “Taiwan” and “the mainland area” indicates equal status, Wang said. But if the new definition of cross-strait relations is an “area-to-area” relationship, isn’t the dignified ROC president nothing but a local ruler?
Yeh Chin-fong is a former vice chairwoman of the Cabinet’s Mainland Affairs Council.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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