Australia and Japan have entered a new phase in their relationship, having signed a joint declaration on security in Tokyo during Australian Prime Minister John Howard's recent visit to Japan. It is an important regional development, coming as it does in the midst of China's expanding military power.
Of course, both Howard and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have emphasized that their new closer security relationship is not directed against China.
"This document is not designed at China ? the purpose of this is to express the common desire for Japan and Australia to work even closer together to contribute to security in the region," Howard said.
But more telling was Howard's observation that "Japan and Australia have a common destiny in this part of the world." He has said before that "Australia has no greater friend in Asia than Japan."
The two countries are already part of a high level trilateral strategic dialogue with the US.
Howard wouldn't, though, consider entering into a similar security arrangement with China because it is not a democracy. Australia's relations with China are pragmatic based on economic realities, with both countries gaining from mutual trade exchanges.
China is getting assured supplies of much-needed resources from a stable country and Australia gets to expand its economic opportunities in a growing Chinese economy. In this sense, Canberra doesn't seem unduly worried about Beijing's negative reaction. China will do business with Australia because it needs access to its resources.
At the same time, Canberra is determined to pursue its strategic interests based on growing security ties with Japan and its security alliance with the US.
Howard has pointed out that the security agreement between the two countries is not a full fledged security pact. He maintained, though, that it might develop into one -- like Australia and New Zealand's ANZUS treaty with the US -- at some future time. If so, it could entail a mutual obligation to come to the other's aid in the event of an attack on either party.
Even without the status of a security treaty, Australia's security relationship with Japan will now be closer than with any other country, with the exception of the US. And for Japan, it will be the first security agreement outside of its US alliance.
The Australia-Japan defense agreement will involve "joint exercises and training" between their two armed forces. Much of the joint training is likely to happen in Australia.
It also involves the gathering and sharing of military intelligence, and "exchanges of strategic assessments and related information," as well as contingency planning. It should enable both Australia and Japan to mesh their military and strategic plans.
The security agreement between Japan and Australia squares the circle of the US-Japan-Australia strategic relationship. Commenting on its significance, one senior official is reported to have said: "The US and Japan already have a security treaty and Australia and the US have the ANZUS alliance. This fills in the missing bit of the trilateral process."
China is worried, sensing it as part of a containment strategy to curb China's expansionary role in the Asia-Pacific region. And undoubtedly it is, despite what Australia and Japan might say to the contrary.
Calling those in Australia who advocate equal treatment of Japan and China "dreamers," Paul Dibb, a professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University, said: "China is not a democracy and it has a poor attitude to the rule of law and a dreadful record on human rights."
"This is not to underestimate the importance of our relations with China, but the jury is still out on how a future militarily strong China will behave," he said.
In other words, Australia is keen to pay an advance premium on its future security by further cementing its ties with Japan as part of the trilateral US-Japan-Australia equation.
It is pertinent to note that it was Canberra which took the initiative in this regard "with the strong backing of the US," said Paul Kelly, editor-at-large of the Australian, in his column.
Canberra indeed wanted a formal pact but "Japan told Australia any treaty must be submitted to Japan's parliament and, given the pacifist Constitution, there would be trouble."
After that Australia settled for the joint security declaration with the prospect, at some time in the future, of a formal security pact being signed by the two countries.
It is also important to note the policy of closer security ties with Japan is supported across the political spectrum of both the ruling party and the main opposition Labor Party. The opposition leader Kevin Rudd has supported "greater security cooperation with Japan."
Rudd doesn't believe, though, that, in the current circumstances, "we should now be moving down the path of a formal defense treaty between our two countries." In any case, Japan is not yet ready for a security treaty because of its constitutional constraints.
Even though Beijing has come to accept Australia's US alliance (but not its Japan connection), it has never lost hope of creating leverage from its growing economic relationship, and regional political clout, to dent it here and there.
For instance, when Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said some time ago that Taiwan might not be covered under the ANZUS treaty if it were attacked by China, Beijing must have felt quite hopeful.
Though Canberra doesn't seem to have repeated this interpretation, Australia would like to maintain some ambiguity regarding Taiwan.
But it is difficult to see how Canberra can stay out of it (if the US were to get involved on Taiwan's behalf) without seriously damaging its security alliance with the US. It is unlikely that Australia would pay that heavy a price since its US alliance is regarded as the ultimate guarantee of its security.
With the new Australia-Japan security declaration closing the "missing pieces of the trilateral process," the circle is now squared to China's chagrin. The talk now is of making it quadrilateral by bringing India in.
Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.
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