Wed, Jan 07, 2026 page8

• EDITORIAL: Taiwan’s view on Venezuela

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  The immediate response in Taiwan to the extraction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by the US over the weekend was to say that it was an example of violence by a major power against a smaller nation and that, as such, it gave Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) carte blanche to invade Taiwan. That assessment is vastly oversimplistic and, on more sober reflection, likely incorrect.

  Generally speaking, there are three basic interpretations from commentators in Taiwan.

  The first is that the US is no longer interested in what is happening beyond its own backyard, and no longer preoccupied with regions in other supposed “spheres of influence.” This view, espoused by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) in an interview on Sunday, assumes Taiwan has been left to fend for itself and requires a new national security strategy.

  Cheng said that US President Donald Trump has upturned the rules of engagement of the international order by attacking a smaller nation, and that he is no longer interested in what is happening in East Asia. The Trump White House “kept its distance” from the diplomatic spat between China and Japan that emerged late last year, as well as China’s military drills around Taiwan last week, she said.

  Her conclusion is that it is unwise to rely on Washington for support in the region, and that Taiwan’s attention must turn toward how to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait: It should not push the situation to a military crisis, and then expect the US to come and clean up the mess. She urged President William Lai (賴清德) to reassess his national security strategy, stop “playing with fire,” acknowledge the so-called “1992 consensus” and remove the “independence clause” from the Democratic Progressive Party charter.

  Notably, her argument does not actually identify a need for re-evaluation; it simply uses the US’ action in Venezuela to reinforce the KMT’s longstanding position. Worryingly, it mirrors — in phrasing and in specifics — Beijing’s position.

  In an article on today’s page (“‘Necessary evils’ and strategic traps”), Simon Tang (湯先鈍), an adjunct professor at California State University, Fullerton, agrees with Cheng’s concerns about the long-term implications for the international order, although he disagrees on the remedy, writing that Taiwan must pursue deterrence through strength.

  A second view is that the move was a warning to what Washington perceives as regional troublemakers and disrupters in the western hemisphere such as Colombia, Cuba and Mexico, but also wider afield, including the states that have enabled Venezuela, with China being the main culprit. That view suggests that it was a show of strength not just to China, but for the countries that choose to rely on China. That implies China is a target by inference.

  It would also suggest that Taiwan should be concerned about the signals the US action is sending: Washington is warning Beijing to keep out of its sphere of influence, the implication being that Xi could equally demand that Trump keep out of what he considers to be his.

  That viewpoint is bolstered by an interpretation of the “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, detailed in the US’ national security strategy released last month, which outlined the US’ resolve to deny “non-hemispheric competitors” — for which, read China — a military presence or strategic assets in the western hemisphere.

  A third perspective places the strategic position on dealing with “non-hemispheric competitors” front and center of the Venezuela action. That view is explained by Tzou Jiing-wen (鄒景雯), editor-in-chief of the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister newspaper), on this page (“Maduro’s capture is a dilemma for Beijing”). Tzou reads the action as targeting the bigger fish, China, more directly, and not just tangentially as an enabler of a regional troublemaker. It was a show of US military strength, with precision and resolve that Beijing should not ignore.

  For her, the debate within Taiwan is whom to side with, a question revolving around whether one is overestimating China’s strength or underestimating Trump’s resolve.

  The evaluations are mutually exclusive: They cannot all be correct. What is certain is that Taipei and Beijing will have plenty to think about. There are many reasons, explained on this page, why it is absolutely not the case that Xi will find any of this cause for confidence.
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