Sun, Mar 01, 2026 page8

• Misreadings of US-cross strait ties

  • By Joanna Yu Taylor 余君慧
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  In her article in Foreign Affairs, “A Perfect Storm for Taiwan in 2026?,” Yun Sun (孫韻), director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington, said that the US has grown indifferent to Taiwan, contending that, since it has long been the fear of US intervention — and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) inability to prevail against US forces — that has deterred China from using force against Taiwan, this perceived indifference from the US could lead China to conclude that a window of opportunity for a Taiwan invasion has opened this year.

  Most notably, she observes that recent US strategic documents signaled a shift in US priorities away from the Indo-Pacific and toward the Western hemisphere. She cites the capture of deposed Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, contrasts that with the muted response to China’s military exercise around Taiwan in December last year, to suggest the US has become singularly focused on its own backyard.

  However, there are several weaknesses in this analysis.

  First, her characterization of US strategic priorities is incomplete. While last year’s National Security Strategy (NSS) references the Western hemisphere early, and codifies a “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, it also identifies China as the US’ “most consequential strategic competitor” and emphasizes the Indo-Pacific region as the primary theater shaping the future of global order. Moreover, the NSS explicitly frames the region as the “economic and geopolitical battleground” where US prosperity would be determined.

  Complementing this, this year’s NSS adopts a “peace through strength” framework, emphasizing deterrence by denial and fortifying the first island chain and managing the military balance through industrial capacity and collective defense — all with the objective of preventing any actor from achieving regional dominance. Read together, these documents do not support the conclusion that US strategic attention has shifted away from Asia or that Taiwan has become a secondary concern.

  Second, Sun’s analysis omits the potential role of Japan. The absence of Japan from the discussion is glaring, given Beijing’s sharp reaction to statements made by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi that a Chinese blockade or use of force against Taiwan would constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. Some analysts have observed that this characterization is another step for Japan’s normalization, as the 2014 re-interpretation of Article 9 explicitly linked collective self-defense to the US-Japan alliance and UN-related missions.

  Third, Sun’s reliance on simple force and budget comparisons to measure military capability is methodologically limited and outdated. Not all of the PLA’s 2 million personnel would be committed to a Taiwan contingency, nor is China’s entire defense budget oriented toward Taiwan operations. Modern military analysis requires evaluating force structure, readiness and training, systems integration, logistics and geography, among other factors, which all complicate the raw numbers Sun presented — particularly given Taiwan’s asymmetric defensive advantages.

  Fourth, Sun makes considerable logical leaps in interpreting Taiwan’s domestic politics. In the months since the legislative recall effort last summer, Taiwanese national identity and statehood preference have remained stable. According to Taiwan’s Election Study Center, which has polled these questions since 1992, as of last month 62 percent of respondents identified exclusively as Taiwanese, compared with 2.5 percent who identified exclusively as Chinese. Similarly, 59.8 percent preferred either the “status quo” indefinitely or independence (eventually or immediately), compared to 7.2 percent who preferred unification (eventually or immediately).

  In Taiwan, maintaining the “status quo” is widely understood to mean preserving the sovereignty of the Republic of China (Taiwan), with or without international diplomatic recognition. The data does not support the claim that Taiwanese public opinion is shifting toward Beijing.

  Fifth, Sun’s assessment of China’s ability to sustain or counter global sanctions rests on economic assumptions. While Beijing currently enjoys a near monopoly on critical minerals processing, these advantages are not immutable. China’s dominance reflects decades of market exit by others rather than an inherent resource exclusivity. Moreover, US efforts at strategic decoupling are increasingly constraining China’s access to key inputs needed to sustain high-technology growth and long-term competitiveness.

  Sixth, Sun’s optimism that China could secure a favorable political settlement from a Taiwan invasion and emerge strategically strengthened is misplaced. Neither Ukraine nor its European partners have accepted territorial concession as a basis for peace, and the war continues.

  Meanwhile, Russia’s economy has contracted and its global standing has eroded amid sanctions, divestment and exclusion from international forums, including the G7, Davos and the Olympics — all the while becoming the junior member to China in their comprehensive strategic partnership.

  Despite these shortcomings, Sun’s article is useful, as it highlights a perspective that might exist in segments of China’s elite. Much has been written about the risk of miscalculation by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) about Taiwan, more acutely now that he has removed almost all senior PLA officers who could otherwise provide professional, informed assessments of PLA capabilities and US intent.

  History offers cautionary examples of how misperception can lead to conflict. In 1990, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was partially attributed to Iraqi leaders misreading US signals, including remarks by then-US ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie suggesting US neutrality in Arab-Arab disputes. Earlier, some historians had suggested that the Korean War was precipitated by North Korean and Chinese leaders misinterpreting US statements, including then-US secretary of state Dean Acheson’s defensive perimeter speech that excluded the Korean Peninsula. Later on, US general Douglas MacArthur also mistook Chinese warnings of intervention as a bluff intended to maintain a buffer zone.

  Against this backdrop, and with Washington and Beijing entering a year of high-level engagements in a bid to negotiate land mark deals across domains as varied as agriculture, technology and diplomacy, the risk is not that US policy has abandoned Taiwan, but that garbled delivery of a deliberately ambiguous declaratory policy on Taiwan, poorly calibrated messaging or unintended mutterings could be misread in Beijing.

  Between Washington’s desire to maximize negotiations with China, Xi’s own ambition — which might be clouding his reading of comparative trends and global sentiment — and Beijing’s skewed understanding of Taiwanese public opinion — shaped by its reference to engage only the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and eschew any dialogue with the Democratic Progressive Party — the conditions for miscalculation remain real.

  That is the “perfect storm” policymakers should seek to dissipate, rather than underestimate.

  Joanna Yu Taylor is a former Taiwan and China country director at the Office of the US Secretary of Defense. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.
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