North Korea's claim to have successfully tested a nuclear device last Monday stirred up a hornet's nest in the international community. Regardless of the results of international efforts to confirm the test, the announcement itself signals the end of hope for resolving the nuclear stand-off through the six-party talks.
The test has also meant that China's efforts to shirk responsibility by treating North Korea's nuclear program as simply a bilateral issue between the US and North Korea now has turned into a strategic nightmare.
North Korea announced that it would conduct a nuclear test at the same time that Japan announced Prime Minister Shinzo Abe would visit China and South Korea for summit meetings. It also coincided with reports that South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon was set to become the UN's next secretary-general. The actual nuclear test took place after Abe's China visit and just ahead of his meeting with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun.
So although North Korea's move clearly seemed to be directed at Abe personally, it clearly also took aim at China and South Korea. From this perspective, we can see that Pyongyang was unhappy with Beijing and Seoul's reception of Abe, who has taken a hard line on North Korea. At the same time, North Korea also gave Ban a difficult task on the eve of his election as the next UN secretary-general.
A key issue discussed at this month's Sino-Japanese summit was North Korea's nuclear program. Pyongyang's test was an open protest against its long-term ally China for holding closed-door negotiations with Abe, who has taken a hard line toward North Korea. It was also an attempt to destabilize and complicate the still-weak Sino-Japanese relationship.
The test also exposed the six-party talks aimed at resolving the issue of North Korea's nuclear program as a complete failure. Because of differences of opinion between the US and China, the talks never achieved a breakthrough. The US believes that China has not done enough to tackle the issue of North Korea's nuclear program, while China regards the issue as being simply a bilateral matter between the US and North Korea.
The US hoped that the talks would resolve the problem, otherwise it would have to send the issue to the UN Security Council. China, however, believed that the goal of the six-party talks should be to reach a consensus among the six nations instead of resolving the nuclear issue. It even accused the US and South Korea of being too harsh on North Korea and opposed their proposals to handle the problem through the UN.
It was not until after July when North Korea conducted its guided missile test that there was any change in China's stance. Although China asked Japan to soften the sanctions it had proposed in the UN, it let them become an official resolution nevertheless.
China has put a lot of effort into the six-party talks, hoping that they would be able to prevent anything from undermining the benefits it gains from North Korea, as well as shore up its power as the leader in formulating the Northeast Asia security agenda. But the failure of the six-party talks resulting from North Korea's nuclear test not only highlighted the failure of China's North Korea diplomacy, it also cost China an advantageous platform for exerting its influence on Northeast Asian politics.
At the same time, the US' and Japan's demands that the UN impose harsh sanctions against North Korea means that China will have to make a difficult choice between the US and Japan or North Korea. North Korea is a crucial strategic buffer zone for China, as well as an important tool to contain Japan. A showdown between China and the US and Japan over North Korea is not in China's current strategic interests. Now that China is faced with an openly antagonistic North Korea as well, its worst strategic nightmares seem to have become reality.
Since North Korea's nuclear test, the US, Japan and other world powers have nearly no room for concessions to North Korea in order to prevent the test from encouraging Iran's nuclear development and causing the post-Cold War anti-nuclear proliferation effort to collapse. Japan is currently serving as the rotating president for the UN Security Council, which poses a challenge for China when responding to international pressure. Sino-North Korean relations have openly deteriorated as a result of the test. China says it cannot accept North Korea's nuclear test, but is it willing to back up its words with concrete action?
China no longer has the option to exchange North Korea for Taiwan, but the ramifications of North Korea's nuclear test will have an impact on the strategic situation in Northeast Asia, and its effect on the situation in the Taiwan Strait must not be ignored. The nuclear test may not only cause South Korea to lean toward the US and Japan, but it could also further highlight strategic differences between China and South Korea.
As for Abe, who sits at the center of the storm, the test has given him a new strategic opportunity. The US-Japan alliance's handling of the current nuclear crisis may improve Taiwan's understanding of how to deal with the cross-strait issue.
Another question is how China will respond to North Korea now that it has crossed China's line in the sand.
This will not only serve as a test of China's international credibility, but also whether it can become a "responsible stakeholder."
Lai I-chung is the director of foreign policy studies at Taiwan Thinktank.
Translated by Lin Ya-ti
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