Thu, May 21, 2026 page8

• How long is the US delaying arms?

  • By Laura Bonsaver
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  US President Donald Trump has returned from Beijing after what he described as an “unforgettable” and “very successful” trip, the first US presidential visit to Beijing in nine years. Many are wondering how this trip could impact the US’ stance on Taiwan — and whether further delays or changes would be made to long-awaited arms sale packages to Taipei, which are yet to be approved or delivered.

  At present, no statements have been made indicating a change in Washington’s official, long-standing position toward Taiwan since the summit. Despite bipartisan and congressional support for maintaining Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, and reassurance from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that US policy remains unchanged, uncertainty over how Trump would manage arms sales in the coming months, and whether he would concede to pressure from Beijing, persist.

  There is no clear evidence of Trump explicitly agreeing to delay arms sales as part of a quid pro quo with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). However, there is speculation suggesting the Trump administration might have slowed movement on the US$14 billion arms package to Taipei ahead of the summit to avoid escalating tensions with Beijing.

  Adding to the uncertainty, Trump commented on the package upon his return from Beijing, saying: “I’m holding that in abeyance and it depends on China,” loosely suggesting a potential, but undefined, connection between arms sales to Taiwan and US-China relations.

  If tensions between the US and China continue throughout this year, and Trump seeks more trade deals and business opportunities from Beijing — or needs Xi’s help in solving the crisis in Iran — could the delivery of arms packages continue to be paused in favor of stabilizing relations with China?

  Xi was very direct throughout the summit regarding Taiwan. He was quick to warn Trump of the risks of clashes or outright conflict in the Taiwan Strait if the “Taiwan issue” was handled poorly. This is not a new threat, but rather a reiteration of his long-term position on Taiwan. His framing of the “Taiwan issue” largely follows Beijing’s long-standing narrative that the problem is driven by “Taiwanese independence” forces and foreign involvement, rather than China’s military activities in the Strait.

  The use of the word “mishandling,” is, however, somewhat ambiguous. This could refer to generally undermining the “one China” principle, that is, directly supporting Taiwanese sovereignty. However, as arms sales remain paused, Xi’s intentionally broad language gives Beijing flexibility to oppose a wide range of US actions, including future large arms packages.

  The US exercises the right to sell arms to Taiwan and does not require prior consultation with Beijing to do so. The Taiwan Relations Act (1979) provides the legal basis for continued US arms sales and support for Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, and the “six assurances” make it clear that Washington does not need Beijing’s approval to make those decisions. China’s narrative may give the impression that the US antagonizes it by helping Taiwan build defense capabilities, but there are legal grounds for Washington doing so.

  If major arms sales to Taiwan were actually perceived to be delayed or scaled back to facilitate smoother relations with Beijing in the coming months, this would raise questions about the spirit of the “six assurances.” A move away from a key aspect of the “assurances” would be a troubling signal for Taiwan.

  This path would also fuel fears that Taiwan is being “traded away” or treated as a bargaining chip. However, the fear of Taiwan being used as a bargaining chip reflects an oversimplified understanding of the complex political and legal realities surrounding the nation’s status. Neither Washington nor Beijing exercises sovereignty over Taiwan in the way that phrase could sometimes imply.

  Rather, the question is more specifically about whether policy instruments related to Taiwan — particularly the timing, scale or signaling surrounding arms sales — would become entangled in broader US-China diplomatic management and post-summit politics.

  As the US-China relationship continues to tread unsteady waters in the coming months, it is vital that Washington remains consistent with its signaling and actions on Taiwan. Arms sales to Taipei should remain a consistent policy instrument and not appear contingent on, or influenced by, US-China ties. Critically, US policies surrounding Taiwan must not become personalized, conditional or transactional between other leaders.

  Laura Bonsaver is a Taipei-based research consultant specializing in Taiwanese international affairs and a director at London China Watchers.
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