On Monday, a group of bipartisan US senators arrived in Taiwan to support the nation’s special defense bill to counter Chinese threats. At the same time, Beijing announced that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) had invited Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) to visit China, a move to make the KMT a pawn in its proxy warfare against Taiwan and the US.
Since her inauguration as KMT chair last year, Cheng, widely seen as a pro-China figure, has made no secret of her desire to interact with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and meet with Xi, naming it a policy priority. Such a meeting is believed to vest Cheng’s significance in cross-strait interactions and solidify her control of the party.
However, the meeting has remained unsettled for more than six months. Reports said the CCP had preconditions for the meeting, including hindering defense budgets for arms procurements, boycotting legislations against Chinese spouses’ freedom and removing obstacles to cross-strait unification.
China’s Taiwan Affairs Office’s (TAO) sudden announcement of Xi’s invitation for Cheng to visit Beijing, Shanghai and Jiangsu from Tuesday next week to April 12 caught even the KMT off guard. Intriguingly, there were no details regarding a potential meeting with Xi.
Although the KMT has rejected allegations regarding China’s prerequisites, there is proof the trip could be in exchange for the party taking Beijing’s bids: the invitation was issued after the KMT continuously stalled the Cabinet’s NT$1.25 trillion (US$39.1 billion) special defense budget and put forth its own way smaller “NT$380 billion + N” version, as well as proposing to allow Chinese spouses to run for office with dual Chinese nationality.
The TAO said the invite was sent because “Cheng has repeatedly expressed a wish to visit the mainland,” adding that “all arrangements of the trip would be decided according to further negotiations between the parties.”
Those statements not only highlighted the fact that the invitation was extended on the KMT’s request, but also implied China has made the KMT subject to its whims in exchange for a possible meeting with Xi.
The TAO also made the announcement immediately after a US delegation arrived in Taiwan to push for the Cabinet’s special defense bill, which showed that Beijing intends to further rope the KMT into continuing to obstruct Taiwan’s efforts to upgrade its defense capabilities.
Cheng’s visit would also be ahead of the summit between US President Donald Trump and Xi next month. There is a high chance that Cheng during her trip would bolster her pro-China stance to pander to the CCP’s “one China” principle, which would send a false message to the US and international society that there are voices in Taiwan calling for unification. Beijing could leverage that to discourage support for the nation’s autonomy and self-determination, and persuade Trump to concede on the Taiwan issue.
Regrettably, during a news conference to reply to Xi’s invitation, Cheng expressed her “grateful acceptance” of the invitation and said her interaction with the CCP would be based on the so-called “1992 consensus” and opposition to Taiwanese independence. She has ignored the fact that the vast majority of Taiwanese have rejected that “consensus” and the “one China” idea that leaves no room for the existence of the Republic of China and Taiwan’s sovereignty.
The “1992 consensus,” a term former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi (蘇起) in 2006 admitted making up in 2000, refers to a tacit understanding between the KMT and the Chinese government that both sides of the Strait acknowledge there is “one China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “China” means.
Cheng has also said that her meeting with Xi would be a “huge boost” for the KMT during the local elections in November, but many KMT members worry that the meeting would instead result in backlash against the party’s campaign.
There are lessons to be learned from history: Former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) of the KMT met with Xi in 2015, which led to the KMT's defeat in the 2016 presidential election, while former KMT chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu’s (洪秀柱) meeting with Xi at end of that same year likely contributed to the party loss of its majority in the following legislative elections.
As polls have shown an increasing trend of public distrust in the KMT, saying that the party “identifies with China more than it does with Taiwan,” Cheng should avoid falling into Beijing’s united front trap, which would further risk the party’s sustainability and the nation’s stability.
Taiwan’s higher education system is facing an existential crisis. As the demographic drop-off continues to empty classrooms, universities across the island are locked in a desperate battle for survival, international student recruitment and crucial Ministry of Education funding. To win this battle, institutions have turned to what seems like an objective measure of quality: global university rankings. Unfortunately, this chase is a costly illusion, and taxpayers are footing the bill. In the past few years, the goalposts have shifted from pure research output to “sustainability” and “societal impact,” largely driven by commercial metrics such as the UK-based Times Higher Education (THE) Impact
History might remember 2026, not 2022, as the year artificial intelligence (AI) truly changed everything. ChatGPT’s launch was a product moment. What is happening now is an anthropological moment: AI is no longer merely answering questions. It is now taking initiative and learning from others to get things done, behaving less like software and more like a colleague. The economic consequence is the rise of the one-person company — a structure anticipated in the 2024 book The Choices Amid Great Changes, which I coauthored. The real target of AI is not labor. It is hierarchy. When AI sharply reduces the cost
The inter-Korean relationship, long defined by national division, offers the clearest mirror within East Asia for cross-strait relations. Yet even there, reunification language is breaking down. The South Korean government disclosed on Wednesday last week that North Korea’s constitutional revision in March had deleted references to reunification and added a territorial clause defining its border with South Korea. South Korea is also seriously debating whether national reunification with North Korea is still necessary. On April 27, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung marked the eighth anniversary of the Panmunjom Declaration, the 2018 inter-Korean agreement in which the two Koreas pledged to
I wrote this before US President Donald Trump embarked on his uneventful state visit to China on Thursday. So, I shall confine my observations to the joint US-Philippine military exercise of April 20 through May 8, known collectively as “Balikatan 2026.” This year’s Balikatan was notable for its “firsts.” First, it was conducted primarily with Taiwan in mind, not the Philippines or even the South China Sea. It also showed that in the Pacific, America’s alliance network is still robust. Allies are enthusiastic about America’s renewed leadership in the region. Nine decades ago, in 1936, America had neither military strength