Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Chairman Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌) took the stage at a protest rally on Sunday in front of the Presidential Office Building in Taipei in support of former TPP chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), who has been sentenced to 17 years in jail for corruption and embezzlement.
Huang told the crowd that Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) had sent a message of support the previous day, saying she would be traveling from the south to Taipei: If the protest continued into the evening, she had said, she would show up. The rally was due to end at 4:30pm. About 20 of the 52 KMT legislators were in attendance. Huang thanked Cheng for her support, as well as that of his “friends in the KMT.”
Cheng’s absence reflects Huang’s complicated relationship with his “friends in the KMT.” Her physical distance was a metaphor for the strategic distance the KMT would like to maintain: The TPP, and Huang himself, perform a useful role at the moment, but lines need to be drawn.
Another “friend from the KMT” present at the rally was former KMT vice presidential candidate Jaw Shaw-kong (趙少康). Jaw spoke, but was very clear about where his lines were drawn, and this was likely a reflection of consensus within the party. He made his speech about judicial reform, which he said was much needed in the light of Ko’s sentencing, coming as it did at the end of an investigation that he said lacked due process, evidential rigor or proportionality. By keeping it to judicial reform and what he portrayed as the failings of the government, he set the stage for a political narrative the KMT could exploit. He was very specific that his presence there was not to be interpreted as implying Ko was innocent.
The KMT needs the TPP to maintain its effective legislative majority until 2028, and it needs it to be “on board,” functioning and undistracted. The KMT would keep its distance, and its support would come with lines drawn. The TPP cannot rely on this support if the KMT secures a legislative majority by itself.
Huang absolutely needs the KMT. His decision to partner with the bigger party in his bid for New Taipei City mayor comes from the extreme unlikelihood that he would defeat the KMT candidate. A KMT-TPP pairing arguably makes strategic sense: If Huang can get his foot in the door as deputy mayor, he could be on track for full mayorship in a future race and from then, potentially, all the way to a presidential race. It is a path that worked for New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi (侯友宜), who was deputy mayor under former mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫) and ran for president in 2024. However, the KMT has no strategic reason to support Huang in the long term. It would try to outmaneuver him, just as he is trying to outmaneuver the KMT.
Huang lacks the political bedrock of a substantial record in office or political resources. He is known for three things: ideological fickleness, obsessive loyalty to Ko and uncontrolled, performative politics. The latter two were on show when he took the stage on Sunday.
Protesting Ko’s innocence, Huang invoked the thunder, but failed to bring on the rain: His face turned red, but he did not shed any tears. His performance was unpersuasive.
Ko founded the TPP; it has always been a one-man party. The TPP needs him as its head; Huang knows this, and readily concedes it. At the rally, he referred to Ko as the party’s “chairman for life.” This is not simply loyalty; it is a recognition that without Ko, the party is headless; and that without Ko, he has no power.
Huang looks isolated, with support from the KMT in spirit only, and from a distance or very contingent on the KMT’s interests. He continues to bask in Ko’s glow, but this glow is in danger of being tarnished by the guilty verdict.
Huang’s performance on Sunday was preaching to the converted and would win no more support for the party. The more politically savvy KMT is planning how to continue playing Huang and the TPP.
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