Former Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) has framed the controversy over newly sworn-in Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) Legislator Li Zhenxiu’s (李貞秀) eligibility to hold office as discrimination against Chinese spouses.
Li, who came to Taiwan in 1993 and married a Taiwanese, has come under fire as questions emerged over whether she had properly renounced her Chinese household registration when she registered as a TPP legislator-at-large candidate at the end of 2023. What should have been a straightforward legal matter has quickly devolved into something else entirely: whether Taiwan’s treatment of Chinese immigrants is unfair or discriminatory.
The issue itself is not particularly complicated. The laws are concerned with eligibility and proper procedure, not ethnic or national identities. Whether someone has the right to register as a political candidate depends on whether they have met legal conditions, not where they came from.
However, Ko has been repackaged the question as an identity issue, moving the discussion to focus on potential discrimination against Chinese spouses. The same legal questions, which deserve answers, are overrun by the vying of personal and emotionally charged positions.
Such narratives are effective because it is far easier to garner attention and mobilize people around identity issues than institutional ones. Legal provisions require time and interpretation, but anyone can take a stance on matters of discrimination.
When the discussion is cast as a standoff between the vulnerable and an oppressor, people naturally want to support a perceived victim.
Although Chinese spouses do not make up a large proportion of Taiwan’s population, once the issue is framed in identity terms, it becomes the concern of entire families and communities rather than just individuals.
With public discourse being steered in that direction, the institutional and legal questions at the heart of the matter are put aside and rarely pursued further.
Taiwan’s laws do not exclude Chinese spouses from accessing social welfare or public services. After obtaining legal status, their treatment in most public institutions is no less favorable than that of Republic of China citizens. As for political participatory rights, the legal requirements are also clear: Foreign nationals who wish to obtain full citizenship rights must complete the naturalization process and renounce their original nationalities.
From that perspective, the issue is clear. Even if certain historical constitutional concepts are cherry-picked to argue that Chinese nationals should be included within the definition of nationality, then, by the same logic, a question would naturally arise: Can Taiwanese also participate in Chinese political elections without renouncing their original nationality? Of course not.
The reason is simple: The two legal systems operate independently. Taiwan’s laws regulate the civil and political rights of its citizens. They cannot be extended over another political system, and the legal boundaries between different systems are clear.
While Ko’s reframing of legal eligibility as one of discrimination against Chinese spouses might help to enliven public debate, it ultimately neglects the simple legal question at its core. In leveraging public emotions, he sidesteps away from responsibility to institutions. It is an entirely intentional act of political maneuvering.
Shen Yan is a political commentator.
Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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