A recent Taipei Times editorial (“A targeted bilingual policy,” March 12, page 8) questioned how the Ministry of Education can justify spending NT$151 million (US$4.74 million) when the spotlighted achievements are English speech competitions and campus tours. It is a fair question, but it focuses on the wrong issue. The problem is not last year’s outcomes failing to meet the bilingual education vision; the issue is that the ministry has abandoned the program that originally justified such a large expenditure.
In the early years of Bilingual 2030, the ministry’s K-12 Administration promoted the Bilingual Instruction in Select Domains Program (部分領域課程雙語教學實施計畫). The program supported schools in shifting their teaching practices from monolingual, traditional approaches toward bilingual, active learning ones. This project went beyond simply increasing English in schools; it encouraged teachers and schools to re-examine their curriculum and teaching practices. Schools began incorporating English into subjects such as the arts, health, life skills, physical education and technology, without sacrificing content learning. At the same time, teachers in the project reflected on their previous instructional practices and began experimenting with new ones. This was not the full immersion that some originally anticipated it to be, but it was positively impacting teaching practices more broadly. In my experience working with schools in this program, I observed more engaging classroom instruction, and noticeably less anxiety toward English among students and teachers.
However, this progress in promoting bilingualism and active teaching practices stalled when the administration changed in 2024. In an interview published shortly after taking office, Minister of Education Cheng Ying-yao (鄭英耀) said that he intended to slow the policy, and later media reported the possibility of its termination. The program was not terminated, but it was changed. The new program was called the Bilingual Campus Life Program (雙語生活化校園計畫), which de-emphasized incorporating English in content learning and the associated changes in teaching, refocusing attention on general schoolwide English activities. These activities are reminiscent of English enhancement initiatives that predated the bilingual policy. The types of activities emphasized by this project are the ones the Taipei Times editorial criticized as insufficient for cultivating bilingualism.
Moreover, the program change created a new gap between the bilingual preparation in K-12 schools and the future bilingual reality of Taiwan’s higher education system. Universities across Taiwan, including National Taiwan Normal University, are expanding English-medium instruction, with some aiming toward a future where students can complete significant portions of their degrees in English. The previous K-12 program was designed to gradually prepare students for this environment, building a foundation through English content learning experiences across the primary and secondary curriculum. However, the current program steps back from that preparation, creating a disconnect between the bilingual policy at different education levels.
As we cross the midway point to the Bilingual 2030 policy target date, the ministry must show strong leadership on how best to proceed. If Taiwan is to go forward pursuing the original vision for the bilingual education policy, then the ministry should return to promoting bilingual teaching in schools to realign the K-12 policy with that of higher education and the National Development Council’s broader economic vision.
However, the recent shift in the ministry’s approach to the K-12 bilingual policy signals that there might not be the political will to do so. If the will is not there, then neither should the budget be. In this case, the ministry must then show the leadership and courage to be honest that bilingual education reform is no longer being pursued and reallocate the funds to other pressing issues in Taiwan’s public K-12 education system. If the ministry fails to do so, the question the editorial raised would only grow louder and harder to answer as 2030 approaches.
Keith M. Graham is an associate professor of bilingual teacher education in the School of Teacher Education at National Taiwan Normal University.
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