US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng (何立峰) are expected to meet this month in Paris to prepare for a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). According to media reports, the two sides would discuss issues such as the potential purchase of Boeing aircraft by China, increasing imports of US soybeans and the latest impacts of Trump’s reciprocal tariffs.
However, recent US military action against Iran has added uncertainty to the Trump-Xi summit. Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) called the joint US-Israeli airstrikes and the killing of Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “unacceptable,” and called for an immediate ceasefire and a return to negotiations.
Meanwhile, although the White House has confirmed that Trump would visit Beijing from March 31 to April 2, Chinese authorities have not formally announced the itinerary.
Beijing has strongly condemned the US, but it has not taken any substantial military action against it. Given that China is an important market for Iranian crude oil, it can only resort to diplomatic means to avoid harming its own interests.
The potential impact of the US-Iran war on the Trump-Xi meeting can be considered at four levels. First is the political signaling. Beijing has responded to US action with tough language. In doing so, it elevates the conflict from a pure military confrontation to an issue concerning international order and sovereignty, seeking to gain a stronger voice in the international discourse.
Second is the practical constraints. China might sound tough, but its leverage is limited. China is one of the largest importers of Iranian crude oil — a blockade of the Persian Gulf or a disruption of supplies would impact both Chinese and global markets. Beijing is more likely to criticize the US and promote diplomatic mediation rather than military intervention.
The third regards the summit’s overall structure. Chinese authorities have not yet formally announced the itinerary for Trump’s visit, meaning that the meeting has not been finalized and could be adjusted at any time. Using a summit’s timing as a diplomatic tool is a common negotiating tactic that expresses dissatisfaction without resorting to direct confrontation.
Lastly is the calculating strategic interests. The key question for Beijing is whether it is worthwhile to “flip the negotiating table” over events occurring in the Middle East. Current signs suggest otherwise — high-level US-China economic and trade talks in Paris are already being arranged, indicating that channels of communication between the two countries are still open. Even if the summit was adjusted, it would not necessarily signal a complete diplomatic breakdown.
The US and Israel’s military strikes against Iran have disturbed the fragile work of easing tensions between the US and China. Furthermore, China’s response to the situation has remained relatively restrained, largely due to concerns that Iran might blockade the Strait of Hormuz, which would disrupt roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil supply. China is more concerned over stabilizing relations with the US than allowing a single event in the Middle East completely overturn bilateral interactions. The US’ military strength has already served as a clear reminder to Beijing of the gap in military capabilities that exists between the two countries. Determining how to condemn US actions while simultaneously preserving space for dialogue has therefore become a key decision in Chinese policy.
Finally, insufficient coordination between the two sides’ teams have hindered preparations for the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, causing considerable concern in China. However, Taiwan cannot afford to simply watch from the sidelines. The Legislative Yuan is still locked in a partisan tug-of-war over the scale of the special defense budget, but what must not be diluted is the political signal of Taiwan’s resolve to defend itself. Taiwan must recognize that allies’ commitments can be reprioritized at any time due to the interests of major powers. Only by accelerating the implementation of defense autonomy and maintaining strategic composure can Taiwan secure its own survival and development opportunities amidst this turbulent geopolitical contest between the US and China.
Liao Ming-hui is an assistant researcher at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
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